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ABSTRACT
The political career of Amos Pinchot spanned from 
1909 to 1942. As a self-professed reformer, Pinchot 
involved himself in a wide variety of causes. At the same 
time, a few fundamental principles dominated his commitment 
to reform. Throughout his long political life, Pinchot 
maintained a remarkably consistent ideological perspective.
Pinchot began his public career as a participant in 
the Ballinger-Pinchot controversy, and he ended it as a 
virulent critic of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. In the 
intervening years, he immersed himself in reform politics. 
Along with his older brother Gifford, he helped found the 
Progressive party in 1912. Two years later, the younger 
Pinchot left the Bull Moose fold. In 1916, he campaigned 
for the re-election of President Woodrow Wilson. Pinchot 
opposed American entry into World War I. Once the United 
States had intervened, however, he struggled to make the war 
a crusade for democracy. He argued for democratic war aims 
abroad and the protection of civil liberties at home. With 
the return of peacetime politics, Pinchot looked forward to 
a revival of the prewar reform movement. In 1920, as a 
member of the Committee of Forty Right, he played a major 
role in efforts to establish a new political party devoted
Lo reform. When the third party coalition failed to 
materialize, Pinchot moved on to other projects. In 1924, 
he supported Senator Robert M. LaFollette for President.
Later in the 1920's, he began work on a history of the 
Progressive party. He also stayed active as a magazine 
writer and newspaper columnist, in 1932, Pinchot welcomed 
the election of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and he 
later supported the early steps in the New Deal. Yet he 
soon came to distrust the Chief Executive. By 1935, Pinchot 
counted himself among the foes of the Roosevelt regime, in 
the closing years of his public life, he repeatedly spoke 
out in opposition to the President and the New Dealers.
Despite the diversity of his endeavors, Pinchot 
maintained a fixed ideological perspective for most of his 
long career. In 1913, he established close ties with New 
Jersey insurgent George L. Record. Under Record’s tutelage, 
Pinchot learned to regard competitive capitalism as a reform 
ideology. The two men subsequently devoted themselves to 
the advancement of a reform program intended to equalize 
entrepreneurial opportunities, in 1914, an effort to impose 
the narrow program on the Progressive party ended in failure. 
After World War I, Pinchot and Record joined the committee 
of Forty Eight in another attempt to promote their shared 
ideals. After breaking with the committee late in 1920, the 
two men continued to fight for their political and economic 
beliefs. During the 1930's, Pinchot held tenaciously to his
v
lony established views cm reform. Hu clashed with the New 
Dealers because he questioned their devotion to democracy 
and to free enterprise.
Pinchot*s ideological proclivities dictated his 
political fate. While the American ruling class accepted 
mass production industries and the beginnings of the welfare 
state, Pinchot espoused an increasingly anachronistic 
ideology based on economic competition and individualism.
As a result, he remained a quixotic figure on the periphery 
of American politics.
Chaptor 1
THE HERITAGE OF A GENTLEMAN
At his birth in Paris on February 3, 1873, Amos 
Richards Eno Pinchot entered a secure and cultured world.
The wealth and social status of his parents assured him a 
comfortable upbringing. As a matter of course, he received 
the benefits of travel and education. America's genteel 
society, appreciative of his background, granted him 
immediate acceptance. Among his contemporaries, young 
Pinchot enjoyed an inordinately privileged existence.
The Pinchots owed their affluence to the skills of 
two successful capitalists. James W. Pinchot in 1850 left 
rural Pennsylvania for New York City where he soon prospered 
as a dry goods merchant. An opportune marriage further 
improved his financial standing. In 1864, he married Mary 
P. Eno, a daughter of Amos R. Eno, the owner of New York's 
opulent Fifth Avenue Hotel and other real eBtate throughout 
Manhattan.*' Just eleven years later, while still in his
^At the time of his death, Amos Eno held real estate 
valued at approximately twenty million dollars. See New 
fork Times, Feb. 22, 1898, 1. On the lavishness of the 
Fifth Avenue Hotel, see Ivan D. Steen, "Palaces For Travelers 
New York City's Hotels in the 1850's as Viewed by British 
Visitors," New York History. LI, No. 3 (April, 1970), 282-84. 
Amos Pinchot once confided to a friend that the family
1
forties, James Pinchot abandoned the realm of commerce for a 
leisurely retirement with his wife and their children 
Gifford, Antoinette, and A m o s . ^
The closely knit family of five lived in a manner 
appropriate to its station. As a group, they traveled 
extensively in Europe. A long stay in France accounted for 
Amos's exotic birthplace."* At home in New York, the quintet 
established residence in exclusive Gramercy Park.** In 1886, 
James Pinchot completed "Gray Towers," a baronial country 
house near Milford, Pennsylvania.5 The secluded mansion and 
adjacent land served as a family retreat for years to come.5
fortune stemmed from the "unearned increment" on New York 
City land. See Amos Pinchot to James R. Garfield, Feb. 13, 
1913, Box 14, Amos Pinchot Papers, Manuscript Division, 
Library of Congress.
For material on James W. Pinchot, see the biographi­
cal sketch in Box 1, Pinchot MSS.
^Martin Fausold, Gifford Pinchot; Bull Moose Progres­
sive (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1961), 6-7?
hereinafter cited as Fausold, Gifford Pinchot.
4On Gramercy Park see Moses King, King1s Handbook of 
New York City (Boston: Moses King, 1893)" 170.
^Designed by the celebrated architect Richard Morris 
Hunt, the house features three large stone towers with 
conical roofs. The interior contains twenty-three fire­
places. See the description in Pennsylvania; A Guide to 
the Keystone state compiled by Workers of the Writers' Pro­
gram of the Works Projects Administration in the state o£ 
Pennsylvania fijew York: Oxford university Press, 1940), 356.
6For additional family background, see Helene Maxwell 
Hooker, "Biographical Introduction" in Amos R. E. Pinchot, 
History of the Progressive Party. 1912-1916. ed. by Helene 
Maxwell Hooker (Washington Square: New York University
Press, 1958), 8-14; the biographical essay hereinafter cited 
as Hooker, "introduction"; while the main text appears as
A private school education came naturally to the 
scions of such a well-endowed household. By the age of 
sixteen, Amos Pinchot had enrolled at Westminster School in
7
Dobbs Ferry, New York. Later, like uncles, cousins, and 
his brother before him, he went on to Yale.® A member of 
the Class of 1897, he matriculated during the height of 
William Graham Sumner's intellectual influence.9 Sports, 
eating clubs, and campus society dominated Pinchot's under­
graduate years, but long after his departure from New Haven 
he retained a strong Sumnerian faith in the efficacy of 
capitalistic c o m p etition.Brief service in the Spanish-
Pinchot, History. See also M. Nelson McGeary, Gifford 
Pinchot; Porester-Politician (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1960), 3-7? hereinafter cited as McGeary, 
Gifford Pinchot.
7W. L. Cushing to James W. Pinchot, Dec. 10, 1889, 
Box 1, Pinchot MSS. In honor of its distinguished alumnus, 
the school subsequently awarded an annual Pinchot Cup for 
athletic excellence. See W. L. Cushing to Amos Pinchot, 
March 1, 1917, Box 28, Pinchot MSS; and W. L. Cushing to 
Amos Pinchot, June 2, 1920, Box 41, Pinchot MSS.
®See the entries for Eno and Pinchot in Directory 
of Living Graduates of Yale University, 1910 (New Haven; 
Tuttle, Morehouse, and Taylor Company, 1910).
^William Lyon Phelps, "When Yale Was Given to 
Sumnerology," Literary Digest International Book Review,
III (1925), 661-63; and Harris E. Starr, William Graham 
Sumner (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1925), 373-407.
100n the extracurricular side of Pinchot's university 
education, see Amos Pinchot to James W. Pinchot, Nov. 26, 
1893, Box 1, Pinchot MSS; and Hooker, "Introduction," 11. 
See also Henry E. Howland, "Undergraduate Life at Yale," 
Scribner's Magazine. XXII, No. 1 (July, 1897), 3-29; and 
Lewis Sheldon Welch and Walter Camp, Yale; Her campus. 
Class-Rooms, and Athletics (Boston: L. C. Page and Company
1898), passim.
American War followed graduation. upon his return home, the 
cavalry veteran capped his formal studies with preparations 
for the bar at New York Law School.11
Yet Pinchot showed no sustained interest in a legal 
career. He accepted a minor post in the office of the
1 O
District Attorney for New York County but soon resigned it.  ^
Social life held far greater attractions. Within a few 
years, he could list memberships in the university, Boone 
and Crockett, Yale, and Racquet clubs.^ pinchot also 
engaged in what he later termed "mild civic dissipations."
As a manager or trustee, he dutifully served as a patron of 
the university Settlement, the Association for Improving the 
Condition of the Poor, the Manhattan State Hospital for the 
insane, and the Orthopedic Hospital.1^
Along with his social ties, the young aristocrat had 
connections among the politically powerful. His older 
brother Clifford won renown as chief Forester of the United 
States and as an adviser to President Theodore Roosevelt.1®
11Hooker, "introduction," 13.
^Amos Pinchot to Frank Harris, Oct. 18, 1917, Box 29, 
Pinchot MSS; and Hooker, "Introduction," 13.
^Typescript dated 1912 in Box 2, Pinchot MSS.
l^Both the quote and the list of positions appear in 
an autobiographical article for the Paterson Sunday 
Chronicle, Jan. 14, 1917. Copy in Box 152, ibid.
-^5See McGeary, Gifford Pinchot, 45-112; and Gifford 
Pinchot, Breaking New Ground (New York: Harcourt, Brace,
and Company, 1947), 188-390; the latter title hereinafter 
cited as Pinchot, New Ground.
Thf' junior Pinchot, as a result, had access to the White 
House, on one occasion he attended a wrestling match between 
the Chief Executive and a visiting Japanese jujitsu expert.
At another time and in a more serious vein, the President 
offered him a sinecure in the Federal bureaucracy. After 
conducting a brief investigation, young Pinchot declined the 
position.1®
Well before middle age, Amos Pinchot had accumulated 
all of the credentials proper to a gentleman of his day.
His wealth, family ties, and education entitled him to a 
place among the socially elite. As befitted a man of his 
rank, he compiled a record of involvement in community 
affairs. His political connections extended to the highest 
levels. Graced with intelligence, wit, and a strong sense 
of noblesse oblige, Pinchot seemed destined for a career 
in the upper reaches of the American ruling class.
i6gee the fragmentary and undated reminiscence of 
Roosevelt in Box 76, Pinchot MSS.
chapter 2
LESSONS IN NATIONAL POLITICS
Entry into national politics came easily to Pinchot.
In 1908, he went to the aid of his embattled brother and 
wound up in the midst of a major political controversy. An 
insurgent from the start, the younger Pinchot adapted 
quickly to the ambiance of reform then at work in the 
country, in making the adjustment, he learned to relish 
life near the center of power. Amos Pinchot, between 1909 
and 1912, completed a political apprenticeship and dis­
covered an avocation of enduring interest.
A zealot by temperament, Gifford Pinchot gave 
unstinted devotion to the cause of natural resource preser­
vation. He regarded the Presidency of Theodore Roosevelt as 
a high point in government supervision of the public domain. 
Accordingly, he had reservations about the change of adminis­
trations in March, 1909. He feared that incoming President 
William Howard Taft would fail to safeguard natural resources 
with Rooseveltian vigor. More important, the Forester 
distrusted Taft's Secretary of Interior Richard A. Ballinger. 
Pinchot deemed the cabinet officer an enemy of conservation, 
and he was soon listening sympathetically to reports that
6
implicated Ballinger in a plot to defraud the government of 
coal lands in Alaska. The alleged conspiracy linked the 
Secretary directly with the Morgan-Guggenheim syndicate, one 
of the most powerful monopoly groups in the Far West. 
Differences between Pinchot and Ballinger surfaced repeatedly 
during the latter half of 1909. A legislative investigation, 
once Congress met in December, seemed inevitable. Faced 
with the likelihood of an inquiry, Pinchot sought help rear 
at hand, in a later review of the situation, he wrote:
". . . I would need counsel, and counsel of the very best.
The man to whom I naturally turned first was my brother 
Amos.1,2
The younger Pinchot responded to the call with 
alacrity. When Congress authorized an investigation, he
3
busied himself with problems of legal strategy. He wanted 
to make certain that his brother remained in the best 
possible light while Ballinger appeared as a tool of
■*-For Pinchot's side of the controversy, see McGeary, 
Gifford Pinchot. 113-89? and Pinchot, New Ground. 391-510. 
The more general aspects of the conflict receive balanced 
treatment in Elmo R. Richardson, The Politics of Conserva­
tion; Crusades and Controversies, 1897-1913 (Berkeley; 
University of California Press, 1962), 1-85; and James 
Penick, Jr., Progressive Politics and Conservation; The 
Ballinger-Pinchot Affair (Chicago: university of Chicago
Press, 1968), passim.
2Pinchot, New Ground. 442.
3For the material compiled by the inquiry, sec IT. S., 
Investigation of the Department of interior and rf the 
Bureau of Forestry, Senate Doc. 719, 6i Cong., 3~Sess., 
1910-1911.
rapacious monopolists.^ The goal, he explained to Gifford,
c
was "to win without a scratch and hands down." To 
guarantee victory, Amos carried his partisanship beyond the 
hearing room. In an article published anonymously, he 
charged the Secretary of interior with corruption and sub­
servience to the trusts.6 He also helped prepare an 
elaborate summary of the evidence against Ballinger for 
submission to President Taft.7
His involvement in the controversy had a profound 
impact on the political neophyte. He observed in retrospect
It is easy to write of America— but hard to write 
of it discerningly. . . .  I came a little into the 
light, or perhaps we should call it the darkness, 
when, in the winter of 1909 and 1910, in a groat 
congressional investigation, I saw the inside of 
the American cup.8
The fundamental conflict, as Pinchot perceived it, matched
^See Amos Pinchot to Gifford Pinchot, Jan. 20, 1910; 
Amos Pinchot to Louis D. Brandeis, March 15, 1910; Amos 
Pinchot to George W. Pepper, May 3, 1910; and Amos Pinchot 
to Louis D. Brandeis, May 23, 1910, all in Box 8, Pinchot 
MSS.
^Amos Pinchot to Gifford Pinchot, Feb. 15, 1910,
Box 22, Gifford Pinchot Papers, Manuscript Division, Library 
of Congress.
6 Amos Pinchot to Livy Richard, June 11, 1910, Box 8, 
Pinchot MSS; and [Amos Pinchot], "The Case Against Bal­
linger," Boston Common: A Weekly Newspaper. June 18, 1910,
15-18.
7See Nathan A. Symth and Amos Pinchot, Brief on the 
Cunningham Coal Entries in Alaska Submitted to the President 
in Beha'l’f of Mr. Gifford Pinchot. Copy in b o x  116, Pinchot 
MSS.
8See Words and Phrases notebook in Box 171, ibid.
reformers against corruptionists, selfless men like his 
brother Eigainst agents of corporate greed like Ballinger.
Q
In such an alignment, Pinchot counted himself an insurgent.
The return of Theodore Roosevelt to the United States
front an international tour made the reform cause all the
more attractive. On June 17, 1910, when the Colonel sailed
into New York harbor after fifteen months abroad, Gifford
Pinchot met him at the shoreline.^-0 Both Pinchots soon
enlisted as Roosevelt speech writers, and their efforts
produced a quick harvest.11 At Osawatomie, Kansas, on
August 31, the ex-President, in words supplied by his
onetime chief Forester, called for a sweeping new program of
12national change. The address delighted the junior Pinchot.
9See especially the summary of the Ballinger case in 
Amos Pinchot to John callan O'Laughlin, Aug. 15, 1912,
Box 12, ibid.
10New York Times, June 18, 1910, 2.
i;LSee Gifford Pinchot to Louis D. Brandeis, June 29, 
1910, Box 126, Gifford Pinchot MSS; and Amos Pinchot to 
Gifford Pinchot, Aug. 16, 1910, Box 8, Pinchot MSS. With 
pardonable myopia, Amos Pinchot saw his brother as the 
driving force behind the Rough Rider's progressivism. After 
a day spent with the former Chief Executive, he noted in his 
diary: "I feel TR is in a very unsatisfactory frame of
mind. Gifford is his political conscience & when Gifford's 
influence is absent TR slumps." See entry for Aug. 19,
Diary. 1910, Box 171, Pinchot MSS.
iZpor the text of the speech, see Theodore Roosevelt, 
Social Justice and Popular Rule: Essays, Addresses, and
Public Statements relating to the Progressive Movement. 
1910—1916, ed. Hermann Hagedom (New York: Charles
Scribner’s Sons, 1926), 5-22; hereinafter cited as Roosevelt, 
Social Justice. On Gifford's role as draftsman, see Amos 
Pinchot to Mrs. James W. Pinchot, Sept. 1, 1910, Box 8, 
Pinchot MSS.
10
Ho immediately sent congratulations to his brother.'*'3 In 
another letter, he described the political scene as "vitally 
and almost thrillingly interesting."*-^
Pinchot channeled much of his excitement into intel­
lectual pursuits, in September, 1910, he published an 
essay on the contemporary reform movement and one of its 
antecedents. After comparing modern insurgents with 
antebellum abolitionists, he concluded that both deserved 
praise as opponents of incumbent oligarchies.*^ An 
enlivened concern for reading went with the burdens of 
authorship. Seeking guidance from an old friend, Pinchot 
asked William Kents "Will you tell me where I can get the 
complete works of Miss Jane Adams [sic] ? I want to get her 
ideas into my brain as fast as I can." By way of further
explanation, he added: "I have just begun to think about
16the situation in this country. . . ."
Although a Republican by upbringing, Pinchot, full of 
enthusiasm for reform, now gave his primary allegiance to 
insurgency. He disapproved heartily when Roosevelt tried 
to reunite the G.O.P. for Congressional elections in
13Amos Pinchot to Gifford Pinchot, Sept. 1, 1910,
Box 8, Pinchot MSS.
^Amos Pinchot to W. Kirkpatrick Brice, ibid.
15Amos pinchot, "Two Revolts Against Oligarchy: The
Insurgent Movements of the Fifties and of Today, " McClure * s 
Magazine. XXXV, No. 5 (Sept., 1910), 581-90.
16Amos Pinchot to William Kent, Oct. 10, 1910, Box 8, 
Pinchot MSS.
1910.17 The Colonel, he fretted, might speak for Old Guard
regulars such as Warren G. Harding in Ohio.18 In an acrid
letter to his brother, he warned, that the ex-President
would shift from reformer to reactionary in order to emerge 
1 Qa winner. Widespread Republican losses in November 
further convinced Pinchot of the futility of attempts at 
reconciliation. Roosevelt, he hoped, had learned the same 
lesson. With regard to the Rough Rider's future, he told 
Henry L. Stimson: "The role of a great moral teacher is
. . . inconsistent with the compromises and maneuvers of a 
great politician. It seems to me that the colonel has got 
to make a definite choise fsicl."2®
Early in 1911, the Pinchots temporarily parted 
company with Roosevelt and joined a more militant reform 
circle. On January 21, they helped establish the National 
Progressive Republican League. Fathered by Wisconsin's 
Senator Robert M. LaFollette, the new organization sought tc
170n Roosevelt's campaign strategy, see George E. 
Mowry, Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Movement 
(Madison* university of Wisconsin Press, 1946), 147-56; 
hereinafter cited as Mowry, Roosevelt.
18See Amos Pinchot to James R. Garfield, Oct. 27, 
1910, Box 8, Pinchot MSS.
19Amos Pinchot to Gifford Pinchot, ibid.
20Amos Pinchot to Henry L. Stimson, Nov. 11, 1910,
ibid.
12
21democrat! '.e American politics. its declaration of 
principles included demands for popular election of United 
States Senators, direct primary nominations for all elective 
offices, and State constitutional amendments to foster 
initiative, referendum, and recall. As founding members, 
both Pinchots signed the statement of principles. Gifford 
accepted a position on the newly formed Executive Com­
mittee.^
Amos, on the other hand, concentrated on the unit's
financial problems. He sent League Secretary Frederic C.
Howe a list of prospective contributors from New York. As
an alternative means of fund raising, he favored a
LaFollette rally in Manhattan and offered to rent Carnegie
23Hall for the occasion. He subsequently donated ten
2^ -On the League's democratic aspirations, see Jonathan 
Bourne, Jr., to Amos Pinchot, Feb. 14, 1911, Box 9, ibid.
The movement began with a series of letters sent out by 
LaFollette late in 1910. See Robert M. LaFollette to E. 
Clarence Jones, Dec. 28, 1910; Robert M. LaFollette to 
Ben B. Lindsey, Dec. 29, 1910; and Robert M. LaFollette to 
Louis D. Brandeis, Dec. 30, 1910, all in Series B, Box 105, 
LaFollette Family Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of 
congress,
22For the declaration of principles, a list of the 
founders, and the first slate of officers, see Robert M. 
LaFollette, "The Beginning of a Great Movements Address 
Before the Wisconsin Legislature Announcing the Formation 
of the National Progressive Republican League," LaFollette's 
Weekly Magazine, III, No. 5 (Feb. 4, 1911), 7-8, 12.
23See Frederic c. Howe to Amos Pinchot, Jan. 31,
1911; and Amos Pinchot to Frederic C. Howe, March 3, 1911, 
both in Box 9, Pinchot MSS.
13
24thousand dollars to the Senator's cause.
For Pinchot, work on behalf oi the League evolved
into support for LaFollette's Presidential aspirations. in
March, 1911, he conferred with the Senator about plans to
make the 1912 Republican nominee a p r o g r e s s i v e .2  ^ other
strategy meetings followed. ^  Finally, on May 26, 1911, the
New Yorker jotted in his diary: "I believe that Taft can be
defeated for renomination. The people do not trust him. I
77
believe LaFollette can be nominated,' The euphoric spell 
lasted through the summer months, in a late September note 
to his brother, Pinchot rated LaFollette as "gaining 
steadily" while Taft was "failing— failing pathet­
ically. . . ,"28
The autumn brought a special opportunity to promote 
the Senator's candidacy. On October 16, Pinchot attended a 
gathering of two hundred progressive Republicans in Chicago.
2^Amos Pinchot to Robert M. LaFollette, March 29, 
1911, ibid.; Amos Pinchot to John J. Hannan, undated, Box 
13, ibid.; and John J. Hannan to Amos pinchot, July 15, 
1911, ibid.
25Amos Pinchot to Gifford Pinchot, March 21, 1911, 
Box 9, ibid.
26Entries for March 24, and May 19, Diary, 1911, 
Box 171, ibid.
27Entry for May 26, ibid.
28Amos Pinchot to Gifford Pinchot, Sept. 29, .191 i , 
Box 146, Gifford Pinchot MSS. See also Amos Pinchot to 
Mrs. James W. Pinchot, July 31, 1911; and Amos Pinchot t) 
Norman Hapgood, Aug. 4, 1911, both in Box 9, ibid.
As a member of the Resolutions Committee for the session, he 
helped write a forceful endorsement of LaFollette for 
President.2^ air Qf optimism prevailed among the dele­
gates. Pinchot emerged from talks with George L. Record of 
New Jersey and other insurgents in high spirits.30 To a 
skeptical friend, he declared: "The meeting at Chicago was
a tremendous success. It is my very distinct opinion that 
we are going to win out."3^
In the afterglow of the conference, Pinchot seemed to
oe the perfect LaFollette loyalist. He joined a finance
32committee set up at Chicago to aid the Senator. Even his
ties with Roosevelt showed signs of atrophy. When Walter
Hines Page of World * s Work asked for the name of someone to
do a story favoring the colonel's renomination, Pinchot
33replied that he knew no one well suited for the job.
Still, the Rough Rider's popularity could not be 
denied. James R. Garfield, Roosevelt's former Secretary of 
Interior, assured Gifford Pinchot that in the key state of
29New York Times, Oct. 17, 1911, 1. Gifford Pinchot 
announced his support for LaFollette by wire from Seattle.
See Gifford Pinchot to Medill McCormick, Oct. 17, 1911,
Box 144, Gifford Pinchot MSS.
30See Amos Pinchot to William Kent, Oct. 19, 191 I? 
and Amos Pinchot to Robert M. LaFollette, Oct. 20, 1911, 
both in Box 10, Pinchot MSS.
3^Amos Pinchot to Thomas R. Shipp, Oct. 18, 1911, ibid.
32Amos Pinchot to Gilbert E. Roe, Nov. 3, 1911, ibid.
33Walter Hines Page to Amos Pinchot, Dec. 19, 1911; 
and Amos Pinchot to Walter Hines Page, Dec. 23, 1911, both 
in ibid.
15
Ohio Roosevelt far surpassed LaFollette in voter appeal. 
Garfield further claimed that Ohio insurgent Republicans 
would never unite behind the Wisconsin Senator. Accordingly, 
he urged a bipartisan reform coalition of anti-Taft 
forces.34 When G.O.P. progressives met in Columbus on 
January 1# 1912, Garfield, the older Pinchot, and even 
LaFollette' s manager Walter L . Houser were on hand to plead
O C
for unity. The assemblage responded positively with a 
vote "to work in harmony and unison to nominate a Progres­
sive Republican for President. . . . "  The declaration went 
on to mention both Roosevelt and LaFollette, but neither man 
won a clear endorsement.3®
The portents of a full-scale Roosevelt drive placed 
Amos Pinchot in awkward straits. At a meeting of LaFol­
lette advisers on January 19, he voted with the majority 
against his brother to disavow fusion tactics such as those
34See James R. Garfield to Gifford Pinchot, Nov. 23, 
1911; James R. Garfield to Gifford Pinchot, Nov. 28, 1911; 
and James R. Garfield to Gifford Pinchot, Dec. 2, 1911, all 
in Box 142, Gifford Pinchot MSS.
35Houser had evidently decided that LaFollette would 
have to give way to Roosevelt as the progressive standard- 
bearer. See the entry for Dec. 26, Diary, 1911. Box 3315, 
ibid.
3®For the declaration and a general account of the; 
Columbus meeting, see Belle Case LaFollette and Fola 
LaFollette, Robert M. LaFollette. June 14, 1855— June 18, 
1925 {New York: Macmillan Company, 1953*5", I, 372-75;
hereinafter cited as Belle and Fola LaFollette, LaFollob ;e.
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used in Ohio.37 Just three days later, however, he 
encountered Roosevelt, Gifford, and a small coterie at the 
University club in New York. The colonel invited him into 
the conversation, and he soon learned of the ex-President's
■So
amenability to a draft for the Republican nomination.''0 
Pinchot resolved his dilemma with small qualms. Scheduled 
to consult with Roosevelt again on January 24, he wrote in 
his diary on the previous day: "See TR in morning. Must
stick up for LaFollette & make TR see that if he . . .  is 
to take the flag RML must be honorably treated & must have 
good excuse for quitting race."39 The inevitable break with 
LaFollette came shortly thereafter. During a stormy con­
frontation on January 29, Gifford reminded the Senator of an 
earlier warning to count him out if it reached the point of 
a fight with Roosevelt. The brothers stood on coirmon ground. 
In recounting the episode. Giffort noted laconically: "hmos
strong with me this time."^9
37Entry for Jan. 19, Diary. 1912. Box 171, Pinchot 
MSS? and Robert M. LaFollette, LaFollette1s Autobiography: 
A Personal Narrative of Political Experience (Madison: 
Robert M. LaFollette Company, 1911, 1913), 589-93.
38Entry for Jem. 22, Diary. 1912. Box 171, Pinchot 
MSS; and entry for Jan. 22, Diary. 1912, Box 3315, Gifford 
Pinchot MSS.
39Entry for Jan. 23, Diary. 1912. Box 171, Pinchot
MSS.
40For the quotation and an account of the meeting, 
see entry for Jan. 29, Diary. 1912. Box 3315, Gifford 
Pinchot MSS.
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A dramatic turn of events furnished the Pinchots with 
a pretext for their exit from the LaJ-'oJ lette camp. Speaking 
at Philadelphia on the night of February 2, the Senator 
faltered badly during his address and appeared to be 
seriously ill.41 He left for Washington immediately after 
the speech, and on February 5, Walter Houser announced that 
the candidate planned to rest for a few weeks.42 in the 
furor that ensued, both Pinchots made haste to desert the 
Wisconsinite. On February 6, Amos told the press: "With
LaFollette out of the race, his followers are free to get 
behind Roosevelt and continue the fight with a new leader." 
He cited growing popular demand for the Colonel and the 
state of the Senator's health as reasons for his shift.42 A 
few days later, Gifford informed progressives in Minnesota 
that in his judgment LaFollette was too sick to go on with 
the campaign.44
41New York Tribune. Feb. 4, 1912, 1-2.
42The New York Times carried the announcement under 
the headline "LaFollette Now Out of the Race." The Senator, 
on the other hand, never, considered his candidacy terminated 
by the statement. See New York Times, Feb. 6, 1912, 1; and 
Belle and Fola LaFollette, LaFollette, I, 405-21.
43New York Tribune, Feb. 7, 1912, 9. Gilbert E. Roe, 
a long time LaFollette associate, met Pinchot together with 
George L. Record on February 7. Reporting back to the 
Senator, Roe affirmed that both men "had gone over," and 
that he "saw no use of talking with them." See Gilbert B.
Roe to Robert M. LaFollette, Feb. 7, 1912, Series B, Box 72, 
LaFollette Family MSS.
44New York Times. Feb. 12, 1912, 2. See also Gifford 
Pinchot to Robert M. LaFollette, Feb. 17, 1912, Box 154, 
Gifford Pinchot MSS.
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Soon after their apostasy, the brothers made contact 
with Roosevelt. On February 14, the three men met at the 
Rough Rider's office to discuss drafts of a speech that he 
intended to give a week later in Columbus, Ohio.4-* The 
conference produced an exchange of letters reflecting strong 
differences of opinion. The younger Pinchot, distressed by 
the conservative tenor of the proposed address, wanted a 
statement more sharply critical of big business, in 
rebuttal, the former President declared his preference for 
complex "whole truths" over "a string of easy we11-sounding,
A C
and rather cheap, half truths."^0 The speech, as finally 
delivered, contained a full measure of calculated ambi­
guity.^ Even so, Pinchot knew his duty. In a burst of 
campaign hyperbole, he told reporters: . .Mr. Roosevelt
has struck a great blow for the people of this country. He 
had thrown down the glove to the whole reactionary 
army. . . .1,48
Once securely tied to the Colonel's staff, the new 
aide undertook a variety of political tasks. When the New
^Entry for Feb. 14, Diary. 1912. Box 171, Pinchot 
MSS; and entry for Feb. 14, Diary, 1912, Box 3315, Gifford 
Pinchot MSS.
4®See Amos Pinchot to Theodore Roosevelt, Fob. 14, 
1912, Series 1, Microfilm Reel 129, Theodore Roosfvell 
papers. Manuscript Division, Library of Congress; and 
Theodore Roosevelt to Amos Pinchot, Feb. 15, 1912, box li, 
Pinchot MSS.
47por the text, see Roosevelt, Social Justice, 119-48.
48New York Tribune, Feb. 23. 1912, 3.
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York Evening Post launched an editorial attack on both 
Roosevelt and himself, Pinchot responded with a lengthy note 
of p r o t e s t . M o r e  ambitiously, he sought election as a 
delegate to the Republican national convention but lost when 
Taft swept the New York primary.^0 Later in the intraparty 
battle, he published a magazine article that rebashed the 
Ballinger affair and openly questioned the integrity of the 
President.
The bitter fight over the nomination strained 
Pinchot*s Republican loyalties to the breaking point. Two 
weeks before the G.O.P. convention, he confided to another 
Roosevelt partisan: "I can not look forward to a new party
with dread, for it will perhaps mean a tremendous step in 
advance. . . ."52 The last strands of his fealty were 
subsequently snapped by the heavy-handedness of tbe Old 
Guard. Using their control of the National Committee and 
the convention hierarchy, the regulars brushed aside charges 
of improperly seated delegations and pushed Taft through to
49(New York) Evening Post. March 16, 1912, 6; and 
Amos pinchot to Editor, New York Evening Post, March 20, 
1912, Box 11, Pinchot MSS.
50See Amos Pinchot to Gilson Gardner, Feb. 24, 1912, 
Box 11, Pinchot MSS; and New York Tribune, March 27, 1912, 
2.
51See Amos Pinchot, "President Taft— candidate For 
Re-election," Pearson's Magazine. XXVII, No. 5 (May, 1912), 
533-44.
52Amos Pinchot to Mrs. James R. Garfield, June 6, 
1912, Box 12, Pinchot MSS.
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renomination.53 Roosevelt, stung by defeat, took the only 
course that allowed him to remain in the race. On the night 
of June 22, 1912, he announced his intention to seek the 
Presidency on an independent reform ticket.5^ The Repub­
lican breakup caused Pinchot no grief. In the aftermath of 
the debacle, he described his brother and himself as 
"greatly pleased," even "elated" over the prospect of a new 
party.55
Zealously committed to a reform crusade, Pinchot 
wanted an insurgent coalition free of conservative taint.
He complained forcefully when Progressive party ranks grew 
to include trust executive George W. Perkins, wealthy 
publisher Frank A. Munsey, and a host of veteran political 
bosses.55 Half of the Bull Moose recruits in New York, he
53See Mowry, Roosevelt. 237-255; Victor Rosewater,
Back Stage in 1912 s The Inside Story of the Split Republic an 
Convention (Philadelphia* Dorrance and Company, 1932), 80- 
120, and 160-85; and Norman Wilensky, Conservatives in the 
Progressive Bra; The Taft Republicans of 1912 (Gainesville: 
University of Florida Press, 1965), 53-69.
5^New York Times, June 23, 1912, 1, 7.
55Amos Pinchot to Albert B. Kerr, June 25, 1912; and 
Amos Pinchot to W. J. McGee, June 25, 1912, both in Box 12, 
Pinchot MSS.
55See Amos Pinchot to James R. Garfield, July 8, 1912, 
Box 117, James R. Garfield Papers, Manuscript Division, 
Library of congress* and Amos Pinchot to Hiram W. Johnson, 
July 12, 1912, ibid. Both Perkins and Munsey were heavy 
financial contributors to Roosevelt's drive for the Republi­
can nomination. When that goal proved unattainable, they 
promised to underwrite the third party effort. See Pinchot, 
History, 165; George Britt, Forty Years— Forty Millions: The
Career of Frank A. Munsey (New York* Farrar and Rinehart, 
1935) , 158-84; and John A. Garraty, Right-Hand Man: The
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grumbled, were "band wagon reactionaries."^ In hopes of 
reversing the trend toward political eclecticism, he urged 
California's Hiram W. Johnson to rally militant reformers 
and force Roosevelt "to see the necessity of making the 
progressive fight on progressive lines. . .  ^«58 influx
of the unanointed left Pinchot gloomy. After less than a 
month of new party watching, he confessed to Norman Hapgood: 
"Confidentially, I do not feel so good over the Bull Moose 
movement as I did. . . .“59
Much of Pinchot's disillusionment stemmed from the 
prominence of George Perkins in the Progressive high command. 
A former partner of J. P. Morgan and a director of both the 
United states steel Corporation and the International 
Harvester Company, Perkins articulated a corporate approach 
to reform. He particularly favored the regulation of
Life of George W. Perkins (New York: Harper and Brothers,
1960), 256; the last title hereinafter cited as Garraty, 
Perkins.
57Amos Pinchot to Thomas R. Shipp, July 12, 1912,
Box 12, Pinchot MSS. For some perceptive comments on the 
party's mixed following in New York, see Herbert Hillel 
Rosenthal, "The Progressive Movement in New York, 1906-1914" 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard university, 1955), 
411-13.
58Among the militants, Pinchot specified his brother, 
James R. Garfield, George L. Record, Francis J. Heney, and 
William Allen White. See Amos Pinchot to Hiram W. Johnson, 
July 18, 1912, Box 12, Pinchot MSS.
59Amos Pinchot to Norman Hapgood, July 20, 1912,
ibid.
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industry through close business-government c o o p e r a t i o n .  
Conversely, pinchot believed that such an intimate relation­
ship led to corruption as evidenced by the Ballinger 
embroglio. He regarded Perkins's position as the very 
antithesis of reform.
When the Progressives convened at Chicago in August, 
1912, the two men quickly clashed. First, Pinchot tried
Cl
unsuccessfully to keep Perkins off the National Committee.
A conflict of opinions over the platform widened the rift. 
Working with the Resolutions Committee, Pinchot helped draft 
a plank that called for a stronger version of the 1890 
Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Perkins and Roosevelt, as members 
of an informal review board, later refashioned the draft 
into a declaration that accepted the trusts as inevitable 
and proposed their regulation by a government c o m m i s s i o n .
An error in convention procedure brought the contrasting 
views of economic concentration to light. On the final day
60For a survey of Perkins's business career, see 
Garraty, Perkins, 15-240. The financier's notions of 
political economy are insightfully treated in Gabriel Kolko, 
The Triumph of Conservatisms A Reinterpretation of American 
History, 1900-1916 ^Glencoes Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), 
113-32, and 173-81.
6^See Garraty, Perkins. 267.
62° For the text of the Committee's plank, see Pinchot, 
History. 173. On the process of revision, see Pinchot, 
History. 174; and Mowry, Roosevelt, 270-71. The Perkins- 
Roosevelt declaration appears in A Contract with the People; 
Platform of the Progressive Party Adopted at Its First 
National Convention? August 7th, 1912 (New York: Progressive
National Committee, n.d.), 6-7.
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of tho party mooting, the anti-trust plant prepared by the 
Resolutions committee was read by mistake to the assembled 
delegates. Perkins, realizing the blunder immediately, had 
the errant words struck from the record and replaced in the 
press accounts by the proposal that he had co-authored.®** 
Despite the troubles at Chicago, Pinchot took an 
active part in the autumn campaign. In the role of 
pamphleteer, he attempted to trace the historical roots of 
the Progressive party. His sweeping survey included the 
Renaissance, John Calvin, William Shakespeare, the American 
Revolution, and the Civil War. Significantly, the tract 
ended with a blast at contemporary monopolies in general and 
United states steel in particular.®^ in a less cerebral 
vein, Pinchot tried his luck as a candidate. He ran for 
Congress in New York City's heavily Democratic Eighteenth 
District. Although he collected an endorsement from 
Roosevelt and waged an aggressive canvass, the effort proved
63oscar King Davis, Secretary of the Progressive 
National Committee, witnessed the mistake in presentation of 
the platform and negotiated the alteration of the press 
reports. See Oscar King Davis, Released For Publications 
Some Inside Political History of Theodore Roosevelt and His 
Times. 1898-1918 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1925),
331-34. See also Pinchot, History, 177.
®^See Amos Pinchot, What's the Matter with America; 
The Meaning of the Progressive Movement and the Rise of the 
New Party (’fNew York?], 1912), passim.-  Pinchot admitted 
that his essay might be "too highbrow for the average 
public," but he insisted that "it could be used effectively 
among independent thinkers." See Amos Pinchot to George L • 
Record, Oct. 8, 1912, Box 113, Pinchot MSS.
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futile.65 in the final voting, he outpol.led the Republican
but finished well behind the Democrat.66
Meanwhile, the pre-eminence of Perkins and other
malefactors within the Bull Moose camp continued to bother
Pinchot. With the financier serving as chairman of the
National Executive Committee and campaign chief of staff,
Pinchot found abundant reason to complain.67 Halfway
through the race, he lamented to Democratic braint.ruster
Louis D. Brandeis;
I regret more than I can tell you that George Perkins 
and Frank Munsey are taking so prominent a place in 
our party. Munsey is painting us . . .  as the party 
of protection, while Perkins is giving people an 
opportunity to assume that we help the defenders of
the trusts.68
Only Roosevelt, Pinchot finally decided, could avert an 
election disaster. In letters to his brother and Hiram
65See Theodore Roosevelt to Stanley Isaacs, Oct. 12, 
1912, Box 121, Pinchot MSS? and Amos Pinchot to Hiram W. 
Johnson, Oct. 5, 1912, Box 13, Pinchot MSS.
66The vote among major candidates was: Thomas G.
Patten (Democrat), 13,704; Amos Pinchot (National Progres­
sive), 6,644; S. Walter Kaufman (Republican), 4,943; and 
Algernon Lee (Socialist), 2,085. See State of New York, 
Manual For the use of the Legislature of the State of New 
York, 1913 (Albany: J. B. Lyon Company Printers, 1913),
698.
67on Perkins's campaign activities, see Garraty, 
Perkins, 273-284. Chicago lawyer Harold L. Ickes later told 
Pinchot that the party organization in New York had "con­
sisted of George W. Perkins and a push button.1 See Harold 
L. Ickes to Amos Pinchot, Dec. 2, 1912, Box 13, Pinchot MSS.
68Amos Pinchot to Louis D. Brandeis, Oct. f , 1912,
Box 13, Pinchot MSS.
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Johnson, he outlined a plan to have tiho Colonel take over 
direction of the campaign from Perkins, summon an elite 
guard of reformers to his side, and lead a last minute 
charge to victory.^9 convinced of the merit of his scheme, 
Pinchot even revealed it to Perkins. The chairman, however, 
dismissed it as impractical.
When the election ended in defeat, both Pinchots 
vented their wrath on Perkins, in separate screeds to 
Roosevelt, they insisted on the need to minimize the 
financier's future political activities. Gifford wanted 
Progressive National Headquarters moved from New York to
Washington and Perkins assigned to non-controversial
71duties.* iimos, along the same line, argued that the party 
would never gain credibility as a vehicle for reform so long 
as a trust magnate remained at its head. Perkins, he con­
cluded, needed to "identify himself with progressive social 
and industrial work, " so that his name would bring to mind 
"other organizations than . . . J. P. Morgan & Co., the 
united States Steel Corporation, and the international
Amos Pinchot to Gifford Pinchot, Oct. 15, 1912; and
Amos pinchot to Hiram W. Johnson, Oct. 14, 1912, both in
ibid.
70Amos Pinchot to George W. Perkins, Oct. 17, 1912;
and George W. Perkins to Amos Pinchot, Oct. 19, 1912, both
in ibid.
71Gifford Pinchot to Theodore Roosevelt, Nov. 9,
1912, Box 157, Gifford Pinchot MSS.
26
Harvester c o m p a n y . " ^
Roosevelt responded with a stout defense of his chief
lieutenant. Writing to Gifford, he expressed doubt that any
other man had done as much as Perkins in the campaign. He
also cautioned that any move to unseat the Chairman would be
interpreted as an attack on the forces of "sane radicalism"
within the party.73 The Colonel followed the same tack with
the younger Pinchot. He refused to consider dropping
Perkins. The trust issue, he added, was far more complicated
than Amos thought, in closing, the ex-President recalled
that the Pinchots had already broken with Taft and haFol-
lette. involvement in another quarrel, he warned, might
permanently impair the brothers' usefulness to the reform 
74cause.
If Perkins needed additional support, he soon 
received it. On December 10, 1912, Bull Moose leaders 
returned to Chicago for a post-election conference. Roose­
velt, in his remarks to the first session, paid special 
tribute to Perkins and other major financial backers of the 
party. Speaking directly to a few heavy contributors, he 
said: "I not only want to thank you but to say that I have
7 2Amos Pinchot to Theodore Roosevelt, Dec. 3, 1912,
Box 13, Pinchot MSS.
73Roosevelt supplied the emphasis. See Theodore 
Roosevelt to Gifford Pinchot, Nov. 13, 1912, Box 157,
Gifford Pinchot MSS.
^ T h e o d o r e  Roosevelt to Amos Pinchot, Dec. 5, 1912,
Box 13, Pinchot MSS.
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beon happy to be associated with you . . .  there have been 
no morn disinterested Progressives than yourselves."75 The 
chairman won still another vote of confidence from the 
National Committee. When presented with a proposal to move 
headquarters from New York to Washington, the unit vetoed 
the transfer by a vote of thirty-two to twelve.7® According 
to one authority, Perkins emerged from the Chicago meeting 
"second only to Roosevelt in command of the party."77
The conference marked the end of Amos Pinchot's 
political apprenticeship. Drawn into the Ballinger affair 
by family ties, the young socialite becanie a committed 
insurgent. He immersed himself in the actions and assump­
tions of the reform movement. In practical terms, his 
experiences as a speech writer, polemicist, fund raiser, and 
candidate constituted an excellent introduction to the 
mechanics of national politics, in the realm of reform 
ideas, pinchot adopted a simple anti-monopoly point of view.
7 5Roosevelt singled out Perkins, Munsey, William 
Flinn of Pennsylvania, and Charles Sumner Bird of Massa­
chusetts. See New York Times. Dec. 11, 1912, 1. According 
to the financial statement filed by the party in Albany,
New York, Perkins donated one hundred and thirty thousand 
dollars to the Progressive National Committee and ten 
thousand dollars more to the local unit in the Bnpire State. 
See New York Tribune, Nov. 26, 1912, 6.
76in an effort to placate the Pinchots and other 
dissidents, Roosevelt had the original Resolutions Com­
mittee anti-trust plank restored to the platform. On that 
action and for the vote in the National committee, see 
Garraty, Perkins. 288.
77Mowry, Roosevelt. 296.
Tlv fight with Ballinger aroused his suspicions about the 
political machinations of the trusts. His encounters with 
George Perkins suggested far more sinister possibilities. 
From his contacts with the financier, Pinchot learned that 
an agent of the trusts could infiltrate and even decisively 
influence a movement ostensibly devoted to reform.
Chapter 3
THE REFORMER AS IDEOLOGUE
With George Perkins securely lodged near the top of 
the Bull Moose hierarchy, Amos Pinchot faced a clcudy 
political future. His opposition to the trusts conflicted 
sharply with the assumptions of Progressive leaders such as 
Perkins and Theodore Roosevelt. Yet Pinchot neither 
retreated from politics nor compromised his beliefs, instead, 
he merged his anti-monopoly views with a more systematic 
critique of economic concentration. His reform endeavors, 
as a result, took on a narrow and dogmatic quality.
Early in 1913, Pinchot established regular contact 
with long time New jersey insurgent George L. Record. The 
two men had worked together in the LaFollette and Roosevelt 
campaigns, but now they became close friends.^ Pinchot
^Record's reform activities extended back into the 
1890's. He first rose to prominence as Jersey City's cor­
poration counsel in the administration of Mayor Mark Fagan 
between 1901 and 1905. For biographical information on 
Record, see New York Times, Sept. 28, 1933, 24; "Obituary of 
George L. Record," New Jersey Law Journal. LVI, No. 10 (Oct., 
1933), 264-66; and William M. Barr, "George L. Record" 
(unpublished M.A. thesis, Columbia University, 1936), 1-64; 
the last title hereinafter cited as Barr, "Record." On 
Record's political career through 1912, see Ransome E. Noble, 
jr., New Jersey Proqressivism Before Wilson (Princeton:
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particularly admired the Jerseyman's taste for heated debate 
and clear presentation of ideas.^ He quickly concluded that 
Keenrd deserved a greater voice in Progressive afiairs. 
Accordingly, he invited party luminaries such as George 
Perkins and Jane Addams to join him for evenings of discus­
sion with the loquacious New Jersey reformer.^
Record, by 1913, had reduced his notions of political 
economy to a concise formula. An ardent believer in 
capitalism and a disciple of Henry George, he envisioned an 
economic order based on widespread competition among com­
mercial equals. The vital prerequisite for such a system. 
Record maintained, was equality of opportunity. Therefore, 
he advocated a five-point program designed to strip away the 
special privileges already enjoyed by the giants of American 
industry. His master plan called for: government ownership
of railroads, other utilities, and natural resources; 
prohibitive taxation on large landholdings; an end to patent 
restrictions; abolition of the tariff; and decentralization 
of banking. These steps, according to Record, would open up
Princeton university Press, 1946), 15-18; and James Kernoy, 
The Political Education of Woodrow Wilson (New York:
Century Company, 1926), 68-76, 94-95, and 100-105; the 
latter work hereinafter cited as Kerney, Wilson.
2See Amos Pinchot, "George Record," New Republic. 
LXXVI, No. 987 (Nov. 1, 1933), 329-31; hereinafter cited 
as Pinchot, "Record."
3 Amos Pinchot to Gifford Pinchot, Jan. 23, 1913; and 
Amos Pinchot to Jane Addams, Jan. 28, 1913, both in Box 14, 
Pinchot MSS.
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now possibilities in the economy and allow all business 
competitors to begin from an equal start.^ By attacking 
monopolistic capitalism, the wily reformer hoped to save 
free enterprise. He fervently believed that only atomistic 
competition could provide the foundation for economic justice 
and ward off the threat of socialism to America.^ A small 
band of New Jersey Progressives shared his staunchly pro­
capitalist point of view.^
Pinchot soon gave evidence of Record1s impact on his 
political thinking. In a speech at Yonkers, New York, on 
January 20, 1913, he urged Progressives to wage war on the 
trusts. His specific recommendations included government 
ownership of railroads and other "natural monopolies" along
^Record first formulated his program as a newspaper 
columnist for the Jersey journal in 1910-1911. For an 
excellent discussion of the position developed in that 
column, see Ransome E. Noble, Jr., "Henry George and the 
Progressive Movement," American journal of Economics and 
Sociology. VIII, No. 3 (April, 1949), 259-69. For addi­
tional material on Record's ideas, see Ransome E. Noble, 
jr., "George L . Record * s Struggle For Economic Democracy," 
American journal of Economics and Sociology, X, No. 1 
(Oct., 1950), 71-83; and George L. Record, How to Abolish 
Poverty (Jersey City: George L. Record Memorial Associa­
tion, 1936), passim.
5See especially, George L. Record, A Complete Program 
of Fundamental Reform. The Only Answer to Socialism, memo­
randum attached to George L. Record to Robert M. LaFollette, 
May 5, 1911, Series B, Box 69, LaFollette Family MSS.
6On the Record faction in the Garden State, see 
Joseph Francis Mahoney, "New Jersey Politics After Wilson: 
Progressivism in Decline" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Columbia University, 1964), 50-56; hereinafter cited as 
Mahoney, "New Jersey Politics."
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with passage of a stronger version of the Sherman Anti-Trust 
Act. At the close of his remarks, he also endorsed pro­
hibitive taxes on landed estates.7
In the months that followed, Pinchot continued to 
assimilate the Record credo. Writing to William Kent in 
April, 1913, he praised the anti-trust policy of President 
Woodrow Wilson. At the same time, he declared:
What I am working for here in New York is to get a 
little bunch to stand for some of the big things 
. . . for municipal ownership, for Wilson's trust 
ideas, and above all for the gradual breaking down 
of the land monopoly.
The brief list reflected the new concerns that increasingly
g
came to dominate Pinchot's outlook on reform.
From his newly attained perspective, Pinchot saw the 
economic aims of Progressive leaders in an even more 
critical light. He particularly opposed the concept of 
trust regulation by a government commission, an idea favored
Q
by both Theodore Roosevelt and George Perkins. in a paper 
for the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 
Pinchot argued that no Federal bureau could successfully 
control the industrial giants. He pointed to competition as
7 (Yonkers) Sunday Record, Jan. 26, 1913. clipping in 
Box 225, Pinchot MSS. A typescript of the speech appears in 
Box 1985, Gifford Pinchot MSS.
®Amos Pinchot to William Kent, April 21, 1913, Box 14, 
Pinchot MSS.
Q
For insight into Roosevelt's economic views, see the 
report of his remarks on competition and regulation in New 
York Times, July 3, 1913, 9.
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thn onJy definitivo solution to the trust problem.1® In a 
subsequent letter to Hiram Johnson, the New Yorker labeled 
the commission method of regulation "legalized monopoly."11 
He insisted that big business would ultimately gain control 
of any regulatory agency.12
With help from George Record, Pinchot soon devised a 
plan to make the trust issue central to a realignment of 
Progressive forces. The scheme called for Gifford Pinchot 
to lead an attack on the Perkins wing of the party and win 
Roosevelt back to the side of reform. In a series of 
magazine articles, the Forester was to expose the failure of 
the party' s platform to deal effectively with the monopoly 
menace. At the same time, he would offer a program designed 
to break up the trusts and establish the preconditions for 
economic competition. Naturally, Record and the junior 
Pinchot expected to draft the essays intended for magazine 
publication. On July 23, Record sketched the scenario for 
Gifford.13 in a follow-up letter written on the next day,
10Amos Pinchot, "The Cost of Private Monopoly to 
Public and Wage-Earner," Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science. XLVIII (July, 1913), 164-88.
11Anos Pinchot to Hiram W. Johnson, July 8, 1913,
Box 15, Pinchot MSS.
12See Amos Pinchot to Francis w. Bird, July 15, 1913,
ibid.
1 ^ Record explained that he and Amos had hit upon the 
plan during a conversation on the previous day. He went on 
to outline the plot in detail. See George L. Record to 
Gifford Pinchot, July 23, 1913, Box 167, Gifford Pinchot 
MSS.
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Amos Pinchot urged his brother to comply with the plan.14
The older Pinchot responded in a cautious but 
receptive manner. He concurred on the need for the series 
of articles. He suggested to his brother that the circle of 
draftsmen be enlarged to include George W. Woodruff, one of 
his closest friends. Woodruff, he told Amos, was "far less 
apt to run wild than Record. . . ."15 still, Gifford 
appeared willing to cooperate with the Jerseyman. On August 
2, he confided to Record: "I think you and Amos are more
radical than I am, but I also think that X am plenty radical 
enough for the present purpose."1®
Despite the semblance of unity, work on the project 
lagged from the start. Record hoped to have the articles 
drafted and approved within a few weeks.17 Yet November 
found him still instructing Gifford in the intricacies of 
land value taxation and associated reforms.1® As Christmas 
neared, Amos tried his hand at doctrinal exegesis. He told 
his brother:
14Amos Pinchot to Gifford Pinchot, July 24, 1913,
Box 166, ibid.
15Gifford Pinchot to Amos Pinchot, July 30, 1913, 
ibid. On the ties between Gifford Pinchot and Woodruff, see 
McGeary, Gifford Pinchot. 46.
l6Gifford Pinchot to George L. Record, Aug. 2, 1913, 
Box 167, Gifford Pinchot MSS.
17See George L. Record to Gifford Pinchot, Aug. 11, 
1913; and George L. Record to Gifford Pinchot, Sept. 19, 
1913, both in ibid.
I; 18See George L. Record to Gifford Pinchot, Nov. 14, 
1913, ibid.
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Now what I propose is this. That the Progressive 
Party, through means which we have already discussed, 
shall be dedicated to the destruction of private 
monopoly in the United States; that it shall divide 
all monopolies into natural and unnatural monopolies; 
that it shall advocate government ownership of the 
former and destruction, not regulation of the latter.
He closed by reminding Gifford that the breakup of the
trusts would mean increased competition and greater effi-
1 Q
ciency for industry. ^
In the early weeks of 1914, Record and Amos kept the
pressure on their reluctant colleague. Record bombarded
Gifford with requests for conferences and epistolary lessons
20in political economy. When the Forester reached a
decision to run for the United States Senate in Pennsylvania,
his two single-minded allies tried to fit the move into
PItheir own political design. Record noted that the anti-
monopoly credo could be written up as a Pinchot campaign
22document and restated later for the magazine s e r i e s . A m o s  
Pinchot argued along the same lines. He called upon his 
brother to make the Senate race as a champion of government
l^Amos Pinchot to Gifford Pinchot, Dec. 8, 1913, Box 
15, Pinchot MSS.
20See George L. Record to Gifford Pinchot, Jan. 7, 
.1.914? George L . Record to Gifford Pinchot, Jan. 19, 1914; 
George L . Record to Gifford Pinchot, Jan. 21, 1914; George 
L.. Record to Gifford Pinchot, Jan. 27, 1914; and C4eorge L. 
Record to Gifford Pinchot, Jan. 28, 1914, all ir> Box 180, 
Gifford Pinchot MSS.
2^On Gifford's Senatorial bid, see McGeary, Gifford 
Pinchot. 242-59; and Fausold, Gifford Pinchot. 151-93.
22George L. Record to Gifford Pinchot, Jan. 12, 1914,
Box 180, Gifford Pinchot MSS.
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ownership oi the railroads and equal commercial opportuni­
ties ±or all.22
The Senatorial candidate, however, chose to back away 
from the anti-monopoly dogma. He counted heavily on campaign 
help from Theodore Roosevelt and could ill-afford to take a 
stand that might alienate the Colonel.2^ Moreover, some of 
Gifford's friends and advisers considered Record a political 
liability. Overton Price, a long time Pinchot associate, 
recommended that the Jerseyman be silenced with chloro­
form.25
Unable to control Gifford, Record and Amos finally 
had to abandon their original scheme. Yet an alternate 
possibility appeared almost immediately. On March 13, 1914, 
Norman Hapgood, editor of Harper's Weekly, asked the younger 
Pinchot for an article on George Perkins and divisions with­
in the Progressive party.25 The New Yorker, in his own 
words, "seized the opportunity with fear and trembling." He 
envisioned an essay on the political machinations of the 
trusts with the link between Perkins and United States Steel
^Amos Pinchot to Gifford Pinchot, Feb. 3, 1914, 
Box 16, Pinchot MSS.
^See especially Gifford pinchot to Theodore Roosc 
velt, Dec. 10, 1913, Box 167, Gifford Pinchot MSS.
^Fausold, Gifford Pinchot. 154.
26Norman Hapgood to Amos pinchot, March 13. 1914, 
Box 16, Pinchot MSS.
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97as his prime example.
The proposed article, even in preliminary form, 
created a small furor. Gifford Pinchot feared that an
2ftattack on Perkins and big business would anger Roosevelt. °
He preferred to delay any confrontation with Perkins until
after the November elections . S i m i l a r  pleas for caution
30came from Gifford's supporters and campaign intimates. w
Amos, at least initially, tried to override the wave 
of criticism. He insisted that a public disclosure of 
Perkins's activities would force Roosevelt to drop the trust 
magnate. ^  On advice from Record, the younger Pinchot even 
considered entering the Bull Moose primary for united States 
Senator in New York. A Senatorial bid of his own, he con­
tended, would gain publicity for his article and allow him
^7Amos pinchot to Louis D. Brandeis, March 18, 1914,
ibid.
^®See Amos Pinchot to Gilson Gardner, March 29, 1914,
ibid.
29Entry for March 30, Diary, 1914. Box 3315, Gifford 
Pinchot MSS; and Gifford Pinchot to Amos Pinchot, April 4,
1914, Box 179, Gifford Pinchot MSS.
-^Gilson Gardner to Amos Pinchot, March 30, 1914; 
Overton Price to Amos Pinchot, April 4, 1914, Gifford 
Pinchot to Amos Pinchot, April 6 , 1914; and Edwin A. Van 
Valkenburg to Amos Pinchot, April 9, 1914, all in Box 16, 
Pinchot MSS. See also entry for April 1, Diary, 1914, Box 
3315, ibid.
Amos Pinchot to Gifford Pinchot, March 30 , 1914, 
Box 179, Gifford Pinchot MSS; and Amos Pinchot to Gifford 
Pinchot, April 7, 1914, Box 16, Pinchot MSS.
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32to extend his attack on Perkins. No such opportunities
materialized. A letter from his ailing mother convinced
Amos not to make the Senate race. J
Faced with strong objections to any public arraignment
of Perkins, the junior pinchot finally decided to present
his case in private. On May 23, 1914, he summarized his
arguments against the trust magnate in a long letter to the
members of the Progressive National committee. After
reviewing the former Morgan partner's involvement in the Bull
Moose crusade, Pinchot charged:
. . .  Mr. Perkins has conducted an extensive pro­
trust propaganda calculated to convince the party 
and the public that the trusts are useful and 
sacred institutions; that those who attack them are 
bent upon the destruction of all healthy industry 
on a large scale, and finally, that the Progressive 
Party fully agrees with him in these views. The 
result is that we have been placed in a false and 
fatal position. . . .  Mr. Perkins' pro-trust 
activity within the Progressive Party began soon 
after the party's formation. It has continued to 
the present time.
The letter closed with a demand that Perkins resign as
32Amos Pinchot to Gifford Pinchot, April 20, 1914; 
and Amos Pinchot to A. Nevin Detrich, April 24, 1914, both 
in Box 16, Pinchot MSS.
330n the decision to forego the primary battle, see 
Amos Pinchot to Gilson Gardner, April 24, 1914, ibid.; Amos 
Pinchot to Mrs. James w. Pinchot, April 24, 1914, Box 23, 
Gifford Pinchot MSS; and entry for April 26, Diary. 1914. 
Box 3315, Gifford Pinchot MSS. Amos also scuttled the pro­
posed article for Harper'a Weekly. Even so, Hapgood, under 
his own name, subsequently published an attack on Perkins 
that bore clear marks of Pinchot's influence. See Norman 
Hapgood, "Roosevelt, Perkins and Wilson," Harper's Weekly, 
LVIII, No. 3000 (June 20, 1914), 11-12.
<’h.lirman ul tho Hull Moose National Hxecutive Committee. 34 
His ringing indictment brought results that Pinchot 
did not anticipate. Reporting to his brother, he described 
the early replies to his letter as "rather guarded in 
tone."35 Later correspondents showed less reticence. Most 
of those who wrote expressed agreement with Perkins on the 
need for consolidation in industry.35 Two prominent Bull 
Moose supporters bluntly told Pinchot that his penchant for 
competitive capitalism was anachronistic.3  ^ Theodore Roose­
velt, meanwhile, moved to reassure his chief lieutenant. 
Writing Perkins on June 2, the Colonel took note of 
Pinchot's letter and dismissed it as inconsequential.3®
The negative responses to his views did not dissuade 
Pinchot. He simply shifted his anti-monopoly endeavors to a
34Amos Pinchot to Senator Joseph M. Dixon and the 
Members of the Progressive National Committee, May 23, 1914, 
Box 122, Pinchot MSS.
35Amos Pinchot to Gifford Pinchot, May 28, 1914,
Box 179, Gifford Pinchot MSS.
35See Amos Pinchot to Henry N. Rickey, June 4, 1914, 
Questionable Materials Box, Pinchot MSS.
37See Inez Milholland Boissevain to Amos Pinchot,
May 29, 1914? and Charles Sumner Bird to Amos Pinchot, June 
1, 1914, both in ibid.
3®Theodore Roosevelt to George W. Perkins, June 2, 
1914, Series 3A, Microfilm Reel 383, Roosevelt MSS. The 
text of Pinchot*s letter to the National Committee later 
appeared in the press. A mild furor resulted, but Perkins 
remained clearly ascendant within the Progressive party.
See New York Times, June 11, 1914, 1-2; New York Times,
June 12, 1914, 6? and "Pinchot*s War on Perkins, 1 Literary 
Digest. XLVIII, No. 25 (June 20, 1914), 1473-74.
different front. As a new target, he selected the Rocko- 
feller-owned Colorado Fuel and Iron Company. Long a domi­
nant force in the coal fields of the Rockies, the Company, 
throughout 1913 and 1914, waged a small war with striking 
m i n e r s . P i n c h o t ,  at a rally in New York on July 17, 1914, 
focused his attention on the struggle in Colorado. Lashing 
out at the Rockefellers, he blamed them for "a system of 
absentee landlordism . . .  as ruthless, and as coldly cruel 
as anything . . .  in Russia or Mexico." in order to break 
the grip of the trusts in Colorado and elsewhere, he urged 
government ownership of coal deposits and other natural 
resources. These essential raw materials, he asserted, 
should be made available to all competitors on an equal 
basis.40
Political developments related to the Colorado situa­
tion served to re-enforce Pinchot's hostility toward the 
Bull Moose national leadership. As an observer of Rocky 
mountain politics, the New Yorker favored the election of 
Edward P. Costigan, a Rockefeller foe and the Progressive
39See George S. McGovern and Leonard F. Guttridge,
The Great coalfield War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company,
1972), passim? and Graham Adams, Jr., The Age of industrial 
Violence. 1910-15; The Activities and Findings of the 
United States Commission on Industrial Relations (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1966), 146-75.
40FOr the text of the speech in pamphlet form, sec 
Speech of Amos Pinchot At a Mass Meeting Held at Webster 
Hall, in New York City, on Friday Evening. July 17. 1914, 
to Discuss the Colorado Strike. Copy in Box 95, Pinchot MSS.
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candidate J or tiovornor of Colorado.^ During the 1914 
gubernatorial race, he provided Costigan with a one thousand 
dollar campaign contribution. He also sought additional 
help for the candidate from influential friends.4  ^ Mean­
while, the Progressive National Committee, according to 
Pinchot, did not make commensurate efforts on the Coloradan's 
behalf.43 Predictably, Pinchot interpreted the supposed 
lack of support for his favorite as proof that the trusts 
controlled the Bull Moose high command. In a letter to 
Francis j. Heney, he fumed: " . . .  Costigan is fighting the
Rockefellers and all they stand for, and the crowd in charge 
of headquarters is backing up what the Rockefellers stand 
for."44
When the elections ended in defeat for costigan and 
most other Bull Moose hopefuls, Pinchot publicly castigated
410n the political situation in Colorado, see Colin 
B. Goodykoontz (ed.), Papers of Edward £. Costigan Relating 
to the Progressive Movement in Colorado, 1902-1917 (Boulder: 
university of Colorado, 194177 247-317; and Fred Greenbaum, 
Fighting Progressives A Biography of Edward P. Costigan 
(Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1971), 55-74.
42See Amos Pinchot to Edward P. Costigan, Sept. 25, 
1914; Amos Pinchot to Franklin K. Lane, Sept. 11, 1914; and
Amos pinchot to E. W. Scripps, Sept. 11, 1914, all in Box
18, Pinchot MSS.
43See Amos Pinchot to Gifford Pinchot, Sept. 11,
1914, Box 179, Gifford Pinchot MSS; and Amos Pinchot to
Alice Carpenter, Oct. 5, 1914, ibid.
44Amos Pinchot to Francis J. Heney, Nov. 2, 1914, 
Box 18, Pinchot MSS.
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Lh<; leaders of his party.4-* Writing for the sociolist 
journal The Masses, he noted that the Progressive platform 
contained "something of everything . . . from the care of 
babies to the building of a birch bark canoe."4** As a 
result, he said, the document never went beyond generalities 
and offered no solutions to major national problems.
Pinchot placed the blame for the dearth of serious reform 
proposals squarely on the shoulders of George Perkins. 
Progressive policymakers, he concluded, were too much 
entwined with big business to mount a real challenge to the 
status quo.47
4^The Progressives suffered a string of disastrous 
losses in 1914. Among the defeated Bull Moose candidates 
were Costigan, Gifford Pinchot, Francis J. Heney, Albert J. 
Beveridge, and James R. Garfield. On the election results, 
see New York Tribune, Nov. 5, 1914, 1, 6; and Mowry, 
Roosevelt, 302-303.
4®Pinchot contributed both articles and money to The 
Masses, but he showed no inclination to embrace socialism as 
an ideology. On one occasion, he wrote Max Eastman, editor 
of-The Masses, a letter filled with praise for the anti- 
monopoly capitalism of Henry George. Eastman, in turn, 
stated a preference for the works of Karl Marx. For Pinchot, 
at least, the views expressed represented a permanent ideolo­
gical commitment. His friendships with Eastman and other 
socialists did not alter the fact that he remained a stead­
fast believer in the ethics and institutions of competitive 
capitalism. For the exchange of letters, see Amos Pinchot 
to Max Eastman, Nov. 11, 1913; and Max Eastman to Amos 
Pinchot, Dec. 1, 1913, both in Box 15, Pinchot MSS. On 
Pinchot's financial contributions to The Masses, see Max 
Eastman, Enjoyment of Living (New Yorks Harper and Brothers, 
1948), 455-56.
47Amos pinchot, "The Failure of the Progressive 
Party," The Masses, VI, No. 3 (Dec., 1914), 9-10. Pinchot's 
verbal assault enraged Theodore Roosevelt. Reacting in part 
to publication of the essay, the Colonel told an ally:
Amos has not enough capacity for coherent thought to
43
Among blueprints for reform, pinehnt had complete 
<*f>ni j«li'ni!•* only in I hc? anti—nmnopoLy creed that he shared 
with boorgo Record. He drew heavily on that body of ideas 
in testimony before the United States industrial Relations
i.
i
Commission early in 1915. Speaking as a proponent of 
atomistic competition, he assured Commission members that 
free enterprise, where a condition of equality of entre­
preneurial opportunity prevailed, could outproduce either 
socialism or private monopoly. As the first steps toward 
equal competitive opportunities, he urged government owner­
ship of railroads and natural resources.
Pinchot, in the months that followed, sought a wider 
audience for his views, in May, 1915, he accused the 
editors of the New Republic of timidity in their presenta­
tion of reform ideas. He wanted to see the magazine con­
front questions like nationalization of railroads and 
taxation on landed estates. These were the issues where he 
saw "economic privilege and democracy . . . lining up for a
make him a Socialist; he is a kind of parlor anarchist 
or amateur I.W.W. follower. . . .  He is utterly impotent 
as a foe and the only damage he can do is as a 
treacherous friend and he should never be allowed 
inside the ranks again.
See Theodore Roosevelt to Henry Frederick Cochems, Nov. 28, 
1914, in Biting E. Morison (ed.). The Letters of Theodore 
Roosevelt (Cambridge: Harvard university Press, 1954),
VIII, 850.
48For the complete testimony, see U. S., Industrial 
Relations: Final Report and Testimony Submitted to congress
by the Commission on industrial Relations created by the 
A c t 6£ August 23. 1912. Senate Doc. 415, 64 Cong., 1 Sess., 
1916, IX, 8041-52.
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real and not a sham fight."^ A few weeks later, Pinchot 
carried a similar message into the bailiwick of the Colorado 
Fuel and Iron Company. Addressing a labor rally in Denver 
on July 31, he implored his listeners to work for government 
ownership of railroads and natural resources.^ Finally, in 
the September issue of Pearson1s Magazine, the anti-monopoly 
crusader summarized his objections to the trusts. Unfair 
advantages in access to raw materials and availability of 
transportation, he explained, allowed the industrial giants 
to dominate their respective markets with no regard for 
greater efficiency or lower prices. His article closed with 
the now familiar demands for government control ol rail 
facilities and natural resources.51-
While he preached the anti-monopoly creed, Pinchot 
maintained close ties with George Record. He backed the 
Jerseyman when the latter broke with the Progressive party 
and returned to the Republican fold.52 Record's devotion to
49Amos Pinchot, "Criticism From Mr. Amos Pinchot,"
New Republic. Ill, No. 3 (May 29, 1915), 95-97.
50See Amos Pinchot, Labor and the Future: An Address
by Amos pinchot Before the Justice League at the l.awson 
Protest Meeting Denver, Colorado, July 31, 1915 (Denver: 
Smith-Brooks Press, n.d.), 3.
^Amos Pinchot, "The Biggest Thing Between You and 
Prosperity," Pearson's Magazine. XXXIV, No. 13 (Sept., 1915), 
225-40.
52Record and his New jersey followers hoped to capture 
the G.O.P. at the state level. Their strategy called for a 
series of victories in Republican primary elections. The
Record slate, however, suffered an overwhelming defeat in the
change, lie explained, make the question of party labels 
i m m a t e r i a l . D e c e m b e r ,  1915, Pinchot was invited to 
move across the Hudson River and work directly with the 
Record faction in New Jersey. He declined the offer due to 
family obligations, but his loyalties remained with the 
small band of Garden State insurgents.^ in the last days 
of 1915, an editorial gibe from the New York World led 
Pinchot to enumerate his reform goals. His list duplicated 
the Record credo. He endorsed; government ownership of 
railroads and natural resources, heavy taxation oi idle 
land, abolition of the tariff, and other steps to foster
e c
equal competition within the economy.
National politics offered no precise analogue to the 
anti-monopoly program, but Pinchot looked with sympathy on 
the accomplishments of President Woodrow Wilson. Writing to 
E. W. Scripps in November, 1915, the New Yorker dv.scribed
intraparty balloting in 1915. Record himself lost a bid for 
the G.O.P. gubernatorial nomination in 1916. Even so, the 
anti-monopolist and his sympathizers held fast to their 
narrow program. See Mahoney, "New Jersey Politics," 250-321 
and Barr, "Record," 78.
53See Amos Pinchot to Herbert M. Bailey, Aug. 14, 
1915, Box 21, Pinchot MSS.
5^Edmund Osborne, a close associate of Record's in 
New jersey, tendered the invitation. For the exchange of 
letters, see Edmund Osborne to Amos Pinchot, Dec. 1, 1915; 
and Amos Pinchot to Edmund Osborne, Dec. 3, 1915, both in 
Box 23, ibid.
55in a derisive tone, the editorial linked Pinchot 
with a group of self-proclaimed Social Revolutionaries in 
New York. See New York World. Dec. 14, 1915, 10; and Amos 
Pinchot to Editor, New York World, undated. Box 13, ibid.
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h im^ vll: fi« "pnM ty strong for Wilson." Hvon so, he weiiL on 
to complain about the president's failure to make "anybody 
think or talk about economics, the distribution of wealth, 
government ownership, etc."^® A dramatic White House 
appointment soon convinced Pinchot to put aside his criti­
cisms. On January 28, 1916, the Chief Executive nominated 
lawyer and anti-trust expert Louis D. Brandeis for a seat on 
the united States Supreme C o u r t . P i n c h o t  rejoiced at the 
news of the nomination. In a statement to reporters, he 
termed the selection the best thing to happen to America in 
the scope of his memory.
The partisan opposition that subsequently challenged 
President Wilson's bid for re-election only strengthened 
Pinchot in his resolve to vote for the incumbent. Theodore 
Roosevelt, in June, 1916, rejected a second Bull Moose 
Presidential nomination and threw his support to republican 
standard-bearer Charles Evans Hughes.^ Pinchot viewed the
56Amos Pinchot to E. W. Scripps, Nov. 3, 1<>15, Box 
22, Pinchot MSS.
^7See New York Times, Jan. 29, 1916, 1, 3. Brandeis, 
like Pinchot, favored atomistic competition over corporate 
hegemony. On the lawyer's anti-trust views, see Melvin I. 
Urofsky, "Wilson, Brandeis, and the Trust issue, 1912-1914," 
Mid-America. XLIX, No. 1 (Jan., 1967), 3-28.
58Typescript dated Jan. 29, 1916, Box 224, Pinchot 
MSS. See also Amos Pinchot to Woodrow Wilson, Jar. 27,
1916, Box 25, Pinchot MSS.
59See Mowry, Roosevelt. 345-366; and Garraty, Perkins, 
327-372. See also Harold L. Ickes, "Who Killed the Progres­
sive Party?" American Historical Review. XLVI, No. 2 (Jan., 
1941), 306-37.
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colonel's actions with disdain. Referring to the patriarch
of Oyster Bay, he wrote William Kent:
He is now just where he has . . . wanted to be all 
along— back in the stronghold of respectable, benevo­
lent plutocracy. Nothing could be more desirable for 
the oyster man. Having eaten his oysters, he is now 
resting comfortably with a full belly.60
Hughes, a former Governor of New York and more recently an
Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, stood
only slightly higher in Pinchot's estimation. The reformer
judged the Republican nominee "quite crystalized in his
views and impossible to educate. . . . "  He came away from a
July meeting with the aloof and magisterial Hughes convinced
that a midwinter suit should have been worn for the
occasion.^
During the autumn campaign, Pinchot worked to insure 
Wilson a second term. He headed a group of volunteers that
toured throughout New York State on behalf of the Presi-
62dent. In order to reach a more distant audience, Pinchot
60flraos Pinchot to William Kent, July 6, 1916, Box 25, 
Pinchot MSS.
6lPor Pinchot's comments on Hughes, see Amos Pinchot 
to W. S. Rainsford, July 20, 1915, ibid. Gifford Pinchot 
subsequently decided to support the former New York Governor, 
and he strongly urged Amos not to vote for Wilson. See 
Gifford Pinchot to Amos Pinchot, Sept. 4, 1916, ibid.
62The volunteers included Walter Lippmann, Frederic 
c. Howe, Alexander j. McKelway, and Rabbi Stephen S. Wise. 
With Pinchot in the forefront, the aggregation crisscrossed 
New York State by automobile. According to one report, 
Pinchot's storehouse of stump invective included a crowd- 
pleasing reference to Theodore Roosevelt as "'the bell hop 
of Wall Street.'" See Dante Barton, The Wilson Volunteers 
in New York State, undated typescript. Box 24, ibid. See 
aTso New York Times. Oct. 30, 1916, 4.
fell back rm his journalistic skills, writing for the 
Chicago Daily Tribune, he detailed for Midwestern readers 
the fate of the anti-trust plank at the 1912 Bull Moose 
convention. Suppression of the plank, he contended, was the 
price that Roosevelt had "paid for the support of those 
captains of finance who . . .  became i:he monitors of the 
[Progressive] party's policies.H^ 3 On the eve of the 
election, Pinchot dared to challenge the Rough Rider 
directly. In an open letter addressed to the Colonel and 
released by the Democratic National Committee, he charged 
that Roosevelt, in 1912, had conspired with Perkins to kill 
the anti-trust plank in the Bull Moose platform.®4 The 
ex-President replied in kind. He wrote his former aide: 
"When I spoke of the Progressive party as having a lunatic 
fringe, I specifically had you in mind.
The Presidential race embroiled Pinchot in contro­
versy, but it did not sway him from more important goals. 
Shortly after the election, Matthew Hale, a Bull Moose 
diehard from Massachusetts, contacted Pinchot about a pos­
sible revival of the Progressive party.6** in response, the
63Chicago Daily Tribune. Oct. 22, 1916, 10. Two days 
earlier, the same newspaper had published a critique of 
Wilson's conservation policies authored by Gifford Pinchot. 
See Chicago Daily Tribune, Oct. 20, 1916, 10.
64Amos Pinchot to Theodore Roosevelt, Nov. 1, 1916, 
Box 24, PinchotMSS. See also New York Times, Nov. 2, 1916, 6.
65Theodore Roosevelt to Amos Pinchot, Nov. 3, 1916, 
Series 3A, Microfilm Reel 386, Roosevelt MSS.
66{4atthew Hale to Amos Pinchot, Nov. 24, 1916, Box
49
Now Yorker disclaimed any desire to rebuild on the old 
foundations, hut lie hastened to advise Hale on the best site 
lor a new structure. He explained in brief compass the 
relationship between monopoly power and special transporta­
tion advantages. Government ownership of the railroads, he 
contended, offered the only hope for destruction of the 
trusts and the beginning of an economy based on competition. 
He urged Hale to work for a reform coalition devoted to 
nationalization of the rail network. Such a movement, he 
said in conclusion, would command his own deepest interest,Cj 1 
The letter to Hale provided added proof of the meta­
morphosis that had occurred in Amos Pinchot*s reform 
commitment. Beginning in 1913, Pinchot, under the tutelage 
of George Record, mastered a new perspective on questions 
of domestic political economy. His inchoate opposition to 
the trusts fused with a more systematic anti-monopoly creed. 
As a result, he became an ardent exponent of atomistic 
competitive capitalism. Along with Record, he tried to rally 
support for that body of ideas within the Progressive party. 
When those efforts failed, Pinchot drifted away from the 
Bull Moose camp and worked at freelance exposition of his 
views. His devotion to dogma proved costly. He lost the
24, Pinchot MSS. Hale stayed on with the Progressive party 
until its amalgamation with the Prohibitionists in 1917.
See Mowry, Roosevelt, 367n.
67Amos Pinchot to Matthew Hale, Nov. 28, 1916, Box 
24, Pinchot MSS.
friendship of Theodore Roosevelt, arid relations with his 
brother Gifford grew strained. In 1)16, Amos Pinchot 
severed his last ties with the Progressive party and sup­
ported the Democratic national ticket. Yet the decisive 
shift in his political allegiance came earlier and at a 
different level. Long before 1916, Pinchot, under George 
Record's spell, had become a political sectarian, an 
ideologue with a narrow and unchanging message.
Chapter 4
PEACE, WAR, AND WOODROW WILSON
Amos Pinchot did not pursue the study of political 
economy in a vacuum. While he mastered George Record's anti- 
monopoly creed, the nations of Europe, beginning in August, 
1914, engaged in a genocidal civil war. For the United 
States, the European holocaust meant three years of troubled 
neutrality followed by active involvement in the conflict. 
Pinchot, once caught in the flow of events, increasingly 
turned his own attention to problems of international 
significance. From 1916 through 1919, he tried repeatedly 
to shape American policies with regard to peace and war.
Soon after the outbreak of fighting in Europe, 
military preparedness emerged as a major issue in the united 
States.1 Such apostles of strenuous living as Theodore 
Roosevelt and General Leonard Wood stepped forward as 
advocates of a more militaristic national posture. Roose­
velt threw himself into the preparedness movement with
1
For an overview of the preparedness controversy, see 
William Henry Harbaugh, "Wilson, Roosevelt and Intervention­
ism, 1914-1917: A Study of Domestic Influences on the
Formulation of American Foreign Policy" (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Northwestern University, 1954), 14-51 and 
111-51.
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t v.iiujf 1 n.TiJ lorvor. General Wood, meanwhile, arranged a 
.ser ies of training camps to acquaint civilians with the 
rudiments of military life.^ Initially, President Wilson 
eyed the upsurge of martial spirit with misgivings, but as 
the international crisis deepened, he too joined the parade. 
In July, 1915, the President asked his advisers for recom­
mendations on an American arms buildup.4 Four months later, 
he unveiled plans for a rapid expansion of the armed 
s e r v i c e s .5 m  December, 1915, Wilson presented Congress 
with an annual message that bristled with references to 
military hardware and defense spending.^
Pinchot took up the preparedness issue in the
^Hermann Hagedorn, The Bugle That Woke America; The 
Saga of Theodore Roosevelt's Last Battle For His Country 
(New York: John Day Company, 1940), 25-119. See also
Theodore Roosevelt, Fear God and Take Your Own Part (New 
York; George H. Doran company, 19l6), passim.
^See John Garry Clifford, The Citizen Soldiers; The 
Plattsburg Training Camp Movement, 1913-1920 (Lexington: 
University Press of Kentucky, 1971), 1—91.
40n Wilson's changing view of preparedness, see 
Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Movement. 
1910-1917 (New York; Harper and Row, 1954), 174-88.
5Wilson revealed his plans in an address before the 
Manhattan Club of New York City on November 4, 1915. For 
the text of his speech, see Woodrow Wilson, The New 
Democracy: Presidential Messages. Addresses, and Other
Papers. 1913-1917. eds. Ray Stannard Baker and william E. 
Dodd (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1926), I, 384-92;
hereinafter cited as Wilson, New Democracy.
6U . S., Address of the President of the united states 
Delivered at a joint Session of the Two Houses of Congress 
December £, i9l5. House Doc. 1, 64 Cong., 1 Sess., 1915,
4-7.
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aftermath ot Llic Presidential message. His first pronounce­
ments clearly reflected his attachment to anti-monopoly
r
capitalism. Before a New York audience on January 22, 1916, 
he condemned as half measures proposals that called for 
nothing more than a stronger military establishment. Full- 
scale readiness, he said, would require economic mobiliza­
tion including government ownership of railroads and 
natural resources.? a  few weeks later, he again tried to 
link preparedness with his own reform aspirations. American 
patriotism, he told the Washington Irving Labor Forum, would 
flourish only if the nation's people could "free themselves 
from grinding economic privilege, and gain an economic 
democracy. . . ."8
Despite his allusions to maximum readiness and 
patriotism, Pinchot distrusted the preparedness movement, 
and he quickly came out against it. Early in 1916, he joined 
the Anti-Preparedness Committee. Soon to be renamed the 
American union Against Militarism, the unit, under the 
leadership of social worker Lillian D. Wald, had established 
a long record of opposition to aggrandizement of the
^Amos Pinchot, "Preparedness: An Address cf Amos
Pinchot at Dinner of the Society of the Genesee, Hotel 
Knickerbocker, New York, January 22," The Public, XIX 
(Feb. 4, 1916), 110-13.
^Typescript dated March 5, 1916, Box 24, Pinchot MSS. 
For the speech in article form, see Amos Pinchot, "Upon 
Panicky Patriots," War, I, No. 1 (May, 1916), 11-12.
/
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military.9 Just after Pinchot entered its ranks, the Union 
embarked upon a "Truth About Preparedness" campaign. With 
Pinchot in the forefront, a team of A.U.A.M. speakers toured
1 A A ^
eleven cities over a ten-day span. u A papier-mache 
dinosaur christened "jingo" accompanied the troupe and helped 
draw large crowds.^ While the dinosaur offered a silent 
reminder of the limits of brute force, the A.U.A.M. orators 
sermonized on the dangers of overreliance on armed might.
The round of speech making opened the doors to the 
White House. On May 8, 1916, Lillian Wald, Pinchot, and 
three other A.U.A.M. spokesmen conferred with President 
Wilson. The anti-militarists presented a strongly worded
90n the origins and background of the American union 
Against Militarism, see R. L. Duffus, Lillian Wald: Neighbor
and Crusader (New York: Macmillan Company, 1938), 151-60?
and Blanche Wiesen Cook, "Woodrow Wilson and the Anti-Mili­
tarists, 1914-1917" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The 
Johns Hopkins University, 1970), 1-20? the latter title 
hereinafter cited as cook, "Wilson and the Anti-Militarists."
*°For an itinerary, see Crystal Eastman to Amos 
Pinchot, March 16, 1917 [sic]. Box 30, Pinchot MSS.
■^See "The Latest Publicity Feature of the Anti-'Pre­
paredness* Committee," Survey. XXXVI, No. 1 (April 1, 1916), 
37; and "An Animal of Extinction," Survey. XXXVI, No. 6 
(May 6, 1916), 165.
12For accounts of the speaking tour, see Cook,
"Wilson and the Anti-Militarists," 56-60? and "Swinging 
Around the Circle Against Militarism,” Survey, XXXVI, No. 4 
(April 22, 1916), 95-96. See also Lillian D. Wald to 
Woodrow Wilson, April 21, 1916, Series 4, Box 377, File 
1935, Woodrow Wilson Papers, Manuscript Division, Library 
of Congress.
55
memorial against the preparedness movement.13 Wilson, in 
reply, made a distinction between necessary precautions and 
bellicose militarism. He endorsed the former and promised 
to oppose the latter v i g o r o u s l y v i s i t o r s  left with 
mixed emotions. Although appreciative of an opportunity to 
express their views, they went away convinced that Wilson 
seriously underestimated the malevolent forces at work 
behind the preparedness movement.
Pinchot had very definite ideas about who controlled
the militaristic agitation. Writing to newspaperman Roy
Howard on May 23, he declared:
I think there is going to be hell to pay with this 
military question. Already the preparedness crows 
who are by and large . . . the big employers and 
monopolists . . . have succeeded in getting what 
they want most . . .  a big National Guard to take 
care of industrial troubles when the war is over and 
times become hard again.16
When Howard, in rebuttal, argued that tighter discipline
might lift the nation out of its "sordid, pot-bellied, fat-
joweled state," Pinchot repeated his gloomy prophecy. The
13Por a copy of the memorial, see Cabinet 1, Drawer 
1, Lillian D. Wald papers. Manuscript Division, New York 
Public Library, New York, New York.
14A printed version of the President's remarks 
appears in Box 189, Pinchot MSS.
15See the undated memorandum in Cabinet 1, Drawer 1, 
Wald MSS. For printed accounts of the meeting between 
Wilson and the anti—milltarists, see Kerney, Wilson, 363- 
67? and "The President on Militarism," Survey. XXXVI, No. 8 
(May 20, 1916), 198-99.
lfiAmos Pinchot to Roy Howard, May 23, 1916, Box 24, 
Pinchot MSS.
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"exploiting class," he insisted, wanted a strong military
17ready to quell postwar industrial strife.
In terms of immediate realities, however, Pinchot and 
his anti-preparedness colleagues faced a challenge from a 
different quarter. On June 21, 1916, a United States 
Cavalry detachment on patrol in Mexico clashed with Mexican 
troops near the village of carrizal.^® The skirmish pro­
voked a war scare and brought the American Union Against 
Militarism into action. Within a few days of the fighting, 
the A.U.A.M. made public a letter written from the battle­
field by captain Lewis S. Morey, one of the men wounded in 
the fray. In a report intended for his military superiors, 
Morey blamed the violence at Carrizal on the recklessness of 
a fellow American officer.^-9 Along with its reprint of the 
Morey letter, the A.U.A.M. raised the question: "Is There A
l^See Roy Howard to Amos Pinchot, May 24, 1916;, and 
Amos Pinchot to Roy Howard, May 25, 1916, both in ibid.
IQ
The American soldiers were part of an expedition 
sent into Mexico in pursuit of the Mexican revolutionary 
leader Francisco Villa. For an authoritative discussion of 
the military aspects of the Carrizal incident, see Robert 
S. Thomas and Inez V. Allen, The Mexican Punitive Expedition 
under Brigadier General John J . Pershing United States A m y  
1916-1917 (Washington: Department of the Army, War
Histories Division, 1954), Part IV, 18-29.
19For the letter as a government document, see u. S., 
Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the united 




Just Caiisi; tor War?" ' Pinchot, on June 30, answered with a 
resounding "No!" in an open letter carried by the New York 
Times, he argued that no legitimate cause for war with 
Mexico existed, pressure for intervention, he claimed, came 
primarily from Americans with business interests south of 
the Rio Grande.21 The A.U.A.M. peace offensive produced 
fast results. President Wilson, flooded with letters and 
telegrams inspired by the anti-war group, quickly announced
that no retaliatory steps would be taken against the
22Mexicans,
The President's announcement heartened the anti­
militarists. Accordingly, when A.U.A.M. leaders discovered 
a clause that authorized a military draft in the 1916 
National Defense Act, they contacted the White House. In 
a letter to Wilson on August 9, Pinchot pointed out the
20For the text of the letter and the editorial com­
ments by the A.U.A.M., see New York Times. June 27, 1916, 7.
21Ibid., June 30, 1916, 7.
22Wilson's biographer Arthur S. Link attributes the 
upsurge of anti-war sentiment to the A.U.A.M. See Arthur S. 
Link, Wilson; Confusions and crises. 1915-1916 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1964), 315. For the text of the 
President's statement on Mexico, see Wilson, New Democracy, 
II, 217-21.
Authored by Arizona's Democratic Congressman Carl 
T. Hayden, the draft provision became known among the anti­
militarists as the "Hayden Joker." For the authorization as 
it appears in the National Defense Act, see U. S., Statutes 
at Large, XXXIX, Part 1, 202-203. See also "A Federal Con­
scription Act?" Survey. XXXVI, No. 25 (Sept. 16, 1916), 
596-97.
obscure* provision and urged its immediate repeal.2^ Wilson, 
in reply, offered the view that the draft authorization 
would go into effect only if the United States entered a 
war.25 The Chief Executive's interpretation failed to 
mollify Pinchot. In a telegram to Wilson on August 18, the 
New Yorker reiterated the case for repeal.2® On the same 
day, Charles T. Hallinan, Editorial Director of the A.U.A.M., 
fired off a brief against the conscription measure to Presi­
dential Secretary Joseph P. Tumulty.2^ When these efforts 
proved fruitless, Lillian Wald tried to reach Wilson through 
a different channel. in September, 1916, United States 
Ambassador to Turkey Henry Morgenthau forwarded the Presi­
dent a letter in which Wald addressed herself to the draft 
issue,2® The indirect approach appeared to be successful.
In an answer to Morgenthau on September 22, Wilson expressed 
complete sympathy with Wald's objections to conscription.
The draft provision, he promised, would "be altered upon the
2^ Amos Pinchot to Woodrow Wilson, Aug. 9, 1916,
Series 4, Box 419, File 3016, Wilson MSS.
25Woodrow Wilson to Amos Pinchot, Aug. 11, 1916,
Box 24, Pinchot MSS.
26Amos Pinchot to Woodrow Wilson, August 18, 1916, 
Series 4, Box 419, File 3016, Wilson MSS.
27Charles T. Hallinan to Joseph P. Tumulty, ibid.
2ftHenry Morgenthau to Woodrow Wilson, Sept. 20, 1916,
ibid.
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i O Qfirst suitable occasion by action of Congress,"*7
The letter from Wilson to Morgenthau served as a 
temporary opiate. Wald, Pinchot, and other key figures in 
the A.U.A.M. worked actively to re-elect the President in 
1916.3° Almost as soon as the votes were counted, however, 
Lillian Wald refocused on the draft issue. On November 23, 
she reminded Wilson of his pre-election pledge with regard 
to c o n s c r i p t i o n . i n  response to Wald's letter, Wilson 
reaffirmed his vow to oversee repeal of the draft p r o v i s o . 3 2  
Yet the President, with a second term won, found it easy to 
renege on his promise. When next contacted by Wald about 
conscription, the Chief Executive admitted that he had taken 
no action toward repeal. "Just at present," he said, "I am 
caught in a drift which carries me very rapidly in other 
directions."33
Despite the President's equivocation on the draft 
question, the anti-militarists continued to find reasons to
29Woodrow Wilson to Henry Morgenthau, Sept. 22, 1916, 
ibid. For further detail on the A.U.A.M. campaign against 
the "Hayden Joker," see Cook, "Wilson and the Anti-Mili­
tarists, " 76-83.
3°see Cook, "Wilson and the Anti-Militarists,"
140-71.
■^Lillian D. Wald to Woodrow Wilson, Nov. 23, 1916, 
Series 4, Box 419, File 3016, Wilson MSS.
32w0odrow Wilson to Lillian D. Wald, Nov. 27, 1916,
ibid.
33woodrow Wilson to Lillian D. Wald, Dec. 5, 1916,
ibid.
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.support him. On January 24, 1917, just two days after 
Wilson had issued an appeal for peace in Europe, an A.U.A.M. 
delegation arrived at the White House.34 by pinchot and
Wald, the group assured the President that his plea for 
amity would be remembered proudly by "Liberals of every 
faith and clime . . .  as long as men speak and write of 
these times. . . ."35 A few aayS later, the anti-mili­
tarists again rallied to the Wilsonian banner. When the 
German government announced its resumption of unrestricted 
submarine warfare, the anti-war group publicly expressed the 
belief that Wilson would keep the United States "clear of 
any ignominious eleventh-hour participation" in the 
European conflict.
Even so, fear of the international maelstrom soon led 
Pinchot to re-emphasize his opposition to any form of 
American belligerency. In February, 1917, along with Max
3^The President made his appeal for peace in an 
address to the United States Senate. For the text of his 
speech, see Gong. Rec., 64 Cong., 2 Sess. (Jan. 22, 1917), 
1741-48.
35See Lillian D. Wald, Oswald Garrison villard, Owen 
R. Lovejoy, Paul U. Kellogg, and Amos Pinchot to Woodrow 
Wilson, Jan. 24, 1917, Cabinet 1, Drawer 1, Wald MSS.
3®See John Lovejoy Elliott, Agnes Brown Leach, Joseph 
Cannon, Harold Hatch, Sidney Gulick, L. Hollingworth Wood, 
Oswald Garrison villard, Mary K. Simkhovitch, Henry Wads­
worth Longfellow Dana, Robert Hale, Carlton J. H. Hayes, 
Emily Green Balch, William I. Hull, George Foster Peabody, 
Amos Pinchot, Lillian D. Wald, Frederick Lynch, Crystal 
Kastman, Paul U. Kellogg, John Haynes Holmes, George W. 
Kirchwey, Alice Lewisohn, Owen R. Lovejoy, Henry R. Mussey, 
Max Eastman, and Margaret Lane to Woodrow Wilson, Feb. 1, 
1917, Box 30, Pinchot MSS. See also New York Times. Feb. 2, 
1917, 7, 8.
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Eastman and Randolph S. Bourne, he formed the Committee For 
Democratic C o n t r o l . w i t h  Pinchot as Chairman, the new 
organization advanced armed neutrality as the best way to 
keep the United States out of war. In articles and adver­
tisements, the Committee developed a parallel between 
conditions in 1917 and the diplomatic situation in the 
1790's. Armed neutrality, according to the group's argument, 
had saved the United States from war in the earlier instance, 
and a similar stand, the Committeemen declared, would yield 
the- same results in the current crisis.3®
Pinchot, meanwhile, opened fire on domestic proponents 
of compulsory military training. On February 19, he warned 
a friend: "Make a machine of a man for one purpose and you
have a machine for all purposes. The man who unthinkingly 
obeys the epaulet, will unthinkingly obey the employer."39 
Shortly thereafter, Pinchot tried to convey the same message 
to Samuel Gompers, President of the American Federation of 
Labor. In an open letter, the Mew Yorker called upon
3?see New York World, March 4, 1917, II, 5; and 
Mew York Times, March 4, 1917, I, 10.
38see Amos Pinchot to Editor, Springfield (Mass.) 
Union, Feb. 16, 1917, Box 30, Pinchot MSS; Amos Pinchot, 
"Armed Neutrality," The Public. XX (Feb. 16, 1917), 154;
"1917— American Rights— 1798," New Republic, X, No. 121 
(Feb. 17, 1917), 82. See also Charles Downer Hazen, "Demo­
cratic Control of History," New Republic, X, No. 121 (Feb.
24, 1917), 105; and Amos Pinchot, "In Defense of Armed 
Neutrality," New Republic. X, No. 123 (March 10, 1917), 
163-64.
39Amos Pinchot to J. A. H. Hopkins, Feb. 19, 1917,
Box 28, Pinchot MSS.
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Goinpors to throw the weight of organized labor into the 
light against schemes for mandatory service.4® pinchot's 
pi tin foLl on deaf ears. Early in March, 1917, Gompers 
compelled the A. F. of L. Executive Council to adopt a 
declaration that pledged "to defend, safeguard and preserve 
the Republic of the United States of America against its 
enemies. . . .
Pinchot, along with some of his anti-war colleagues, 
regarded Gompers and like-minded men as dupes of Wall Street 
propaganda. On March 3, 1917, the Committee For Democratic 
Control warned readers of the New Republic that only big 
business favored American involvement in the war.4^ Pinchot 
maintained the same point of view in his private corre­
spondence. Writing to financial expert John Moody on March 
12, he asserted that "Nine-tenths of the Wall Street men" in 
his circle of acquaintances wanted war.4** A few days later, 
he ruefully predicted that "the old war horses of Wall 
Street" would ultimately drag the united States into armed 
combat.44
4®Amos pinchot to Samuel Gompers, March 10, 1917,
Box 30, ibid. See also New York Times, March 13, 1917, 4.
41Quoted in New York Times. March 13, 1917, 4. See 
also Lewis L . Lorwin, The American Federation of Labor; 
History, Policies, and Prospects (Washington: Brookings
Institution, 1933), 142-45.
4.2See "Do the People Want War?" New Republic. X,
No. 122 (March 3, 1917), 145.
43Amos Pinchot to John Moody, March 12, 1917, Box 30, 
Pinchot MSS.
44Amos pinchot to William P. Harvey, March 21, 1917, 
Box 32, jbid.
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Ay yon bimen t for intervention continued to build, 
I'incliot and other A.U.A.M, leaders again turned to President 
Wilson. On March 16, Lillian Wald urged the Chief Executive 
to stand by his policy of neutrality.45 Four days later, 
Wald, Pinchot, and other A.U.A.M. members sent Wilson 
assurances that his neutral stance had broad popular 
support.46 Finally, on March 27, Pinchot wired the Presi­
dent:
The war excitement is an upper-class hysteria. It 
is at its height, it will pass, and there will be 
a strong reaction. The people themselves are calm 
and do not want war. They will bless you if you 
ask for a vigorous policy without a war declaration.47
The telegram went unheeded. On April 2, Wilson called upon
Congress for a declaration of war against Imperial Germany
and her a l l i e s .48 within a few days, the United States
officially entered £he Great War.49
Even before the President's address to Congress,
Pinchot had turned to the problem of financing the war
45Lillian D. Wald to Woodrow Wilson, March 16, 1917, 
Cabinet 1, Drawer 1, Wald MSS.
46Lillian D. Wald, Amos Pinchot, Paul U. Kellogg, and 
John Haynes Holmes to Woodrow Wilson, March 20, 1917, Box 
90, Pinchot MSS.
47Amos pinchot to Woodrow Wilson, March 27, 1917,
Box 30, ibid.
4®For the President's request, see Cong. Rec.. 65 
Cong., 1 Sess. (April 2, 1917), 118-20.
49por the respective votes of the Senate and House on 
the war resolution, see Cong. Rec.. 65 Cong., 1 Sess.
(April 3, 1917), 261; and Cong. Rec.. 65 Cong., 1 Sess. 
(April 5, 1917), 412-13.
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effort. On March 30, he helped found the American Committee 
on War Finance, a New York based group with definite ideas 
about taxation in wartime.50 The Committee, with Pinchot as 
Chairman, moved quickly to publicize its views, in news­
paper advertisements across the country, the unit urged a 
pay-as-you-go war with heavy taxes on large incomes.51- The 
public, Pinchot told reporters on April 1, needed to know 
that pro-war business elements would not profit unduely from 
intervent ion.5^
The Committee's tax proposals attracted broad popular 
support, and the group soon carried its arguments to 
Washington.55 The unit provided members of Congress with
For background material on the committee, see the 
memorandum entitled Statement of the Activities of the 
American committee on War Finance and the Results Obtained 
Thereby in b o x 204, Pinchot MSS.
51An example of the Committee's literature appears in 
New York Times, April 1, 1917, 17.
5^See ibid., April 2, 1917, 3.
53Pledges of support came to the Committee from
across the nation. For an indication of the popular 
response, see Amos Pinchot to E. W. Scripps, April 9, 1917, 
Box 27, Pinchot MSS; Amos Pinchot to Stephen S. Wise, April 
10, 1917, Box 32, Pinchot MSS; and Amos Pinchot to Roy 
Howard, April 19, 1917, Box 34, Pinchot MSS.
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r A
npm:iJ:.i.c recommendations on proposed income tax rates. 
Pinchot, on May 15, appeared before the Senate Finance Com- 
mittee to outline his ideas on revenue policy. A day 
later, Representative Edward Keating, a Democrat from Colo­
rado, introduced legislation that emboided Pinchot1s 
views.56
Although the proposal by Keating failed to pass, 
Pinchot could later look with pleasure on the revenue 
measure finally enacted into law.^7 Led by North Carolina
^ i n  a memorandum prepared for distribution among 
Congressmen, the committee recommended the following 
schedule of income tax rates:
10% per annum on income from $10,000-$ 20,000
15% per annum on income from $20,000-$ 40,000
20% per annum on income from $40,000-$ 60,000
30% per annum on income from $60,000-$ 80,000
40% per annum on income from $80,000-$100,000
50% per annum on income from 100,000-$150,000
98% per annum on income from 150,000+
For a copy of the memorandum, see Box 31, ibid.
55See Amos pinchot, Statement of Amos Pinchot Before 
Senate Finance Committee on May 15, 1917, Representing 
American Committee on War Finance. Printed copy in Box 196, 
ibid.
Due to his public activities, Pinchot achieved a 
special kind of notoriety, in the midst of the revenue 
debate, the Douglas Fairbanks Film Corporation released In 
Again, Out Again, a cinematic melodrama of sabotage on the 
homefront. Fairbanks, as the film's protagonist "Theodore 
Rutherford," uncovers the villainy of "Pinchit," a German 
spy disguised as a mincing pacifist. On the motion picture 
and its characters, see Owen R. Lovejoy to Amos Pinchot, May 
17, 1917, Box 29, ibid.; and Alistair Cooke, Douglas Fair­
banks ; The Making of a Screen Character (New York: Museum
of Modern Art, 1940T7 17.
56ln offering the measure, Keating made specific 
reference to Pinchot and his views on taxation. See Cong. 
Rec., 65 Cong., 1 Sess. (May 16, 1917), 2403-2404.
5 'Keating's proposal never got beyond the House. For 
the vote, see Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., 1 Sess. (May 17, 1917), 
2483.
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lh -m i i o c x ,'iL Claude Ki tchin, Congressional proponents of heavy 
LajioH on high incomes kept a tight reign on the 1917 Revenue 
bill.®® in its final form, the legislation called for a 
sharp increase in levies on incomes in the higher brackets. 
The tax rates did not match those favored by the American 
Committee on War Finance, but Pinchot viewed the Revenue Act 
as an acceptable compromise.®9 Even before the money bill 
had cleared the Senate, the New Yorker pronounced the work 
of his lobbying group successfully done.®0 By July, 1917, 
the Committee had disbanded.®-*-
Pinchot's sense of accomplishment proved ephemeral. 
Wartime restrictions on civil liberties soon propelled him 
into another fight. In June, 1917, during a Flag Day 
Address, President Wilson lashed out at domestic critics of
®^See Alex Matthews Arnett, Claude Kitchin and the 
Wilson War Policies (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company,
1937) , 249-66; and Sidney Ratner, Taxation and Democracy in 
America (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1967), 372-86.
®'The maximum rate imposed by the Revenue Act was a 
tax of 67% on the portion of annual income in excess of two 
million dollars. For the text of the Act, see U. S., 
Statutes at Large. XL, Part 1, 300-38. For the schedule of 
rates in tabular form, see Ernest Ludlow Bogart, War Costs 
and Their Financing: A Study of the Financing of the War
and the After-War Problems of Debt and Taxation (New York:
D. Appleton and Company, 1921), 476.
fiOAmos Pinchot to John E. Lander, June 7, 1917, Box 
29, Pinchot MSS; and Amos Pinchot to James F. Minturn,
June 15, 1917, Box 28, Pinchot MSS.
®iAmos Pinchot to Charles j. Rhoads, July 9, 1917,
Box 29, ibid.
ft othe war effort. Stung by the attack, Pinchot reacted 
angrily. The chief Executive, he told a friend, had 
"flourished the knout" over all those who opposed "the 
temporary little fatherhood" that Wilson was fast estab­
lishing.63 Shortly thereafter, Pinchot joined with Max 
Eastman and John Reed to protest another manifestation of 
the martial spirit. Acting as spokesmen for The Masses and 
other radical journals, the trio sent Wilson a list of 
socialist periodicals recently banned from the mails by the 
United States Post Office Department. After makirg an 
appeal to the President's devotion to the "Anglo-raxon
tradition of intellectual freedom," the petitioners asked
64for a reversal of Post Office policy.
The entreaty to Wilson produced minimal results. The 
President forwarded the incoming letter to Postmaster 
General Albert S. Burleson. With reference to the three 
authors, he told Burleson: "These are very sincere men and
62For the text of the Flag Day speech, see Woodrow 
Wilson, War and Peace: presidential Messages. Addresses,
and Public Papers, 1917-1924, eds. Ray Stannard Baker and 
William E. Dodd (New Yorks Harper and Brothers, 1927), I, 
60-67.
63Amos Pinchot to Crystal Eastman, June 15, 1917,
Box 30, Pinchot MSS.
64Max Eastman, John Reed, and Amos Pinchot to Woodrow 
Wilson, July 12, 1917, Series 4, Box 465, File 4122, Wilson 
MSS. For additional material on the exclusion of The Masses 
from the mails, see Max Eastman, Love and Revolution: My
Journey Through an Epoch (New York: Random House, 1964),
58-63; hereinafter cited as Eastman, Love and Revolution.
I should like to please t h e m . T h e  Postmaster, however, 
had a mind of his own. He bluntly informed the President 
that the periodicals in question had been banned due to clear 
violations of the Espionage Act.®® Wilson made no effort to 
challenge his acerbic cabinet officer. On July 17, he sent 
Pinchot a copy of Burleson's letter, in terms of supple­
mentary comment, Wilson limited himself to a request that
6 7the letter receive Pinchot*s "most friendly consideration." 
Burleson subsequently continued his crusade against litera­
ture that failed to meet Post Office standards for 
patriotism.®®
Although he battled against infringement oJ civil 
liberties, Pinchot accepted united States involvement in the 
Great Wax as an irreversible reality, in fact his criticisms 
of Burleson stemmed partly from a belief that the Post­
master 's activities compromised the idealism that needed to 
be made paramount in waging the war. In a letter to Wilson
®-’Woodrow Wilson to Albert S. Burleson, July 13,
1917, Series 4, Box 465, File 4122, Wilson MSS.
®®Albert S. Burleson to Woodrow Wilson, July 16,
1917, ibid.
®’Voodrow Wilson to Amos Pinchot, July 17, 1917,
Box 29, Pinchot MSS.
®®See Donald Johnson, The Challenge to American 
Freedoms: World War l and the Rise of the American Civil
Liberties union (Lexington: university of Kentucky Press,
1963), 57-63; and Harry N. Scheiber, The Wilson Administra­
tion and civil Liberties. 1917-1921 (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1960), 29-41. See also William H. Lamar, 
"The Government's Attitude Toward the Press," Forum. LIX 
(Feb., 1918), 29-41.
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on July 25, Pinchot attempted to explain his point of view. 
American intervention in Europe, he contended, could be 
justified only if it contributed to the spread of democracy 
throughout the world. Accordingly, he argued that the 
Wilson administration ought to commit itself to the advance­
ment of democratic institutions both at home and abroad. In 
conclusion, he urged the President to adopt policy goals 
that would make the American war effort a clear-cut fight 
for international democracy.®^
Annng allies of the United States, pinchot regarded 
Great Britain as the archenemy of democratic war aims.7® 
Writing to a former Bull Moose colleague on July 26, he 
lamented "British insistence upon a land grabbing pro­
gram."71 The subsequent growth of interallied cooperation 
did nothing to allay Pinchot1s suspicions. In October, 1917, 
he wrote pessimistically:
It will be a terrible thing for our people to have 
to make the sacrifices of war not for justice, not 
for democracy, not for permanent peace, but for the
®®Amos Pinchot to Woodrow Wilson, July 25, 1917, Box 
27, Pinchot MSS.
70For a panoramic, multinational view of the problem 
of war aims in World War I, see Arno J. Mayer, Political 
Origins of the New Diplomacy, 1917-1918 (New Haven: Yale 
university Press, 1959), passim. For additional material, 
see Charles Seymour, American Diplomacy During the World War 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1942), 253-98; and
Lawrence W. Martin, Peace Without Victory: Woodrow Wilson
and the British Liberals (New Haven: Yale university Press,
195877” B7-195.
71Amos Pinchot to Bainbridge Colby, July 26, 1917,
Box 30, Pinchot MSS.
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exploitation of the world by Anglo-American banking 
and business interests— an exploitation which should 
logically result in another conflict.72
The specter of an aggressive alliance between big business
forces in Great Britain and the United States continued to
haunt Pinchot as the war dragged on.
The protection of civil liberties provided another 
focus for the New Yorker's concern. In October, 1917, after 
the dismissal of two Columbia University professors for 
anti-war endeavors, pinchot sent letters of condolence to 
both men.7^ "The first thing that a nation at war attacks," 
he told one of the academicians, "is its own intellectual 
honesty."74 Naturally, Pinchot saw the activities of 
Postal authorities as a pre-eminent threat to freedom of 
thought. He took vindictive delight in an expose of Post­
master Burleson authored by journalist George P. West.75 
Writing to congratulate West on October 15, he exclaimed: 
"Good Lord! How can Woodrow Wilson keep that elderly
72Amos pinchot to Arthur LeSueur, Oct. 2, 1917, Box 
34, ibid.
7^The faculty members in question were James McKeen 
Cattell and Henry Wadsworth Longfellow Dana. On their 
difficulties with Columbia, see "Columbia's Dismissed Pro­
fessors," Literary Digest, LV, No. 16 (Oct. 20, 1917), 24; 
and Horace" C. Peterson and Gilbert c. Fite, Opponents of 
War, 1917-1918 (Madison: university of Wisconsin Press,
1957), 103-104.
74Amos Pinchot to James McKeen Cattell, October 4, 
1917, Box 30, Pinchot MSS. See also Amos pinchot to Henry 
Wadsworth Longfellow Dana, Oct. 4, 1917, Box 27 Pinchot MSS.
75See George P. West, "A Talk with Mr. Burleson," The 
Public. XX (Oct. 12, 1917, 985-87.
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village-idiot in his cabinet?"78
Late in 1917, Pinchot found a forum for expression of 
his discontent over conduct of the war. The race for Mayor 
of New York city pitted pro-war nationalists against 
advocates of peace abroad and restored civil liberties at 
home. As spokesman for the former group, incumbent Mayor 
John Purroy Mitchel offered himself to the voters as the 
embodiment of militant patriotism. His campaign posters 
pictured him in a doughboy uniform with bayonet at the 
ready.77 The youthful Mayor's chief opposition came from 
judge John F. Hylan, a Tammany Hall Democrat, and Morris 
Hillquit, a veteran Socialist party functionary. Hillquit 
proved to be the surprise of the campaign. While Hylan 
stood discreetly aside, the Socialist called for an end to 
the European war and for the complete restoration of 
domestic civil rights. Hillquit's platform stirred the 
popular imagination, and the third party candidate soon 
found himself with a large and vocal following.78
78Amos Pinchot to George P. West, Oct. 15, 1917,
Box 29, Pinchot MSS.
770n Mitchel and his bid for re-election, see Edwin 
R. Lewinson, John Purroy Mitchel; The Boy Mayor of New 
York (New Yorks Astra Books, 1965), 230-45.
78For material on the Hillquit campaign, see Morris 
Hillquit, Loose Leaves From a Busy Life (New York: Macmillan
Company, 1934), 180-210; and James Weinstein, The Decline oi 
Socialism in America. 1912-1925 (New York: Monthly Review
Press, 1967), 149-54.
Pinchot threw himself into the Hillquit campaign. In 
an open letter of endorsement, he praised the Socialist 
candidate's stand on civil liberties. He went on to place 
Hillquit on the side of a European peace that would be 
"American in spirit, democratic in terms . . .  and at one 
with the aspirations of liberal elements in all coun­
tries."^9 Pinchot subsequently presided over a Hillquit 
rally at Madison Square Garden.®9 Late in the campaign, he 
joined a "flying squadron" of pro-Hillquit speakers that 
canvassed New York by automobile.®*- The expenditure of time 
and energy led to welcomed results. Hillquit finished third 
in the race, but he won enough votes to ensure Hylan's 
victory over Mitchel.82 In a post-election statement, 
Pinchot termed the outcome "a slam at the wave of Prussian- 
ism" that had swept the country since American intervention 
in Europe.®-*
With the election decided, pinchot shifted his atten­
tion to the problem of war aims. His primary concern was
79Amos Pinchot to Morris Hillquit, undated, Box 102, 
Pinchot MSS. See also New York Times. Oct. 29, 1917, 1.
89New York Times. Nov. 1, 1917, ly and New York Call. 
Nov. 1, 1917, 1.
Q 1
New York American, Nov, 4, 1917, 12y and New York 
Call. Nov. 6, 1917, 3.
82See New York Times, Nov. 7, 1917, 1.
83New York Call. Nov. 8, 1917, 2.
"the danger of having to fight for British imperial ism. 
on November 14, LlJl7, in a long letter to Presidential 
adviser George Creel, Pinchot gave vent to some of his 
anxieties about the diplomatic situation. His involvement 
in the Hillquit campaign, he explained, had stemmed from the 
belief "that a big Socialist vote would . . .  off-set . . .  
British . . . propaganda for war aims that the [American] 
people would not stand behind." With an eye to more 
inspiring goals, Pinchot urged Creel to keep the President 
ever mindful of the need to make the war a crusade for 
democracy.®-* In the weeks that followed, Pinchot continued 
to worry that reactionaries at home and abroad would out— 
maneuver Wilson and convert the war into a struggle for 
economic advantages.®®
Pinchot soon saw documentary evidence that confirmed 
his worst suspicions about international politics. By means 
of an extraordinary chain of events, he became aware of the 
secret agreements that tied the Entente coalition together. 
In November, 1917, the Russian Bolsheviks revealed the 
confidential treaties found in the Tsarist archives. The
84Amos pinchot to A. M. Todd, Nov. 0, 1917, Box 32, 
Pinchot MSS.
®^Amos pinchot to George Creel, Nov. 14, 1917, Box 
34, ibid.
86See Amos Pinchot to Arthur Brisbane, Nov. 20, 1917; 
and Amos Pinchot to Joseph D. Cannon, Nov. 20, 1917, both in 
Box 30, ibid. See also Amos pinchot, "War Aims," Forward: 
Orqan of the Leaque For Democratic Control, I, No. 6 (Dec., 
lllfT,"65^66.--- ------------------------------
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documents, with their provisions for crippling indemnities
07
and territorial adjustments, appeared in the Soviet press. 
Subsequently, a Russian seaman arrived in New York with a 
Vladivostok newspaper that reprinted the texts of the 
treaties. The seaman and his valuable cargo passed quickly 
from a Russian emigre doctor, to Pinchot's cousin, and on to 
Pinchot himself.88 The latter sent the newspaper and its 
bearer tc Oswald Garrison Villard, publisher of the New York 
Evening Post. A short time later, Villard*s paper carried 
complete translations of the once secret documents.®9
Pinchot deplored the tenor of the confidential pacts, 
and he assumed that President Wilson shared his point of 
view. Ir January, 1918, he raised the question of war aims 
in a letter to colonel Edward M. House, the President's 
closest ioreign policy adviser. Pinchot called the 
colonel*£ attention to a recent declaration in which members 
of the Bi itish Labour party had endorsed a peace settlement
8*See Jane Degras (ed.), Soviet Documents on Foreign 
Policy (New York: Oxford university Press, 1951)” I, 8-9;
and George F . Kennan, Russia Leaves the War (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1^56), 92-93. For a discussion 
of the contents of the treaties, see Ray Stannard Bakei, 
Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement: Written From His
Unpublished and Personal Material (Garden City: Doubleday,
Page, and Company, 1923), I, 23-81; hereinafter cited as 
Baker, Wilson and World Settlement.
88On Pinchot*s role in the episode, see the memo­
randum dtited Nov. 25, 1941, in Box 140, Pinchot MS;-
88See Oswald Garrison Villard, Fighting Ye. t a: 
Memoirs of a Liberal Editor (New York: Harcourt, Brace,
and Company, 1939), 340-42.
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with no annexations or indemnities.9® The time had come, 
Pinchot asserted, for "liberal groups in the united States" 
to take the same stand. While he noted that the President 
had so far failed to occupy such advanced ground, Pinchot 
expressed confidence that the Chief Executive had a "no­
annexations program . . .  at heart."9^
Reports from House and another Presidential intimate 
re-enforced Pinchot's favorable view of Wilson. In February, 
1918, he told George Foster Peabody: "Colonel House assures
me that the President is on to the imperialists and will 
keep pressing them back . . . until he has them where they 
belong."-'2 A later conversation with an unidentified friend 
of the President left Pinchot even more confident. In 
recounting the talk to his wife, he explained:
Wilson’s idea is to call a halt to land-grabbing 
and till its modifications. . . . Give everybody or 
as many people as possible self-determination.
Build up a public opinion to the effect that war, 
or rather conquest is simply larceny. Establish 
free trade. . . .  of course, all this . . .  has not 
been stated in so many words by the President, but 
the man I spoke of believes he is working toward it.
At all events, I am going on the principle that he is.
Pinchot termed the program which he attributed to Wilson
9®For the text of the declaration, see New York
Times, Jan. 16, 1918, 1, 3.
91 Amos Pinchot to Edward M. House, Jan. 28, 1918,
Box 37, Pinchot MSS.
9*>
"Amos Pinchot to George Foster Peabody, Feb. 19, 
1918, Box 35, ibid.
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"the bigqost thing that any statesman" had ever attempted.9^
The stubborn problem of infringements on civil 
liberties soon brought Pinchot back to the less exalted side 
of the war effort. In April 1918, Max Eastman, John Reed, 
and other staff members of The Masses went to trial for 
violations of the Espionage Act. The charges stemmed from 
the dispute with Postmaster Burleson nearly a year before.94 
Pinchot, incensed by the prolonged harassment of his friends, 
protested directly to the President. In a letter to Wilson 
on May 24, he vigorously defended the journalists and urged
AC
that the indictments against them be dropped. The court 
battle continued, however, and it ended only after two 
juries had failed to reach a verdict.9** Meanwhile, Pinchot 
waited in vain for word from the White House. After almost 
a month, he admitted that Wilson, for the first time, had 
neglected to answer one of his letters.^
Following the trials of The Masses staff, Pinchot 
continued to support Wilson, but his allegiance stopped short
^Amos pinchot to Gertrude M. Pinchot, March 4, 1918,
ibid.
94For an enumeration of the charges against the 
journalists, see Louis Untermeyer, From Another World (New 
York; Harcourt, Brace, and Company, 1939), 66-77.
95Amos pinchot to Woodrow Wilson, May 24, 1918,
Box 37, Pinchot MSS.
96On the two appearances in court, see Eastman, Love 
and Revolution. 82-99, and 118-23.
9^Amos Pinchot to Owen R. Lovejoy, June 19, 1918,
Box 37, Pinchot MSS.
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of blind faith. In October, 1918, the President asked for a 
popular mandate in the form of Democratic victories in the 
upcoming Congressional races.98 Pinchot, within a few days, 
endorsed candidates on the Socialist party ticket as the 
true proponents of "Wilson’s program for a just peace . . . " "  
When the Republicans swept the subsequent elections, Pinchot 
offered a quick analysis of the cause for the Democrats' 
downfall. The electorate, he argued, had registered its 
opposition to repressive steps taken by the administration 
on the hcmefront. As for international affairs, Pinchot 
remained certain that Wilson, if he could engineer a fair 
peace, wculd be remembered as "a very great man."*88
For Pinchot, the end of the war in Europe set the 
stage foi Wilson’s acid test. On November 18, just a week 
after an armistice had quieted the battlefronts, the 
President announced that he would lead an American delega­
tion to France in order to participate in the peace 
negotiations.*-8*- A few days later, Pinchot publicly assessed 
the challenge that faced the chief Executive. If the treaty
,8See New York Times. Oct. 26, 1918, 1.
(>9New York Call. Nov. 2, 1918, 7.
*-88See Amos Pinchot, Peace or Armed Peace? An Open 
Letter From Amos pinchot to the American Representatives of 
the Coming international Peace conference, pamphlet in Box 
37, Pinchot MSS.
*-°*-The international conclave was scheduled to begin 
in January, 1919. For the President’s announcement, see 
New York Times, Nov. 19, 1918, 1-2.
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talks ended in a "burglar's peace" dictated by Britain and 
Prance, Wilson, the New Yorker predicted, would "go down in 
history as a pretty tragic failure." On the other hand, if 
the President won a just settlement, he might, according to 
Pinchot, be recognized as "America's greatest raan."^^
In his own sphere, Pinchot worked to publicize the 
secret treaties that already obligated the Entente powers. 
Early in 1919, he composed a series of five short articles 
on the orce confidential agreements.103 His accounts 
emphasized the selfish balance of power motives that char­
acterized the pacts. At the same time, he pictured Wilson 
as the harbinger of a new diplomacy based on open discussion 
and democratic institutions. In their final form, Pinchot's 
essays went to the united Press news service.1,0^  They 
subsequently appeared in newspapers throughout the West and 
Midwest.105
With his writing chore done, Pinchot kept a close 
watch on preparations for the peace conference at Versailles. 
News from across the Atlantic soon took an ominous turn. On
102see Pinchot's letter to the editor in (Baltimore) 
Sun. Dec. 1, 1918, 10.
1-03See Amos Pinchot to Roy Howard, Jan. 10, 1919,
Box 38, Pinchot MSS.
104por the complete set of five articles, see united 
Press Red Letter, VII, No. 5 (Jan. 29-Feb. 4, 1919). Copy 
in Box 140, ibid.
l ° ! » A m o s  pinchot to Mrs. Arthur Minturn Scott, Feb. 10, 
1919, Box 39, Pinchot MSS.
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January 15, 1919, spokesmen for the victorious powers
announced that treaty negotiations would be conducted in
secret sessions.1®® Pinchot greeted the announcement with
anger and dismay. The peace, he concluded glumly, would now
"be arranged by a little bunch of old school profiteer
diplomats, closeted behind the closed doors of a palace."^07
A few days later, he wrote to Roy Howard:
I fear our friend Woodrow is going to have a worse 
time than I expected. . . .  He has gotten himself 
into a position ffrom] which it is . . . utterly 
impossible for him to make a real fight for open 
diplomacy and a liberal peace. He is therefore not 
going to make such a fight, but he is going to make 
believe make it and make himself think he is making 
it, and he [is] going to come home claiming that he 
has made it, and more than that, that he has von
it.108
In Pinchot's estimation, the closed negotiating sessions 
meant that Wilson had failed even before the peace* confer­
ence began.
Predictably, Pinchot could see no merit in the 
settlemert that finally emerged from the Versailles meetings. 
He branded the finished compact "a rehash of the iecret
lO^See New York Times. Jan. 16, 1919, 1-2. On the 
problems of publicity and newspaper coverage at the con­
ference, see Baker, Wilson and World Settlement, 7., 136-60; 
and James D. Startt, "The Uneasy partnership: WiJ son and the
Press at Paris," Mid-America. LII, No . 1 (Jan., 1970),
55-69.
l^Amos pinchot to W. Forbes Morgan, Jan. 16, 1919,
Box 39, Pinchot MSS.




Treaties . . .  a glorified Rivers and Harbors bill." 
Likewise, he dismissed the League of Nations Covenant as 
"the last trump card of the governmental reactionaries and 
the financial groups. . . ."HO He feared that the new 
international organization would be used by conservatives 
to suppress future democratic upheavals around the world.
Along with his opposition to the treaty, Pinchot 
voiced his disillusionment with Wilson. In June, 1919, he 
told Geoige Sylvester Viereck: "I am . . . utterly dis­
gusted with Wilson's performances at Versailles. He comes 
out of tie episode dishonored and discredited. . . . " H 2 
Publicly, Pinchot argued that the chief Executive, through 
either naivete or insufficient preparation, had Wcisted the 
world's one chance for a durable p e a c e . A t  Versailles, 
he later contended, Wilson had been "gulled, hoodwinked, 
outwitted, outvoted, made ridiculous and finally sent home
1(iQ
See Amos Pinchot, "Amos Pinchot Calls For a 
Separate Peace," The World Tomorrow. II, No. 6 (June, 1919), 
172.
H ° A m o s  pinchot to Albert Jay Nock, April 21, 1919,
Box 39, Pinchot MSS.
Hlsee Amos Pinchot to Peter Golden, June 9, 1919,
Box 38, ibid.; and Amos Pinchot, "League of Nations covenant 
Analyzed By One Who Regards it As a Great Peril." Reconstruc­
tion. I, No. 6 (June, 1919), 172-75.
■^ ■2Amos Pinchot to George Sylvester Viereck, June 10, 
1919, Box 38, Pinchot MSS.
H3por the argument in pamphlet form, see Amos Pinchot, 
Why America Was Beaten at the Peace conference. Copy in 
Box 178, ibid.
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defeated <it ovory point.'*^^
In deriding the President, Pinchot gave evidence of 
his own political frustration. He had once regarded Wilson 
as an ally in the fight to keep America out of the European 
war. When the United States entered the conflict, he looked 
to the Whxte House for a clarion call that would make the 
war a crusade for democracy. Meanwhile, Pinchot maintained 
a direct Line of communication with the President, and on a 
few occasions he seemed to be in tune with Wilson and other 
key policymakers. At least while in league with the. 
American Union Against Militarism and the American Committee 
on War Finance, the New Yorker appeared to exert a modicum 
of political influence. Yet Pinchot, in the last analysis, 
proved to be politically powerless. On the crucial issues 
of protection for civil liberties and advancement of 
democratic war aims, his preachments had no discernible 
impact on administration policies. When faced with a peace 
treaty that he deplored, Pinchot could only rail at a Presi­
dent who had seldom listened to him even in better days.
^■^Amos pinchot, “Head Down in a Bootleg," The Free­
man, II, No. 34 (Nov. 3, 1920), 178.
Chapter 5
THE COMMITTEE OF FORTY EIGHT
As World War I drew to a close, Amos pinchot renewed 
his interest in American domestic politics. He looked 
forward to a revival of the reform spirit that had marked 
the prewar years, in particular, he hoped to see the enact­
ment of the anti-monopoly creed that he shared with George 
Record. With an eye to that goal, pinchot joined forces 
with other dissidents who dreamed of a new political party 
devoted to reform. Involvement in the third-party movement 
kept the New Yorker hard at work throughout 1919 and 1920.
Within Pinchot's circle of friends talk about a new 
party certered around retired insurance executive j. A. H. 
Hopkins.^ A veteran of Bull Moose politics in New Jersey, 
Hopkins, during World War I, had retained an interest in 
third paity action. Early xn 1919, he began to neet
*For biographical material on Hopkins, see Who's Who 
in America. 1922-1923 (Chicago: A. N. Marquis and Company,
1922), 1565; and New York Times, June 16, 1960, 33.
2in the midst of the war effort, Hopkins had joined 
John Spargo and others in an attempt to fuse liberals and 
pro-war socialists into a new party. On the brief and abor­
tive history of that coalition, see John Spargo, "The New 
National Party, " National Municipal Review. VII, No. 3 (May, 
1918), 284-87; "The New 'National1 Party," Nation, CVI,
No. 2750 (March 14, 1918), 284-85; and New York Times,
March 9, 1918, 9.
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regularly with Pinchot and a few other political indepen­
dents. Out of the meetings came the committee of forty 
Eight, a reform minded group with Hopkins in the role of 
chairman. As its name indicated, the Committee hoped even­
tually to build support in every State of the Union. From 
the beginning, however, a small clique of Eastern urbanites 
controlled the organization. The Committee served primarily 
as a vehicle for the advancement of the political ideals of 
gentlemen reformers such as Hopkins and Pinchot.3
Once banded together, the Committeemen moved to gain 
public attention, in March, 1919, spokesmen for t.he group 
proposed that the leaders of American "liberal thought" meet 
in a national conference and formulate a common program. The 
Committee's representatives, at the same time, clearly 
registered their opposition to any form of political 
extremism. As an alternative to the polar forces of "Re­
action and Revolution," they called for a moderate program 
"Reconstruction."4
30n the early days of the Committee of Forty Eight, 
see the interview with Hopkins in New York Times. July 4, 
1920, VII, 1. See also J. A. H. Hopkins to Amos Pinchot,
Feb. 15, 1919, Box 39, Pinchot MSS; Will Durant, Transition: 
A Sentiment Story of One Mind and One Era (New Yorkt Simon 
and Schuster, 1927), 297? and Arthur Garfield Hays, city 
Lawyer: The Autobiography of a Law Practice (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1942), 250-51”; the latter title herein­
after cited as Hays, City Lawyer.
4For the text of the conference proposal, see "Revo­
lution or Reconstruction? A call to Americans," Survey, XL1, 
No. 25 (March 22, 1919), n.p. For an evaluation of the call, 
see "A New Political Alignment," Nation. CVIXI, No. 2804 
(March 29, 1919), 460-61.
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From the start, Pinchot saw the Committee of Forty 
Eight as a tool that he and George Record could use. Writing 
to the jerseyman in May, 1919, he noted that the Committee's 
proposed national conference would make an excellent forum 
for the presentation of the reform ideas that he and Record 
held in common.5 Record, always ready to advance his
£
doctrinal cause, reacted favorably to the suggestion.0 The 
two veteran activists soon emerged as the chief political 
strategists in the Forty Eighter camp.7
The first major task before the Committeemen was the 
recruitment of a constituency. Potential members received 
the organization's literature by mail, and they were
5Amos Pinchot to George L. Record, May 6, 1919, Box 
39, Pinchot MSS.
During and after the war, Record continued to 
advocate government ownership of railroads, other public 
utilities, and natural resources as a way to equalize 
economic competition. In 1918, when he campaigned for the 
Republican nomination for United States Senator in New 
jersey, his platform included demands for limited national­
ization. See Barr, "Record," 84-86. Record, in March, 1919, 
called for President Wilson to lead a reform crusade on 
behalf of competitive capitalism. In a long letter sent to 
Wilson in Paris, the Jerseyman outlined an economic program 
designed to equalize competitive opportunities. As a first 
step. Record proposed government ownership of railroads and 
natural resources. Wilson, after a long delay, answered in 
polite but non-committal terms. The text of Record's 
letter to Wilson appears in Kerney, Wilson. 437-46. For 
the Chief Executive's reply, see Woodrow Wilson to George L. 
Record, Aug. 15, 1919, Series 3, Letterbook 57, Wilson 
MSS.
7See Hays, City Lawyer. 250-51.
oncouraged to hand it on to other possible enlistees.a In a 
special effort to stir public interest, the group sent out 
thousands of copies of a questionnaire on key political 
issues of the day.® Finally, in September, 1919, a spokes­
man for the Committee announced plans for a national con­
ference to meet in St. Louis, December 9-12.^®
Even before it opened, the St. Louis meeting became 
an object of controversy. The trouble started when an 
American Legion post in Kansas city complained about the 
proposed gathering to St. Louis Mayor Henry W. Kiel.^^ In 
St. Louis itself, local men, who also claimed to be Legion­
naires, pushed the protest a step further. They threatened 
to break up the meeting if Federal officials allowed it to 
open. With tension at a peak, the manager of the head­
quarters hotel for the conference cancelled the reservations
®0n the Committee1s recruiting tactics, see Committee 
of Forty Eight, Bulletin Number One. August 15, 1919, copy 
in Box 39, Pinchot MSS; and New York Times. June 15, 1920,
1.
®A printed copy of the questionnaire appears in the 
papers of Mercer G. Johnston, a prominent Committee member 
from Maryland. See Box 67, Mercer G. Johnston Papers, Manu­
script Division, Library of Congress. The Forty Eighters 
later claimed to have sent out ten thousand copies of the 
questionnaire. See St. Louis Post-Dispatch. Dec. 7, 1919, 
14B.
*°For the text of the announcement in pamphlet form, 
see The Call to a National Conference of American Men and 
Women by~the committee of 48. Copy in Box 67, Johnston MSS. 
See also New York Times, Sept. 22, 1919, 7.
^St. Louis Post-Dispatch. Dec. 3, 1919, 6 .
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held by the Forty Eighters.12 Only a court order reversed 
the cancellation and allowed the sessions to begin on 
schedule. ^  Once under way, the conference discussions were 
carefully monitored by agents from the United States Depart­
ment of Justice.14
As participants in the meeting, Pinchot and Record 
played active and prominent roles.15 Both men sat on the 
all important Platform Committee, the body charged with
1 fkdrawing up a program that would unite the delegates. °
While Record presided over the platform sessions, Pinchot 
worked to shape the contents of specific planks. He 
insisted that first priority go to a plank calling for 
government ownership of natural resources and transportation 
facilities.17
12Ibid., Dec. 8, 1919, 1; S£. Louis Star, Dec. 8, 
1919, 1; and St. Louis Globe-Democrat, Dec. 9, 1919, 1-2.
^St. Louis Star, Dec. 9, 1919, 1.
14See St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Dec. 8 , 1919, 1; St. 
Louis Post-Dispatch. Dec. 10, 1919, 1? and St. Louis Globe- 
Democr at, Dec. 11, 1919, 13.
15According to one estimate, the conference attracted 
approximately two hundred and fifty delegates from thirty- 
eight States. See New York Times. Dec. 11, 1919, 2. For a 
feature article on Pinchot, Record, and other major figuces 
at the meeting, see St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Dec. 10, 1919, 
1-2.
^The Forty Eighters acknowledged the import since of 
the Platform Committee and its members in their own news­
paper. See Facts, Dec. 10, 1919, 3. See also Sit. Louis 
Star, Dec. 10, 1919, 1-2.
1 'Facts. Dec. 11, 1919, 1.
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Tin* p-It'll lor’in, in i L:s J. i nal l.orm, conLu iiR'il sunn* oi: 
the notions tliat Pinchot and Kecord held dear. Tlie document 
opened with a strong endorsement of government ownership of 
natural resources, public utilities, and the means of 
transportation. It went on to condemn large landholdings, 
and to urge taxes designed to break up the land monopoly.
In terms of civil liberties, the platform called for the 
extension of full rights to all citizens. The stcitement 
closed with an expression of support for labor's offorts "to 
share in the management of industry and . . .  to organize 
and bargain collectively. . . .
The sop to labor suggested the kind of coa.i ition 
strategy that the Forty Eighters hoped to follow. On the 
eve of the St. Louis meeting, J. A. H. Hopkins had attended 
the first national convention of the American Labor party.^
■*-8For the text of the platform, see ibid., Dec. 12, 
1919, 1-2. See also New York Times, Dec. 22, 1919, 5.
■^Founded in September, 1918, the American Labor 
party brought together reform minded labor leaders who stood 
to the left of Samuel Gampers. Much of the party's strength 
stemmed from the Chicago Federation of Labor led by John 
Fitzpatrick. For background material on the Labor party, 
see George P. West, "Will Labor Lead?" Nation. CVII, No.
2807 (April, 1919), 600-601; Nathan Fine, Labor and Farmer 
Parties in the united States. 1828-1928 (New York: Hand
School of Social Science, 1928), 377-97; Eugene Staley, 
History of the Illinois State Federation of Labor (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1930), 361-90; and Stanley 
Shapiro, "Hand and Brain: The Farmer-Labor Party of 1920"
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. University of California, 
Berkeley, 1967), 69-145; the last title hereinafter cited 
as Shapiro, "Hand and Brain." See also John Howard Keiser, 
"John Fitzpatrick and Progressive Unionism, 1915-:925" 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. Northwestern University, 
1965), passim.
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in an address to the Labor delegates, he had declared:
We members of the Committee of 48 look forward to 
cooperating with you members of the Labor party,
. . . Your duty and ours is to frame such a program 
that the workers, the farmers, and the liberals of 
the country can work hand in hand at the next 
election,20
The Laborites seemed amenable to Hopkins's offer of an 
alliance. By the close of the Forty Eighters' own national 
conference, an eventual merger of the Committee and the 
Labor party appeared to be a likely p o s s i b i l i t y .2*
Early in 1920, the Committee's leaders took additional 
steps toward building a coalition. On January 1 9 ,  the Forty 
Eighter Executive Committee created a Committee on Procedure 
and authorized it to negotiate with other reform oriented 
groups.22 Pinchot and Record promptly claimed two of the 
seats on the five-man panel.23 i n  February, 1 9 2 0 ,  Hopkins, 
Record, and Pinchot traveled to Chicago for nearly a week of 
talks with officials from the Labor party and the Non-
20New York Call. Nov. 2 5 ,  1 9 1 9 ,  2.
21m  an address to the closing session of the con­
ference, Duncan McDonald of the Labor party offered 
assurances that an agreement "on some definite, common pro­
gram" would allow Laborites and Forty Eighters to "unite 
solidly together. . . . "  See Facts. Dec. 1 2 ,  1 9 1 9 ,  1, 2 .
22Minutes of the committee of Forty Eight Executive 
committee meeting, Jan. 1 9 ,  1 9 2 0 .  Copy in Box 8 4 ,  Pinchot 
MSS.
23
Pinchot and Record were named to the procedure 
Committee on January 2 6 .  See Minutes of the Committee of 
Forty Eight Executive Committee meeting, Jan. 2 6 ,  1 9 2 0 .
Copy in ibid.
Partisan League.24 Pinchot emerged from the discussions in 
an optimistic frame of mind. Writing to a friend on February 
17, he predicted that the Committee of Forty Eight and the 
Labor party would soon hold simultaneous conventions in 
Chicago and fuse into a single unit.25
Meanwhile, Pinchot used his talents as a polemicist 
to advance the third party cause. In an essay published in 
January, 1920, he flayed both the Republican and Democratic 
political machines. The two major parties, he argued, were 
equally subservient to an economic elite that controlled 
America's natural resources and transportation system.26 
In a later article, the New Yorker offered the St. Louis 
platform of the Committee of Forty Eight as an answer to the 
injustices of the established industrial order. The Forty 
Eighter program, he contended, would strip "the privileged 
minority of its monopoly of economic power. . . ."27
Pinchot, in private correspondence, was even more 
insistent about the primacy of the St. Louis platform. He 
maintained that any divergence from that statement would
^Minutes of the Committee of Forty Eight Executive 
Committee meeting, Feb. 16, 1920. Copy in ibid.
25Amos Pinchot to E. W. Scripps, Feb. 17, 1920, Box 
41, ibid.
26See Amos Pinchot, "The Old Order changeth Not," 
Facta, Jan., 1920, 1.
27Amos Pinchot, "Mr. Pinchot cites the Wrongs That 
the *48-ers' Would Right," Reconstruction, II, No. 2
(Feb., 1920), 56.
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2ftbring disunity and disaster. On February 21, he told an 
ally:
Now we only have one asset, just exactly one. It is 
a definite economic program. If we get ahead it will 
be because we have got other people to think the way 
we do, adopt the same platform and unite with us for 
the political carrying out of our economic purposes.
If we don't do this, we will be a flash in the pan 
like the Progressive Party, and we will deservedly 
cease to exist.
The Committee of Forty Eight, Pinchot concluded, needed to 
keep its programmatic goals in the forefront "first, last 
and all the time."^9
The New Yorker soon realized, however, that some Labor 
party members did not share his enthusiasm for the Forty 
Eighter's pro-capitalist program. In March, 1920, he com­
plained about Laborite "hotheads" who favored appeals to 
blue-collar class consciousness.30 a few weeks le.ter, he 
bemoaned the fact that labor wanted "to think as labor and 
function as labor. . . ."31 in a subsequent letter to 
Edward Nockels of the Labor party, Pinchot called for 
moderation on the part of the Laborites. He reminded 
Nockels that the reform movement would need suppox t from
2ftSee Amos Pinchot to James H. Maurer, Feb. 4, 1920; 
Amos Pinchot to J. W. McConaughy, Feb. 5, 1920; and Amos 
Pinchot to W. J. McDonald, Feb. 5, 1920, all in Box 41, 
Pinchot MSS.
^9Amos Pinchot to A. W. Ricker, Feb. 21, 1920, ibid.
30Amos Pinchot to James H. Maurer, March 2.3, 1920,
ibid.
3*Amos Pinchot to Francis J. Heney, April 26, 1920, 
Box 40, ibid.
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I.armors and micUU e-class elements as well as from workPt's,^
Despite Pinchot's wariness, the Committee oL Forty 
Eight appeared to be gaining ground. On April 26, a spokes­
man for the group announced plans for a national convention 
to meet m  Chicago, July 10-13. The Labor party, just 
three days later, declared its intention to convene in 
Chicago, July 11-13.34 With hopes for fusion running high, 
the Forty Eighters talked excitedly about a name tor the 
still unborn third party.3  ^ By the middle of June, Committee 
leaders had sought and obtained assurances that Senator 
Robert M. LaFollette of Wisconsin would consider a third 
party Presidential nomination.3^
The Laborites, on the other hand, were far more 
pessimistic about the chances for fusion. On Jule 19, an 
editorial in the Labor party's newspaper openly questioned 
the wisdom of an alliance with the Committee of F; rty Eight. 
Emissaries from the Committee, according to the journal, had
32Amos pinchot to Edward Nockels, May 21, 1920, ibid.
33New York Times. April 27, 1920, 3.
34Ibid., April 30, 1920, 2.
33The name "Lincoln party" was a favorite among 
Committee leaders. See the Minutes of the Committee of 
Forty Eight Executive Committee meeting. May 27, 1920. Copy 
in Box 84, Pinchot MSS. See also Robert Anderson Pope to 
Mercer G. Johnston, June 15, 1920, Box 45, Johnston MSS.
36See Gilson Gardner to Amos Pinchot, June 15, 1920, 
Box 40, Pinchot MSS.
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already been told that the Labor party expected to retain 
both its name and its working class orientation.37 in a 
later issue, the Laborite editor suggested that the Forty 
Eighters join the Labor party as white-collar auxiliaries.38
Meanwhile, Pinchot continued to insist that the St. 
Louis platform offered the only solid foundation for a reform 
coalition. Writing to Senator LaFollette on June 25, he 
cited the need for a crusade against the root causes of 
economic privilege. "We must," he told the Senator, "de­
prive the privileged class of its present control over 
transportation and the great natural resources. . . .1,38 
Shortly thereafter, Pinchot presented the same argument in 
the pages of The Freeman. In a two-part essay, he explained 
that the Committee of Forty Eight favored a program that 
would end the economic reign of the privileged few and 
initiate an era of genuine competition. He contrasted the 
Committee's belief in free enterprise with what he saw as a 
Labor party commitment to European style socialism.
As the Forty Eighter and Laborite conventions drew 
near, Pinchot remained in the forefront of political 
activity. Arriving in Chicago on July 7, he offered
37See New Majority, June 19, 1920, 4.
38Ibid.. June 26, 1920, 4.
3^Amos Pinchot to Robert M. LaFollette, June 25, 1920, 
Box 41, Pinchot MSS.
40See Amos Pinchot, "The Case For a Third Party," The 
Freeman. I, Nos. 16 and 17 (June 30, and July 7, 1920), 364- 
65 and 394-96.
reporters an assessment of the recently closed major party
conventions. He told the newsmen:
The Democratic convention, like the Republican 
convention, was highly satisfactory to the men 
and women of America who want a new party. . . .
Mr. Cox, like Mr. Harding . . . was chosen because 
he is a mediocre man, who the financial world can 
trust. . . .41
A few hours later, Pinchot, accompanied by Record, left for 
Madison, Wisconsin, and a round of talks with Senator 
LaFollette.42 Tlie two travelers soon returned to Chicago.
On the evening of July 9, Pinchot, Record, and other leaders 
of the Committee of Forty Eight met with Labor party repre­
sentatives to begin final discussions on the matter of 
fusion.4^
For the founders of the Committee, the negotiations 
brought unanticipated difficulties. A night of wrangling 
with the Laborites produced no signs of a unity agreement.
On the next morning, the Forty Eighter national convention 
opened on a second discordant note. When informed of the 
deadlock in negotiations, rank and file members of the 
Committee openly expressed their disappointment. Delegates 
from the Western States complained bitterly about the 
predominance of Easterners within the Committee's hierarchy.
41Chicago Daily Tribune. July 8, 1920, 2.
42LaFollette told his visitors that he would decide 
about a third party nomination after ^he committee of Forty 
Eight and the Labor party had proved their ability to work 
together. See Belle and Fola LaFollette, LaFollette. II, 
999-1000. See also New York Times, July 9, 1920, 3.
43New York Times, July 10, 1920, 1.
94
Lii an effort to quiet the unrest, Committee leadex s quickly 
agreed to double the size of the group responsible for talks 
with the Laborites. Ten Western delegates soon joined the 
ten Eastern incumbents on the negotiating team.44
The increase in the number of negotiators did nothing 
to break the deadlock. When Forty Eighter and Laborite 
conferees met on Saturday night, July 10, they agreed to 
recommend fusion to their respective conventions only if 
prior accords could be reached on a party name and a common 
program. The subsequent exchange of views produced no such 
agreements. in a move designed to keep the talks alive, the 
negotiators finally decided to divide into subgroups on 
platform and organizational problems. Meetings of the two 
smaller bodies were set for Monday, July 12.4^
Hopes for fusion hinged on the outcome of discussion 
in the subgroup on platform. The meeting, as a result, 
attracted its full share of luminaries, pinchot Eind Record 
headed the Forty Eighter delegation, while Labor party 
leaders John Fitzpatrick and Robert M. Buck led the rival 
Laborite contingent. Dudley Field Malone and Gilbert E. Roe 
attended the session as spokesmen for Senator
44For accounts of the first day of the Forty Eighter 
convention, see ibid.. July 11, 1920, 2; and Chicago Sunday 
Tribune. July 11, 1920, 1-2.
45J. A. H. Hopkins later summarized the events of the 
Saturday night conference in a printed letter sent to members 
of the Committee of Forty Eight. See J. A. H. Hopkins,
Facts About the Chicago Convention. Copy in Box 86, Pinchot 
MSS.
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LaFollette.4C* The bargaining got under way shortly after 
midnight on July 13, and it continued on well into the 
daylight hours. Despite efforts at compromise, the partici­
pants could not resolve their differences. The meeting 
ended without producing an agreement on a common program.47
Failure at the negotiating table spelled disaster for 
the founders of the committee of Forty Eight. Restless rank 
and file delegates listened impatiently to the report of 
another night spent on fruitless talk.4® Their discontent 
soon flared into open rebellion. Early in the afternoon on 
July 13, Max Hayes of the Labor party appeared before the 
Forty Eighter convention. He assured the unhappy delegates 
that they would be welcomed at the Labor ite convention with
46For a complete list of the participants, see 
Shapiro, "Hand and Brain," 199, 199n.
47For a detailed account of the meeting, see Gilbert 
E. Roe, The Third Party convention. Why Senator LaFollette 
Declined the Nomination, undated typescript in Series B,
Box 86, LaFollette Family MSS. See also the column by 
William Hard in Chicago Daily News, July 13, 1920, 4.
4®New York delegate Swinburne Hale expressed the dis­
satisfaction felt by many of his colleagues. in a thinly 
veiled attack on Pinchot and Record, Hale told reporters: 
America’s people learned during the war that open 
covenants of peace cannot be arrived at behind closed 
doors. We 48ers have also learned that during 48 
hours of turmoil. I don't imply any dereliction of 
duty, but a certain combination of forces has existed 
to prevent getting together. . . . Certain persons 
from New York and New Jersey haven’t enough faith in 
the essential principles of democracy.
Hale specified that his accusation did not apply to j. A. H. 
Hopkins. See New York Call, July 14, 1920, 2.
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or without their balky l e a d e r s . T h e  invitation created an 
uproar. A host of Forty Eighter delegates bolted their own 
convention and marched on the Labor party's meeting place.
The jubilant Laborites greeted their guests with the strains 
of "Hail! Haill The Gang's All Here."^®
In the midst of the tumult, Pinchot and Record con­
tinued to argue for their point of view. Just after the 
spontaneous merger of the two conventions, pinchot appeared 
before the mixed body of delegates. In an impassioned speech, 
he warned his audience: "There is no place in this country
for a purely labor party. . . . Don't make the mistake of 
representing any one c l a s s . R e c o r d ,  meanwhile, tried to 
rally delegate support for a platform that would be 
acceptable to Senator LaFollette.52
The vote on the platform proved to be the decisive 
test of strength. Pinchot and Record made a last-minute 
effort to clarify their position, in a statement co-authored 
with journalist Gilson Gardner, they told fellow members of 
the committee of Forty Eight:
The negotiations between the platform subcommittee 
of your Convention and a similar committee of the Labor 
Party have reached a stage where we feel that the
49Shapiro, "Hand and Brain," 201.
500n the bolt and the subsequent march, see New York 
Times, July 14, 1920, 1-2; and Chicago Daily Tribune, July 
14, 1920, 2.
^Chicago Daily Tribune, July 14, 1920, 2.
52New York Times. July 15, 1920, 3.
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members of both conventions, and the public generally, 
are entitled to a full and frank statement of the 
inside facts.
After prolonged conferences, we are unable to agree. 
The underlying cause of the difference is that the 
Labor Party representatives think that the new party 
should be a class conscious radical party, standing 
upon the principles of British Guild socialism 
expressed in Trade union language.
We believe that the new party should have a short 
definite platform aimed at the destruction of economic 
privileges, and the winning back of the historic 
political liberties lost during the war.
We offered the substance of our St. Louis platform.
A form of platform drawn by friends of Senator 
LaFollette . . . was also presented to the conference 
Committee, with the assurance that the Senator would 
be willing to accept our joint nomination of this 
platform.
We agreed to accept this platform and the Labor 
representatives refused flatly to accept them [sic]. 
Senator LaFollette's friends then informed us that 
in their judgment the Senator would not be willing to 
become the candidate of the new party.
The situation, therefore, now is this . . .  if the 
platform submitted by Senator LaFollette's friends is 
adopted we can probably have him as our candidate.
If the Labor Party platform is adopted, the Senator 
will not run as our candidate, and in our judgment no 
other public man having any considerable following can 
be induced to take the nomination.
In this event the new Party will enter the field 
with a socialist platform, headed by a radical Labor 
leader. Such a campaign, in our judgment, would be a 
contest between the candidate of the new party and 
Eugene Debs, for the negligible socialist vote of the 
country.
We are unable to join a new party established upon 
such lines.53
The declaration had no discernible impact. Laborite and 
Forty Eighter delegates routinely endorsed the platform
53See Amos Pinchot, George L. Record, and Gxlson 
Gardner, To the Convention of the Committee of Forty Eight, 
undated typescript. Box 86, Pinchot MSS. See also ibid., 
July 15, 1920, 3.
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plunks introduced by Labor party loaders.5^ Alter the vote. 
Record, (Gardner, and Pinchot led a small group of seces­
sionists out of the joint convention.55
The walkout caused no major shock waves among the 
remaining delegates.55 The conventioneers adopted the name 
"Farmer-Labor party" and turned to the selection of a 
national ticket.57 The proceedings were disrupted only 
momentarily when Robert M. LaFollette, jr., appeared on the 
rostrum, in a brief statement, the younger LaFollette 
announced that his father had decided not to accept the 
third party's still untendered Presidential nomination.5® 
unshaken, the delegates went on to designate Parley Parker 
Christensen, a Salt Lake City lawyer, as their choice for 
P r e s i d e n t . A l t h o u g h  a political unknown, Christensen had 
credentials that suited the immediate situation. He had 
been an officer in the Forty Eighter convention, and as an
5<^ On the platform vote, see New York Times, July 14, 
1920, 1-2; and New Majority. July 24, 1920, 2. For the text 
of the platform, see Kirk H. Porter and Donald Bruce Johnson 
(comps.), National Party Platforms, 1840-1960 (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 1961), 223-27.
~*^ New York Times. July 15, 1920, 1.
E C
According to subsequent reports in the Farmer- 
Labor ite newspaper, nine-tenths of the Forty Eighter dele­
gates stayed at the convention. See New Majority, July 24, 
1920, 1, 2, and 4.
57On adoption of the party name, see New York Times, 
July 15, 1920, 1.
58Belle and Fola LaFollette, LaFollette. II, 1007.
59See New York Times, July 15, 1920, 1.
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11 Lorni'y lu-» had shown strong sympathy for the cause oJ: 
organi/.eii labor. Max Hayes, a long time socialist from 
Cleveland, joined Christensen on the ticket.®0
The Farmer-Laborites were more than satisfied with 
the outcome of their Chicago meeting. On July 18, Christen­
sen publicly condemned Pinchot and other dissident Forty 
Fighters as "coupon-clipping intellectuals . . . [who] got 
lost in a convention of the plain people."®^ Two days 
later, Frank P. Walsh, a lawyer with close ties to the 
Farmer-Labor ite hierarchy, quietly praised the work of party 
leaders John Fitzpatrick, Robert M. Buck, and Edward Nockels. 
In a letter to Nockels, Walsh wrote;
Yourself, good old John, and Buck seem to have got 
what you have been driving at for all these months 
. . . a real third party movement inside of labor.
. . . Really and seriously, I think that you pulled 
off a great thing in Chicago, which never could have 
been accomplished . . . except for the clarity of 
purpose and persistency of yourself, John and Buck.
Had you not hung on the way you did, the other side 
would have swallowed you s u r e l y .62
Buck soon added his own voice to the congratulatory chorus.
In a widely circulated article, he argued that the Farmer-
Labor party represented the real interests of ninety per
®°For biographical material on Christensen, see ibid., 
July 16, 1920, 17. For brief sketches of both Christensen 
and Hays, see New Maiority, July 24, 1920, 2.
6lNew York Times. July 19, 1920, 1.
®2Frank P. Walsh to Edward Nockels, July 20, 1920,
Box 35, Frank P. Walsh Papers, Manuscript Division, New York
Public Library, New York, New York.
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cent of the American people.^
Pinchot, on the other hand, looked back on the 
happenings in Chicago with dismay. Upon his return to New 
York, he told reporters that the Committee of Forty Eight 
had been "infiltrated by a lot of honest, well meaning 
mushheads. . . . In a subsequent essay for The Freeman, 
Pinchot explained the differences in economic philosophy 
that kept the founders of the Committee of Forty Eight out 
of the Farmer-Labor party. The original Forty Eighters, he 
contended, had favored a program of limited nationalization 
in order to foster equality of opportunity among industrial 
competitors. On the opposite side, the Farmer-Laborites, 
according to Pinchot, wanted to institute full-fledged 
socialism in the United States.
g3see Robert M. Buck, "The Farmer-Labor Party,"
Nation. CXI, No. 2875 (Aug. 7, 1920), 156.
In the 1920 Presidential election, the Farmer- 
Laborites finished a distant fourth behind the Republicans, 
Democrats, and Socialists. Christensen's 265,229 votes 
compared poorly with the 915,490 ballots cast for Socialist 
candidate Eugene Victor Debs. See Richard M. Scammon (comp.), 
America at the Polls: A Handbook of American Presidential
Election Statistics. 1920-1964 (Pittsburgh* university of 
Pittsburgh Press, 1965), 2; hereinafter cited as Scammon, 
America at the Polls.
64A copy of Pinchot's statement to the press, dated 
July 16, 1920, appears in Series B, Box 180, LaFollette 
Family MSS.
65See Amos Pinchot, "Government By Evasion," The 
Freeman, I, No. 23 (Aug. 18, 1920), 539-41.
Gilson Gardner used another means to argue the merits 
of competitive capitalism. After the Chicago battle, he 
published in book form a new version of the adventures of 
Daniel Defoe's hero Robinson Crusoe. With obvious didactic
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After the debacle in Chicago, Pinchot and oLher 
charter members of the committee of Forty Eight tried to 
regroup. In August, 1920, the Forty Eighter Executive 
Committee authorized a revision of the once sacroscant St. 
Louis platform.6® Record, in particular, wanted a new 
statement that would cleanse the committee of any socialist 
t i n g e . Y e t  the task of revision proved to be too 
difficult. Weeks dragged by without any sign of an agree- 
ment on a new platform.
The lack of a consensus within the Committee 
ultimately led Pinchot and Record to break with the organi-
intent, Gardner traced Crusoe's rise from castaway, to 
entrepreneur, to robber baron. The benefits of competition 
and the dangers of economic concentration are pointed out 
repeatedly throughout the book. See Gilson Gardner, A New 
Robinson Crusoe : A New Version of His Life and Adventures
With an Explanatory Note (New York: Harcourt. Brace, and 
Howe, 1920), passim.
Both Pinchot and Record greeted Gardner's slim volume 
enthusiastically. Pinchot termed it "a perfect corker!" In 
a letter to Pinchot, Record noted that Gardner had "very 
cleverly set up our philosophy." See Amos Pinchot to Gilson 
Gardner, Aug. 13, 1920, Box 41, Pinchot MSS? and George L. 
Record to Amos Pinchot, Aug. 25, 1920, Box 40, Pinchot MSG.
For an insightful discussion of the economic argu­
ments in the original Robinson Crusoe story, see Maximillian 
E. Novak, Economics and the Fiction of Daniel Defoe (Berke­
ley: University of California press, 1962), 1-66.
®®George L. Record to Amos Pinchot, Aug. 27, 1920,
Box 40, Pinchot MSS.
67See George L. Record to Amos Pinchot, Gilson 
Gardner, Frank Pattison, Frank Stephens, j. A. H. Hopkins, 
Allen McCurdy, and A. R. Ricker, Sept. 7, 1920, ibid.
68For complaints about the delay, see J. A. H. Hop­
kins to Amos Pinchot, Sept. 24, 1920; and J. A. H. Hopkins 
to Amos Pinchot, Oct. 19, 1920, both in ibid.
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zaLion. On November 26, 1920, Pinchot submitted his formal 
resignation from the group.^9 in a separate personal letter 
to j. A. H. Hopkins, the New Yorker tried to justify his 
action. The majority of the Executive Committee, he argued, 
no longer shared the principles that he and Record believed 
should be paramount. Most of the committeemen, he added, 
had "neither the brains nor the capacity" to participate in 
the kind of political and economic movement that he and 
Record wanted to build.^0 Shortly thereafter, Record also 
resigned from the Committee. ^
in leaving the Committee, Pinchot remained loyal to 
his own narrow political purposes. From the start., he saw 
the Committee as a vehicle for the advancement of the ideas 
that he held in common with Record. When the organization 
incorporated those views into its St. Louis platform,
Pinchot responded enthusiastically. In published articles 
and in private correspondence, he insisted that the St. Louis 
program offered the only feasible basis for a third party 
coalition. When a reform minded party was built on a dif­
ferent foundation, Pinchot refused to join the movement. He 
condemned the Farmer-Laborites as socialistic enemies of
^Amos Pinchot to J. A. H. Hopkins, Nov. 26, 1920,
ibid.
^Amos pinchot to J. A. H. Hopkins, Nov. 26, 1920,
ibid.
See J. A. H. Hopkins to George L. Record, Nov. 20, 
1920; and George L. Record to J. A. H. Hopkins, Dec. 2,
1920, both in ibid.
free enterprise. Subsequently, Pinchot even questioned the 
ideological soundness of the founding members of the Com­
mittee of Forty Eight. He broke with the Committee when it 
became apparent to him that many of the members did not 
subscribe to the politico-economic ideals that he and George 
Record embraced. Pinchot had no use for an organization 




After leaving the Committee of Forty Eight, Amos 
Pinchot continued to cling to his political and economic 
views. He remained convinced that big business controlled 
American industry and politics. Periodically, he spoke out 
against the power of the financial elite. His intermittent 
activities testified to the durability of his ideological 
commitment.
George Record helped Pinchot stay alert to political 
developments, in March, 1922, Record announced his inten­
tion to seek the Republican nomination for United States 
Senator in New Jersey.^ During the summer months, he waged 
a vigorous campaign in the G.O.P. primary. His platform 
statements had a familiar ring. He castigated the trusts 
and offered economic competition as the surest solution to 
America's industrial problems. As the first steps toward 
equalizing the competitive race, he advocated government
^See Barr, "Record," 103-104.
O
Record used a large tent in order to conduct an 
outdoor, evangelical style campaign. See Amos Pinchot to 




ownership of railroads and natural resources.
Pinchot took an active part in the primary campaign. 
He urged Senator LaFollette and other friends to endorse 
Record’s cause.^ in public, he served the Jerseyman as a 
stump speaker and pamphleteer.6 He also contributed heavily 
to the campaign war chest.6 The expenditure of time, energy, 
and money brought meager results. Record finished a distant 
second at the polls.^
Undaunted, Pinchot and Record soon embarked on 
another project. Along with Oswald Garrison Villard, editor 
of Nation, they drew up plans for a discussion group that 
would meet regularly at Pinchot's house and exchange ideas 
about reform. The ultimate goal, according to Pinchot, was
R o r  Record's arguments in pamphlet form, see George 
L. Record, Break Up the Senate Millionaires * Club. Copy in 
Box 77, ibi(H
^Amos Pinchot to Robert M. LaFollette, April 4, 1922; 
Amos Pinchot to Frederic C. Howe, May 29, 1922; and Amos 
Pinchot to Charles R. crane, June 10, 1922, all in Box 43, 
ibid.
60n Pinchot's efforts as an orator, see the typed 
reports of campaign speeches in Box 79, ibid. For two 
samples of his work as a pamphleteer, see Amos Pinchot, 
George Record: 1Servant of the People'? and Amos Pinchot,
The Man Who could Not Be Bought. Copies of both pamphlets 
appear in Box 82, ibid.
6with a gift of four thousand dollars, Pinchot was a 
major contributor to the campaign fund. For a report on 
Record's financial backers, see Hudson Observer. Sept. 25, 
1922. Clipping in Box 78, ibid.
Republican incumbent Joseph S. Frelinghuysen 
received 191,903 votes to 93,693 for Record. See Barr, 
"Record," 107.
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general agreement on a platform that could be offered Lo the 
public.® Early in 1923, Pinchot's secretary informed Record
that "the liberal group" would meet for the first time on
g
January 8.
From its start, the discussion group included talented 
and well-connected individuals. Pinchot, Record, and Villard 
attended the sessions with strict regularity. United States 
Senator-elect Royal S. Copeland of New York also appeared 
for most of the meetings. Other regulars included 
journalists Charles Merz, Gilson Gardner, Robert W. Brufere, 
and Charles W. Ervin.’1'®
Talk within the circle centered on government owner­
ship of railroads. Proposals to nationalize the rail 
network dominated conversation on the evening of January 
25.11 Five days later, Pinchot argued for a return to the
system oi government operated railroads used during World 
12War I. At a subsequent meeting, the group debated the 
feasibility of calling a national conference on
®Amos Pinchot to P. H. Callahan, Dec. 23, 1922,
Box 43, Pinchot MSS.
^Eleanor Lash to George L. Record, Jan. 3, 1923,
Box 45, ibid.
list of the participants usually appears in the 
minutes of each group meeting. For copies of the minutes 
of several meetings held between Jan. 25, and May 21, 1923, 
see Box 148, ibid.
^Discussion group minutes, Jan. 25, 1923, ibid.
^Discussion group minutes, Jan. 30, 1923, ibid.
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transportation problems.
The loquacious reformers were quick to seek the 
company of established political figures, in February,
1923, Villard invited United States Senators William E.
Borah of Idaho and Smith W. Brookhart of Iowa to a dinner 
meeting of the discussion g r o u p . On the night of March 9, 
Borah and Brookhart joined the regular members for a 
colloquy on government ownership of railroads.
Pinchot found the views expressed by the two Senators
entirely too conservative. Reporting to a friend, he wrote
sarcastically:
We had a marvelous dinner . . .  at which we enter­
tained Senators Brookhart and Borah, and found to 
our vast astonishment, that these statesmen (if that 
is the right term) were not quite ready to throw 
down the gauntlet to privilege, sound a clear clarion 
note in favor of government ownership and rish [sic] 
all on the issue. We discovered, to our amazement, 
that they considered the issue premature . . .  and 
toward midnight these tribunes of the people left us 
with the comforting assurance that they were ready to 
fight to preserve the union, and were heartily in 
favor of all things in the public interest, especially 
their own candidacy fsicl for the presidency of the 
United States, if Providence should stack the cards 
that way.
From the encounter, Pinchot concluded that the discussion
13Discussion group minutes, Feb. 21, 1923, ibid.
^See Oswald Garrison Villard to William E. Borah, 
Feb. 23, 1923, Folder 304, Oswald Garrison Villard papers, 
Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massa­
chusetts; and Oswald Garrison Villard to Smith w. BrooKhorl.. 
Feb. 23, 1923, Folder 376, Villard MSS.
l5Discussion group minutes, March 9, 1923, Box 14u, 
Pinchot MSS.
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group could not look to men in office for decisive leader­
ship. -*-6
The New Yorker and his friends soom formulated an
alternative course of political action. At meetings in late
April and early May, 1923, they discussed sponsoring a
national conference on government ownership of railroads.
By May 14, a list of potential signers for a conference call
l 8had been drawn up. ° Members of the discussion group agreed 
that a conclave on railroads, if properly publicized, would 
"be an event of national importance. During the summer 
months, Charles Ervin and a small staff worked on arrange­
ments for a gathering tentatively set for Chicago, November 
21- 22.20
As the conference date neared, Pinchot spoke out in 
support of government ownership of railroads. On September 
11, he told members of the Public Ownership League of
■^Amos Pinchot to P. H. Callahan, April 10, 1923,
Box 45, ibid.
17Discussion group minutes, April 23, 1923; and May 4, 
1923, both in Box 148, ibid.
l®Discussion group minutes. May 14, 1923, ibid.
19Discussion group minutes. May 21, 1923, ibid.
20Pinchot spent the summer on vacation in Hawaii, but 
he donated office space and secretarial help to the effort 
to organize the conference. See Amos Pinchot to Grenville 
S. McFarland, June 8, 1923, Box 45, ibid. On arrangements 
for the conference, see Amos Pinchot to William Allen White, 
June 16, 1923, Box 45, ibid.; Charles W. Ervin to Gilson 
Gardner, July 18, 1923; Box 44, ibid.; and Oswald Garrison 
Villard to Smith W. Brookhart, Aug. 30, 1923, Folder 376, 
Villard MSS.
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America that nationalization of the rail system would help 
equalize entrepreneurial opportunities in the United 
States.2  ^ Three weeks later, he delivered a similar message 
to the Civic club of Utica, New York.22 with help from 
Villard, Pinchot was soon able to reach a far larger 
audience. Beginning on October 17, in the pages of Nation, 
he published a three-part plea for government ownership of 
rail facilities.23
Despite Pinchot's spadework, the Chicago conference 
failed to materialize. On October 11, the New Yorker 
reminded a friend of the upcoming meeting.2^ Less than a 
fortnight later, he told the same acquaintance that the 
meeting had been rescheduled for January, 1924.23 The delay 
proved to be of no avail. On January 17, Pinchot wrote 
dejectedly: "We have put off our conference. The general
concensus [sic] of opinion among the group around New York
21For the text of the speech in typescript, see 
Address by Amos pinchot to Public Ownership Conference, 
Toronto, September 11, 1923. Box 152, Pinchot MSS.
22See the typescript dated Oct. 4, 1923, in ibid.
23Amos Pinchot, "Railroads and the Mechanics of 
Social Power," Nation, CXVII, Nos. 3041, 3042, and 3043 
(Oct. 17, Oct. 24, and Oct. 31, 1923), 429-31, 458-60, 
and 488-90.
2^Amos pinchot to carl D. Thompson, Oct. 11, 1923, 
Box 44, Pinchot MSS.
23Amos Pinchot to Carl D. Thompson, Oct. 22, 1923,
ibid.
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is that nothing can be done at this t.ime."2^
Although disappointed, Pinchot continued to argue
publicly for his point of view. in February, 1924, he
published another essay on government ownership of railroads.
With an air of confidence, he told readers of Forum that
nationalization of the rail network was imminent. He went
on to explain:
The reason is that short of government ownership, 
no way has been or can be found of preventing our 
great industro-financial interests from using the 
railroad system as an effective weapon with which 
to destroy free competitive industry. . . .
Pinchot closed with a prediction that the railroad issue
27would soon be the dominant question in American politics.
The Presidential race in 1924 gave Pinchot new 
opportunities for political involvement. Writing to Senator 
LaFollette on June 28, he lauded the aging reformer's 
decision to seek the Presidency on an independent ticket.^8 
He urged LaFollette to show the voters "how we can take the 
power-giving things away from plutocracy and restore power
26Amos Pinchot to Edwin J. Gross, Jan. 17, 1924,
Box 47, ibid.
^7For the quotation, see Amos Pinchot, "A Square Deal 
For the Public," Forum. LXXI, No. 2 (Feb., 1924), 202-203.
2®For background material on LaFollette's presiden­
tial bid, see Belle and Fola LaFollette, LaFollette. II,
1088-1114; Kenneth Campbell McKay, The Progressive Movement
of 1924 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1947), 9-109;
and James Henry Shideler, "The Neo-Progressives: Reform
Politics in the United States, 1920-1925" (unpublished Ph.D. 




to tlio public. . . . As his own contribution to popular
political awareness, Pinchot authored still another set of 
articles on government ownership of railroads.3® on July
qi
20, he publicly endorsed LaFollette for President.
Many veterans of the prewar reform movement did not 
share Pinchot's enthusiasm for LaFollette.32 in August, 
1924, Raymond Robins, a onetime Progressive party stalwart, 
initiated an anti-LaFollette drive among his former Bull 
Moose colleagues.33 Edwin A. Van Valkenburg, publisher of 
the Philadelphia North American, and Chester H. Rowell, a 
California journalist, joined Robins in the effort..3^ The
2®Amos Pinchot to Robert M. LaFollette, June 28, 1924, 
Box 46, Pinchot MSS.
^See Amos Pinchot, "The Railroads: A People's
Problem," Railway Clerk. XXXIII, No. 7 (July, 1924), 245- 
and Amos pinchot, "The Real Issue," Railway Clerk. XXXIII,
No. 9 (Sept., 1924), 326-27, 343..
*3 1
J Pinchot and a host of other reform minded New 
Yorkers signed a telegram in support of LaFollette1s 
candidacy. See Belle and Fola LaFollette, LaFollette. II, 
1116-17, and 1224n-25n.
32For an overview of the activities of 1912 Progres­
sives in the 1924 Presidential campaign, see Alan R. Havig,
"A Disputed Legacy: Roosevelt Progressives and the
LaFollette Campaign of 1924," Mid-America. LIII, No. 1 
(Jan., 1971), 44-64.
33Raymond Robins to Edwin A. Van Valkenburg, Aug. 7, 
1924, Folder 252, Edwin A. Van Valkenburg Papers, Houghton 
Library, Harvard university, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
3^Like Robins, both Van Valkenburg and Rowell had 
supported Theodore Roosevelt in 1912. With reference to the 
two newspapermen and the anti-LaFollette drive, see Edwin A. 
Van Valkenburg to Raymond Robins, Aug. 11, 1924, Folder 432, 
ibid. and Raymond Robins to Edwin A. Van Valkenburg, Aug. 24, 
1924, Folder 252, ibid.
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t.Li'i':; l.ilvir <;u I m i 11.11< id i.n a imik«nt attacking l.aKolli ! to
signed by forty-eight former member:; of the Progressive 
party. The partisan declaration appeared in the press on 
September 15.33
Pinchot atruck back at the anti-LaFollette contingent.
In an open letter to LaFollette's running mate, United States
Senator Burton K. Wheeler of Montana, he declared:
Only a small minority of the signers of this shabby 
letter were on the firing line of the old Progressive 
movement. Most of them came in after Roosevelt was 
no longer active and the party had fallen under the 
influence of George W. Perkins and become a sort of 
asylum for well meaning . . . men and women who had 
vague righteous aspirations for which they wanted a 
label that would make them feel Progressive but not 
get them in wrong at the bank.
Pinchot concluded that the declaration's signers had now
decided "to make peace with plutocracy and live comfortably
in its protecting shadow."36
Edwin A. Van Valkenburg replied to Pinchot in kind.
In an editorial for the North American, he attacked Pinchot 
as "an amateur Socialist and radical agitator . . .  a follower 
of the teachings of Marx and Lenine and Debs and LaFol­
lette." He warned his readers that Pinchot subscribed to 
an economic and political philosophy that would destroy
JNew York Times, Sept. 15, 1924, 3.
36Amos Pinchot to Burton K. Wheeler, Sept. 27, i >24,
Box 79, pinchot MSS. See also ibid., Sept. 30, 1924, 2.
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capitalism, marriage, the family, and Christianity.-*7
Pinchot vehemently denied Van Valkenburg's charges.
In an open letter to the publisher, he asserted:
As to your statements about my believing in socialism, 
my alleged desire to destroy . . . the capitalistic 
system, marriage, the family and the Christian church—  
these are the kind of things that your intelligence, 
if not your conscience, should prevent you from putting 
in type. For over ten years, I have constantly spoken 
against socialism, whose [sic] basic doctrine— the 
abolition of competitive effort in industry— I dis­
believe in, disbelieve in as thoroughly as I believe 
in maintaining the capitalistic system. . . .
Continuing his rebuttal, Pinchot argued that the reforms he
IQ
favored would stimulate competitive free enterprise.
Along with letter writing, Pinchot found time for 
other campaign activities. In September, 1924, George 
Record entered the United States Senate race in New Jersey 
as an independent candidate.^ pinchot subsequently stumped 
the Garden State on behalf of Record and LaFolleLt e lie
also joined Record and forty other former Bull Moose 
partisans in an open declaration of support for l.aFol- 
lette.^*" Neither of Pinchot's favorites fared well with the
37gee the editorial "A Pink Poses as a Progressive," 
(Philadelphia) North American, Oct. 10, 1924, 10.
38Amos Pinchot to Edwin A. Van Valkenburg, Oct. 25, 
1924, Box 46, Pinchot MSS.
39New York Times, Sept. 22, 1924, 2.
4°see Amos pinchot to Arthur Garfield Hays, Oct. 4, 
1924; and Gilbert E. Roe to Amos Pinchot, Oct. 22, 1924, 
both in Box 46, Pinchot MSS. See also Amos Pinchot to 
Gilson Gardner, Oct. 10, 1924, Box 79, Pinchot MSS.
^*New York Times, Oct. 24, 1924, 3.
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voters. LaFollette finished a poor third in the nationwide 
race, and Record did no better in New Jersey.4^
Pinchot blamed LaFollette for the disaster at the 
polls. In a post-election appraisal, he contended that the 
Senator had failed to advance a clear and concise program of 
economic reform. Like Theodore Roosevelt in 1912, LaFol­
lette, according to Pinchot, had offered the voters too many 
vague generalities.43 jn a second assessment, the New 
Yorker claimed that reformers would now have to renounce 
expediency and begin serious study of "the American problem. 
. . . "  As for the LaFollette movement, he pronounced it 
smashed to pieces "on the rock of political ambition and 
selfishness. . . .1,44
Pinchot, after a lengthy respite, focused on his own 
notion of "the American problem." By June 1926, he was 
collecting information on past ties between big business and 
national politics in the United States.45 From his material, 
Pinchot planned to write two books about recent American
42For the Presidential vote, see Scammon, America at 
the Polls, 4. For the Senate returns in New Jersey, see 
Trenton Evening Times. Nov. 7, 1924, 1.
43Amos Pinchot to Gilson Gardner, Nov. 26, 1924, Box 
46, Pinchot MSS.
44Amos Pinchot to Mrs. Laurence Todd, Jan. 13, 1925, 
Box 48, ibid.
45See Amos Pinchot to Harry A. Slattery, June 3, 
1926; Harry A. Slattery to Amos Pinchot, June 22, 1926; and 
Amos Pinchot to Gilson Gardner, June 22, 1926, all in Box 
49, ibid.
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liLsLoi'y. Ill U v  first, work, he .inti-uded to survey the 
influence of the business elite on politics since tlu* 
administration of President William McKinley. The second 
volume would recount the history of the Progressive party 
and discuss the ties between Theodore Roosevelt and George 
W. Perkins. Pinchot never managed to complete either book. 
Still, he spent long hours with the projects, and the tasks 
of research and writing kept his attention riveted on th<i 
political machinations of the business community.
Meanwhile, George Record supplied Pinchot with an 
opportunity for a foray into journalism. In September, 1926, 
Record arranged for the publication of a daily column in the* 
Hudson Dispatch, a county newspaper that circulated through­
out northern New jersey. Prom the start, the aging reformer 
planned to share the workload with other writers who would 
contribute on a rotating basis.47 pinchot readily agreed tc 
become one of the columnists.48 James G. Blauvelt and 
Herman B. Walker, two other long time Record associates, 
also volunteered for d u t y . 49 A fifth place went to Everett
^®ln 1958, Helene Maxwell Hooker published an edited 
version of Pinchot's manuscript history of the Progressive 
party. For an insightful commentary on Pinchot's two his­
torical projects and their ultimate fate, see Helene Maxwell 
Hooker, "Editorial Note," in Pinchot, History. 3-6.
47The newspaper was published daily except Sundays.
On Record's plans for the column, see George L. Record to 
Amos Pinchot, Sept. 13, 1926, Box 49, Pinchot MSS.
A Q
Amos Pinchot to George L . Record, Sept. 30, 1926, ibid.
49For biographical material on Blauvelt and Walker, 
respectively, see New York Times, May 11, 1946, 27; and New 
York Times. Jan. ITT, 195$, 3^. On their ties with Recorct, 
see Barr, "Record," 70.
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Colby, once the leader of Progressive party forces in New 
j e r s e y . H e n r y  T. Hunt, formerly the Mayor of Cincinnati 
and more recently a New York attorney, rounded out the list 
of regular contributors.51
Pinchot filled the column with his standard arguments. 
He railed against the political and economic hegemony of big 
business.52 The main task before reformers, he contended, 
was to take away "the special unfair advantages" that gave 
"the monopoly group its power."53 jn specific terms, he 
called for government ownership of railroads and natural 
resources as steps toward equalization of commercial 
opportunities.54
Pinchot also attacked the financial elite xn his 
comments on foreign policy. After Everett Colby had 
endorsed American participation in the League of Nations and 
the World court, Pinchot spoke out against membership in
500n Colby's career, see New York Times, June 20, 
1943, 35.
5:1 For background material on Hunt, see Zane L. 
Miller, Boss Cox's Cincinnati; urban Politics in the 
Progressive Era (New York: Oxford university Press, 1968),
213-38; and Who's Who in America, 1923-1924 (Chicago; A. N. 
Marquis, 1923), 1676.
5^Hudson Dispatch, Nov. 6, 1926, 6; and Hudson 
Dispatch. Nov. 16, 1926, 6.
53ibid., Nov. 26, 1926, 6.
54ibid., Dec. 4, 1926, 6; ibid., Dec. 11, L926, 6 ; 
and ibid., Dec. 18, 1926, 6.
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either body.-0  He reminded readers that any American 
delegate to the multinational forums would be chosen by a 
"Harding closeted with a Daugherty or a Fall . . .  or by 
Galvin Coolidge with the advice and consent of J. P. Morgan 
& Co. . . ." Pinchot's objections went beyond the problem 
of selecting a spokesman for the United States. He argued 
that "Leagues and Courts," located in foreign capitals and 
closed to public view, were "likely to tighten the hold of 
plutocracy on international affairs. . . .  1,58
Differences over domestic issues caused an even wider 
rift among the columnists. The trouble began when Henry 
Hunt authored a series of columns in which he praised 
organized labor and questioned the wisdom of unfettered 
economic competition.5? Both Pinchot and Record deplored 
the tenor of Hunt's remarks. in private, they concluded 
that he had become a socialist.Record, in an cittempt to 
combat the ideological contagion, published three successive 
installments on the fallacies of socialism.^8 Hunt argued
55For Colby's recommendations, see ibid., Oct. 21, 
1926, 6,* and ibid., Oct. 28, 1926, 6.
56Ibid., Oct. 30, 1926, 6.
57Ibid., Oct. 19, 1926, 6; ibid.. Oct. 27, 1926, 6; 
ibid., Nov. 2, 1926, 6; ibid., Nov. 9, 1926, 6; and ibid., 
Nov. 23, 1926, 6.
^8George L. Record to Amos Pinchot, Nov. 27, 1926; 
and Amos Pinchot to George l . Record, Nov. 30, 1926, both 
in Box 49, Pinchot MSS.
^Hudson Dispatch. Nov. 29, 1926, 6; Hudson Dispatch. 
Dec. 6, 1926, 6; and Hudson Dispatch. Dec. 13, 1926, 6.
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r rt
in n  Ini I la I, but: the debate died prematurely. In January, 
1927, a new editor took charge of the Hudson Dispatch, and 
the rotating column came to an abrupt end.®'*'
With the collapse of the newspaper venture, Pinchot 
turned to more leisurely pursuits. He met occasionally with 
reform minded p o l i t i c i a n s . 62 por the most part, however, he 
developed his ideas in unpublished writings. During the 
summer of 1927, his manuscript output included a paean to 
the wisdom of William Graham Sumner. He argued that the 
Yale sociologist had understood the vital need for competi- 
tive struggle within society.
Pinchot returned to active politics in 192fi. In the 
Presidential race for that year, he favored Alfred E. Smith, 
the Democratic nominee, over Herbert Hoover, the Republican 
standard-bearer. On October 4, Pinchot explained his 
preference in an open letter to John J. Raskob, Chairman of 
the Democratic National Committee. He told Raskob that 
Smith had candidly faced the issues of the campaign while 
Hoover had equivocated. In the same letter, Pinchot attacked
6®For Hunt's arguments, see ibid.* Dec. 7, 1926, 6? 
and ibid., Dec. 14, 1926, 6.
61Ibid., Jan. 8, 1927, 1; and George L. Record to 
Amos Pinchot, Jan. 13, 1926 [sic]. Box 49, Pinchot MSS.
®2See Robert F. Wagner to George L. Record. May 5, 
1927; and Amos Pinchot to George L. Record, July 3, 1927, 
both in Box 50, Pinchot MSS.
®2See Amos Pinchot, What Sumner Saw, typescript dated 
July 22, 1927, Box 213, ibid.
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Hoover as .1 lackey of big business in general and tho public
f.A
ul.i.1 i tics trust in particular.
Hoover's subsequent election victory left Pinchot in 
a truculent mood. He lashed out at the President-elect even 
before 1928 came to an end. In an article for Nation, he 
predicted that Hoover would soon scuttle the Sherman Anti- 
Trust Act. The power of monopolies, he added, would then 
grow to new heights "beneath the warming rays of Presi­
dential approval. . . . "  in closing, Pinchot looked four 
years hence and saw Hoover being re-elected by "a nation 
gone serenely Babbitt.
Pinchot continued to goad Hoover after the onset of 
the Great Depression. In April, 1930, Pinchot was part of a 
delegation that went to the White House in order to confer 
with the President about rising unemployment. Hoover, 
according to the New Yorker-; treated his visitors imperiously 
and informed them that the job crisis had nearly passed.**®
In an article almost a year later, Pinchot recalled the 
meeting and asked tauntingly; "Has the magic of the Great 
Engineer lost some of its power and cunning? Or are
®4Amos Pinchot to John J. Raskob, Oct. 4, 1928, Box
51, ibid. Pinchot contributed a thousand dollars to help 
circulate his letter to Raskob in pamphlet form. See Amos 
Pinchot to Frederic C. Howe, Oct. 10, 1928, Box 51, ibid.
See Amos Pinchot, "Hoover and the 'Big Lift,1" 
Nation. CXXVII, No. 3312 (Dec. 26, 1926), 706-708.
S^Amos pinchot to G. B. Parker, Nov. 25, 1930, Box
52, Pinchot MSS.
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'»,000,000 iin‘ft and women looking for work . . . but another 
illusion ol tho untrained lay mind?"^? in a subsequent 
essay, Pinchot branded the Chief Executive as a tool of the 
public utilities trust,®® Early in 1932, he publicly 
censured the President and both major parties for subser­
vience to America's business elite.
Ultimately, Pinchot went beyond the bounds of 
journalism in his condemnation of the Hoover government. 
During the summer of 1932, a ragged army of unemployed World 
War I veterans assembled in Washington. The ex-soldiers 
hoped to encourage early payment of a cash bonus due most of 
them in 1945. The presence of the unkempt lobbyists unnerved 
Hoover, and he called in the armed forces, in July, 1932, 
Federal troops routed the Bonus Army from its encampment 
along Washington's Anacostia River.78 Pinchot turned play­
wright in order to express his disdain for the President's 
use of military might. In General Goober at the Battle of 
Anacostia. a mordant satire in two acts, he pictured the 
President as a blustering incompetent who swaggered about
®7Amos pinchot, "We Met Mr. Hoover," Nation. CXXXII, 
No. 3419 (Jan. 14, 1931), 44.
68Amos Pinchot, "Hoover and Power," Nation. CXXXIII, 
Nos. 3448 and 3449 (Aug. 5, and Aug. 12, 1931), 125-28, and 
151-53.
Amos pinchot, "captain Hoover: Afloat in a Sieve,"
Nation, CXXXIV, No. 3481 (March 23, 1932), 336-38.
70See Roger Daniels, The Bonus March: An Episode of
the Great Depression (Westport: Greenwood Publishing com­
pany, 1971), 3-210.
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Lh<* Executive Mansion with saber in hand. Secretary of 
State "Blimson," Secretary of War "Whirely," and other 
"cabinet officers" helped make up the rest of the seriocomic 
cast.71
Pinchot's effort as a playwright typified the diver­
sity of his political involvements in the years after 1920. 
Over the long travail, he assumed a variety of political 
roles. As a writer, organizer, and campaigner, he stayed 
active in politics. At the same time, his economic and 
political beliefs remained unchanged. In public pronounce­
ments, he inveighed against big business and urged reforms 
intended to promote competitive free enterprise. Pinchot 
preached the gospel of atomistic capitalism at the cost of 
his own political isolation. His arguments were increasingly 
remote from the realities of politics and economics in 
America.
71Amos Pinchot, General Goober at the Battle of 
Anacostia. Printed copy in Box 130, Pinchot MSS.
Chapter 7
THE LAST DECADE
For Amos Pinchot, American politics from 1932 onward 
revolved around Franklin D. Roosevelt. Pinchot welcomed the 
elevation of his fellow New Yorker to the White House, and 
he hailed the early steps in the New Deal. Yet he soon grew 
to distrust the President. He became convinced that Roose­
velt and the New Dealers wanted to make drastic changes in 
American institutions, ultimately, Pinchot emerged as a 
virulent critic of the Chief Executive.
In 1932, Pinchot eagerly supported Roosevelt's drive 
for the Presidency. During the campaign season, he sent 
letters of advice and encouragement to the New York 
Governor.^ On election night, he sat with Roosevelt while 
news of victory poured in from across the country.^ Shortly
Amos pinchot to Franklin D. Roosevelt, Aug. 11,
1932; and Amos pinchot to Franklin D. Roosevelt, Nov. 5, 
1932, both in Box 53, Pinchot MSS.
Nearly eight years later, Pinchot recalled the elec­
tion night celebration. Writing to Senator Hiram Johnson in 
October, 1940, he said:
As you know there was a time when I believed in 
Franklin Roosevelt. I was with him on the evening 
of his first election. And as he sat with the 
telephone receiver in his right hand, he was kind
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i.hcifaftcr, P.inahot reaffirmed hits luitli in the Pii-s j.don I.- 
eloct. In a speech delivered on November 13, lie praised 
Roosevelt as a reform leader who could steer the United 
States between the extremes of socialism and fascism.^
Pinchot knew the exact direction in which he wanted 
the new administration to move, in January, 1933, he out­
lined a reform program for an audience at Forest Hills, New 
York. He recommended government ownership of railroads and 
natural resources as steps toward the revitalization of 
capitalism. He also endorsed controlled inflatioi as a 
stimulant for free enterprise.4
Despite his preconceptions, Pinchot reacted favorably 
to the improvisations of the early New Deal. Just two weeks 
after Roosevelt's inaugural, he exclaimed: " . . .  its a
wonderful and encouraging thing to see how the country 
responds to a brave and honest spirit in the Whitt House." 
The rapid acceleration of governmental activity caused
enough to put his left arm around me and say:
'Pinchot, we're going to have a truly liberal 
administration.'
Pinchot supplied the emphasis. See Amos Pinchot to Hiram W. 
Johnson, Oct. 2, 1940, Box 68, ibid.
3
A printed copy of the speech appears in Box 175, 
ibid. For the same text in article form, see Amos Pinchot, 
"The American Liberal and His program," Churchman, CXLVII, 
No. 10 (April, 1933), 14-15.
4See Amos Pinchot, For Positive Policies, typescript 
dated Jan., 1933, in Box 233, Pinchot MSS.
5Amos Pinchot to William P. Eno, March 18, 1933,
Box 5, ibid.
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Pinchot few qualms. Writing to Allen McCurdy on May 6, he 
lauded the "wartime . . . form of government" adopted by the 
New Dealers. At the same time, he described Roosevelt's 
"spiritual and mental energy" as "astounding and wholly 
admirable."8
personal tragedy soon interrupted Pinchot's celebra­
tion of the New Deal. In August, 1933, George Record 
suffered a cerebral hemorrhage. At first, the venerable
7
reformer appeared to be capable of a recovery. ny August 
27, he was well enough to warn Pinchot that "the loosevelt 
experiment" amounted to "pure socialism."8 Yet the signs of 
improvement in the Jerseyman's condition proved to be 
deceptive. On September 27, he died at the age of seventy- 
four.9
Following Record's death, Pinchot eulogized his old 
friend. In an article for the New Republic, he compared 
Record favorably to William Graham Sumner. Both the 
reformer and the sociologist, he contended, had believed 
wholeheartedly in individualism. He went on to praise Record 
as a tireless opponent of plutocracy and socialism. With 
reference to his long time colleague, Pinchot concluded:
^Amos Pinchot to Allen McCurdy, May 6, 1933, Box 54,
ibid.
7For a report on Record's illness and his chances for 
recovery, see New York Times. Aug. 13, 1933, II, 4.
sGeorge L. Record to Amos Pinchot, Aug. 27, 1933,
Box 54, Pinchot MSS.
%tew York Times. Sept. 28, 1933, 24.
125
"Hi; was a devoted friend, and I think the only great man I 
have known."1®
The death of his comrade resharpened Pinchct's 
ideological consciousness. When the New Yorker returned to 
the political arena, he saw the Roosevelt administration in 
a critical light that contrasted vividly with his earlier 
optimism. On October 11, he complained about the potential 
for dictatorship that he perceived in the New DeaJ's National 
Recovery Administration.11 Less than two weeks later, he 
remarked that Roosevelt seemed to be floundering in a
1 o
manner reminiscent of Hoover. Still, Pinchot showed no 
immediate inclination to desert the President. In November, 
1933, he declared: "My personal opinion of the Roosevelt
administration is that it is trying to make . . . reforms 
that are absolutely necessary to the continuance of 
capitalism.1,13
Pinchot fully expected the capitalist system to 
rescue the United States from the Great Depression. In 
January, 1934, he sketched a reform agenda that included 
nationalization of banks, natural resources, and public
10Pinchot, "Record," 329-31.
•^Amos Pinchot to Charles W. Ervin, Oct. 11, 1933, 
Box 54, Pinchot MSS.
•^Amos Pinchot to Ernest Gruening, Oct. 23, 1933,
ibid.
13Amos Pinchot to Dr. Lewis Frissell, Nov. 23, 1933,
ibid.
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nt i .l.i L i o n . P r e d  ictably, he saw government ownership as a 
way to stimulate competitive enterprise. On April 11, ho 
wrote with reference to the rail network: "I am one of the
old breed of individualists. I don't want to see the rail­
roads taken over as a step to socialism, but as a means of 
keeping equal opportunity, Billy Sumner1s 'equal chance' 
alive.1,15
Short of a program of limited nationalization,
Pinchot looked to monetary inflation as a stimulart for the 
somnolent economy. In June, 1934, he urged President Roose- 
velt to adopt clear-cut inflationary measures. When no 
answer came from the White House, Pinchot tried a different 
tack. On August 8, he sent an open letter to the editors of 
two hundred American newspapers. In his lengthy espistle, he 
argued that the time had come for Roosevelt to "reflate" the 
dollar to its pre-Depression s i z e .
Pinchot soon joined forces with other advocates of 
planned inflation. In September, 1934, he helped establish 
the Sound Money League.^-® As its primary demand, the
•*-4ftnos pinchot to Paul U. Kellogg, Jan. 29, 1934, Box 
55, ibid.
■^Amos Pinchot to Joseph B. Eastman, April 11, 1934,
ibid.
l^Amos Pinchot to Franklin D. Roosevelt, June 28,
1934, ibid.
■^See Amos Pinchot, Copy of Letter Sent to 200 Editors 
For Publication, typescript dated Aug. 8, 1934, ibid. See 
also New York Times, Aug. 10, 1934, 6.
~*~8New York Times. Oct. 1, 1934, 6.
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deceptively named League called for the creation of a 
Federal Monetary Authority. The proposed agency would be an 
independent government bureau with control over supplies of 
credit and currency. League members generally assumed that 
such a body would attack the Depression by increasing the 
amount of money in circulation.^^ Pinchot readily endorsed 
the concept of an independent Monetary Authority. Later in 
1934, he recommended the establishment of such an office to
both Henry Ford and united States Senator William E.
20Borah. In January, 1935, he advanced the same idea in a
01radio speech over station WEVD in New York.
The Roosevelt administration showed no enthusiasm for 
the creation of an independent bureau with power over the 
money supply. Marriner S. Eccles, an ardent New Dealer and 
the Governor of the Federal Reserve Board, insisted that his 
own agency, if given the resources, could solve the full 
range of monetary p r o b l e m s . 22 February, 1935, New Deal
supporters in Congress introduced legislation designed to 
strengthen the hand of the Federal Reserve in monetary
19See Joseph E. Reeve, Monetary Reform Movements; A 
Survey of Recent Plans and Panaceas (Washington: American
Council on Public Affairs, 1943), 87, 90, and 326-29.
20Amos Pinchot to Henry Ford, Oct. 9, 1934; and Amos 
Pinchot to William E. Borah, Nov. 13, 1934, both in Box r5, 
Pinchot MSS.
21For the text of the radio address, see Amos Pinchot., 
Shall We Have a Central Bank? Printed copy in Box 130, ibid.
22See Marriner S. Eccles, Beckoning Frontiers: Public
and Personal Recollections (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1951), 165-76.
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policymaking.^ The proposed measure received a strong 
endorsement from Board Governor E c c l e s . 24
Pinchot objected strenuously to the New Dealers' 
approach to fiscal policy matters. He considered the 
Federal Reserve an all too pliant tool in the hands of the 
Chief Executive, in an open letter issued on March 15, ue 
warned of a growing concentration of economic powcsr in the 
Executive Branch.25 <phe legislation under review, he 
argued, would give the President the ability to numipulat-e 
the economy for political purposes. As an alternative to a 
stronger Federal Reserve, he urged the creation oi "a 
permanent, non-partisan, and non-political Monetary 
Authority. . . ."26
While Congress debated the banking question, Pinchot 
found himself at odds with other aspects of the New D e a l . 27
2^For a summary of the bill, see New York Times.
Feb. 5, 1935, 1, 20.
24see ibid., Feb. 9, 1935, 23. See also Marriner S. 
Eccles, "The Federal Reserve— 1935 Model," Magazine of Wall 
Street. LV, No. 12 (March 30, 1935), 666-67, and 696^57.
2^pinchot told a close friend that copies of the 
letter went to "all members of congress, [the] Cabinet, 
Administration advisers. Presidents of principal banks, and 
Editors throughout the country." See Amos Pinchot to Sumner 
Gerard, March 14, 1935, Box 57, Pinchot MSS.
26For the text of the letter in printed form, see New 
York Times. March 18, 1935, 16.
27in August, 1935, Congress finally passed the Banking 
Act. The legislation give the New Dealers the stronger Fed­
eral Reserve they wanted. For the text of the Act, see U.S., 
Statutes at Large. XLIX, Part 1, 684-723. For an insightful 
commentary on the legislation, see Walter Lippmann, inter­
pretations , 1933-1935 (New York: Macmillan Co., 1936),184-95.
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lie conLinuocl to believe tliat capitalism could lift, the
28ifni.tod states out of the Depression. in terms cf reform, 
he remained committed to a program of limited nationaliza­
tion intended to equalize entrepreneurial opportunities.^ 
The Roosevelt government, he reluctantly concluded, did not 
share his politico-economic goals. On June 19, the New 
Yorker complained that he was "fast losing confidence in the 
President. A week later, he groused: "I'm not so darn
sure that Roosevelt and the brain trust aren't sliding us 
into a dictatorship. . . ."31
Shortly thereafter, Pinchot broke publicly with the 
New Deal. On July 15, he announced his change of allegiance 
in an open letter to Felix Frankfurter, a key Roosevelt 
adviser. Pinchot told Frankfurter that the President had 
prolonged the Depression by failing to restore business
2®Amos Pinchot to Rev. Charles E. Coughlin, April 19, 
1935; and Amos Pinchot to Mrs. Thomas K. Finlettei, May 14, 
1935, both in Box 56, Pinchot MSS.
3^ln May, 1935, Pinchot delineated a reform program 
for United States Senator Homer T. Bone of Washington. 
Pinchot told the Senator:
What we really need, as a start, is to get out 
natural resources . . . and also our transportation 
system and utilities, out of the hands, so to speak, 
of Mr. Morgan and Mr. Mellon. Then there will be 
some chance for industrial equality of opportunity, 
but not till then.
See Amos Pinchot to Homer T. Bone, May 8, 1935, Box 57, 
ibid.
3°Amos Pinchot to Kenneth B. Walton, June 19, 1935,
ibid.
3lAmos Pinchot to Kenneth B. Walton, June '/6, 1935,
ibid.
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miif Lclt'nce. Labeling Roosevelt "the areal tfncertaLnty, "
Ik' called on the Chief Executive to choose among capitalism, 
socialism, and fascism. As for himself, Pinchot declared, 
that he was "no longer gambler enough to support the New 
Deal. "3^
In search of an alternative to Roosevelt, Pinchot 
turned to the Republican party. His attention soon focused 
on Idaho's Senator William E. Borah. An aging veteran of 
reform politics, Borah had a strong aversion to the New Deal, 
a nationally known reputation as a progressive, and a viable 
interest in running for President.33 on August 16, Pinchot 
described the Senator as the perfect G.O.P. Presidential 
candidate for 1936.*^ A few weeks later, he expressed the 
belief that Borah could outpoll Roosevelt in a national 
race.35
Pinchot subsequently emerged as an active supporter 
of Borah's bid for the White House. On February 4, 1936, 
the Senator announced his intention to seek the Presidency.3®
3^Amos Pinchot to Felix Frankfurter, July 15, 1935,
Box 56, ibid. See also New York Times. July 24, 1935, 18.
•* S^ee Orde Sorensen Pinckney, "William E. Borah and
the Republican Party, 1932-1940" (unpublished Ph.D disserta­
tion, University of California, Berkeley, 1957), 84-114; and
William Hard, "Borah and '36 and Beyond," Harper's Magazine.
CLXXII (April, 1936), 575-83.
3^Amos Pinchot to J. S. Cullinan, Aug. 16, 1935, Box
56, Pinchot MSS.
3®Amos Pinchot to Frank Gannett, Sept. 26, 1935, Box
57, ibid.
3®New York Times. Feb. 5, 1936, 1, 2.
131
Within a few days, Pinchot sent Iioran a latter of advice* on 
campaign issues.3  ^ in the monLlis that LoJlowed, he offered 
tin* Senator policy rocornmendations and words of encourage­
ment.-*8 He also publicly endorsed the Idaho politician as a
'IQ
Presidential aspirant. Pinchot expended his energy m  
vain. Borah never seriously threatened Kansas Governor 
Alfred M. Landon in the fight for the G.O.P. nomination.4®
During the autumn election race, Pinchot backed 
Landon in preference to Roosevelt. As his major contribu­
tion to the campaign, Pinchot dispatched an open letter to 
Harold L. Ickes, Roosevelt's irascible Secretary of Interior. 
Writing to Ickes on October 14, he charged that the New 
Dealers wanted to impose a socialist regime on the United 
States. In contrast to the administration's key figures, 
Landon, he said, offered the voters "character and common- 
sense." With reference to the Kansas Governor, Pinchot 
concluded: "He is not as advanced in his views as; I am. But.
he is liberal and open-minded. . . .  I see more chance for
37Amos Pinchot to William E. Borah, Feb. 14, 1936,
Box 58, Pinchot MSS.
3®See Amos Pinchot to William E. Borah, March 3,
1936; and Amos Pinchot to William E. Borah, April 17, 1936, 
both in ibid.
39Hartford Courant. March 6, 1936. Clipping in Box 
231, ibid. See also Amos Pinchot to Chairman of ihe Borah 
Meeting, May 8, 1936, Box 59, ibid.
4®Landon won an easy first ballot victory. Roruh
received only nineteen votes from convention delegates. See
New York Times. June 19, 1936, 1.
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progress in an administration headed by him than by Mr. 
Roosevelt. "41
When the President won re-election by a landslide 
margin, Pinchot cast a doleful eye over the returns. He 
assured Landon that the results stemmed from Roosevelt's 
"matchless skill in arousing class hatred and class 
hopes. . . ."42 In a second assessment, he denied that the 
votes reflected an "outpouring of popular sentiment." He 
attributed the Democratic victory to the efforts of relief 
recipients, subsidized farmers, and others who feared that 
"their semi-annual cheques would cease if the Little White 
Father were not returned to power.
Post-election developments soon brought Pinchot back 
into conflict with the New Dealers. On February 5, 1937, 
President Roosevelt asked Congress for an increase in the 
size of the Federal Judiciary. The Chief Executive's primary 
goal was to enlarge the United States Supreme court and 
thereby make the tribunal more amenable to his reform pro­
gram. 44 pinchot viewed Roosevelt's scheme with alarm. On
41Amos pinchot to Harold L. Ickes, Oct. 14, 1936, Box 
59, Pinchot MSS. See also ibid., Oct. 19, 1936, 2.
42Amos Pinchot to Alfred M. Landon, Nov. 4, 1936, Box 
58, Pinchot MSS.
43Amos Pinchot to Alfred Hawes, Nov. 6, 1936, ibid.
44por the text of Roosevelt's message to Congress,
see Cong. Rec., 75 Cong., 1 Sess. (Feb. 5, 1937), 877-79.
See also William E. Leuchtenburg, "The Origins of Franklin 
D. Roosevelt's 'Court-Packing' Plan," in Philip B. Kurland 
(ed.), The Supreme Court Review. 1966(Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1966), 347-400.
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l:h<* evening oi February 5, ho wrote Koy Howard: " . . .  this
is a tremendous occasion. unless Congress defeats this 
bill, we are in fascism."4 *^
Pinchot‘s sense of urgency propelled him into acuion. 
During a telephone conversation on February 6, he asked 
newspaper publisher Frank Gannett, a former colleague from 
the Borah campaign, to lead the fight against the President's 
plan to reorganize the Judiciary. Gannett accepted the 
challenge. On February 14, the publishing magnate announced 
the formation of the National Committee to Uphold Constitu­
tional Government. Founders of the new organization included 
Gannett, Pinchot, journalist Lincoln Colcord, and historian 
James Truslow Adams. In the months that followed, the com­
mittee fought tenaciously against Roosevelt's "Court 
packing" plan and other New Deal innovations.4®
The furor over Judicial reorganization gave Pinchot 
ample opportunity to use his polemical skills. On February 
14, he sent a caustically worded letter to all members of 
congress. The President's court plan, he told the legis­
lators, constituted "a long and perhaps irrevocable step
4^Amos Pinchot to Roy Howard, Feb. 5, 1937, Box 61, 
Pinchot MSS.
4^On the origins and activities of the National com­
mittee to Uphold Constitutional Government, see Samuel T.
Williamson, Frank Gannett; A Biography (New York: Duell,
Sloane, and Pearce, 1940), 177-203. See also Richard
Polenburg, Reorganizing Roosevelt1s Government; The Contro­
versy Over Executive Reorganization. 1936-1939 (Cambridge:
Harvard university Press, 1966), 55-78? hereinafter cited as
Polenburg, Roosevelt1s Government.
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into dictatorship."^ A few weeks later, Pinchot addressed 
himself directly to the Chief Executive. In an open letter 
on April 26, he told Roosevelt: " . . .  I have watched your
steady and unrelenting drive for more and more power . . .  
[and] I am forced to conclude that . . . you want the power 
of a dictator without the liability of the name.1,48
While Congress continued debate on the Court ques­
tion, pinchot scrutinized other New Deal measures.^ Along 
with Judicial reorganization, Roosevelt had previously gone 
on record in favor of restructuring the Executive Branch. 
Pinchot regarded Executive reorganization as another scheme
Amos Pinchot to Members of the United States con­
gress, Feb. 13, 1937, Box 60, Pinchot MSS. See also New 
York Times, Feb. 15, 1937, 3.
Amos Pinchot to Franklin D. Roosevelt, April 26, 
1937, Box 234, Pinchot MSS. See also New York Times. April
26, 1937, 7.
^Congress struggled with the Court question until 
August, 1937. The legislators finally enacted a compromise 
measure that made no change in the size of the Supreme 
Court. For the text of the Act, see U. S., Statutes at 
Large. L, Part 1, 751-53. For material on the fight in 
Congress, see William E. Leuchtenburg, "Franklin D. Roose­
velt's Supreme Court 'Packing* Plan," in Harold W. Hollings­
worth and William F. Holmes (eds.), Essays on the New Deal 
(Austin: Uhiversity of Texas Press, 1969), 69-115.
~*°For Roosevelt's stand on Executive reorganization, 
see U. S., Reorganization of the Executive Departments; 
Message From the President of the united States Transmitting 
a. Report on Reorganization of the Executive Departments of 
the Government, Senate Doc. 8, 75 Cong., 1 Sess., 1937,
1-84. See also Louis Brownlow, A Passion For Anonymity:
The Autobiography of Louis Brownlow (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1958), 371-403.
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Cl
to increase Presidential power. He detected the same 
sinister motive behind a minimum wage proposal introduced in
eg t
Congress by Senator Hugo L. Black of A l a b a m a . P i n c h o t ,  xn 
short, saw Roosevelt grasping for additional power at every 
turn. On July 26, the New Yorker renewed his open letter 
campaign against the President. In an angry screed, he once 
again charged the Chief Executive with attempting to 
establxsh a dxctatorshxp.
Pinchot kept up his one-sided correspondence with 
Roosevelt during the first half of 1938. In an open letter 
dated January 29, he urged the President to abandon the 
cause of Executive reorganization. At the same time, he 
repeated his contention that Roosevelt wanted dictatorial 
p o w e r . i n  May, 1938, Pinchot challenged the President
Sixmos Pinchot to F. M. Huntington Wilson, May 4,
1937, Box 62, Pinchot MSS; and Amos Pinchot to William
Hard, May 27, 1937, Box 60, Pinchot MSS. See also Polenburg,
Roosevelt1s Government, 66-68.
52For a discussion of Senator Black’s 1937 proposal, 
see Paul H. Douglas and Joseph Hackman, "The Fair Labor 
Standards Act of 1938," Political Science Quarterly, LIII,
No. 4 (Dec., 1938), 493-94. For Pinchot's reaction to the 
bill, see Amos Pinchot to Robert P. Scripps, June 28, 1937, 
Box 62, Pinchot MSS; and Amos Pinchot to Roy Howard, July 2, 
1937, Box 61, Pinchot MSS.
53Amos Pinchot to Franklin D. Roosevelt, July 26,
1937, Box 60, Pinchot MSS. See also New York Times, July 26,
1937, 6.
54Amos Pinchot to Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jun. 29,
1938, Box 64, Pinchot MSS. See also New York Times, Jan.
31, 1938, 3. Congress rejected Executive reorganization in 
April, 1938. A ye air later, however, Roosevelt won approval 
to make sweeping changes in his governmental household. See 
Polenburg, Roosevelt's Government. 162-68.
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■ ilnruj a different. front. On May 12, the House of Represen- 
(atives approved on appropriations bill that called for the 
expenditure of three billion dollars on relief and public 
works projects. The proposed legislation gave the Chief 
Executive discretionary authority over disbursement of the 
money.55 pinchot objected vehemently to the power tenta­
tively granted to the President. In an open letter on May 
17, he accused Roosevelt of trying to "Tammanyize” the 
United States. The appropriations measure, he fumed, was a 
'plan to buy America on the hoof."56
As an alternative to increased government spending, 
Pinchot argued for reliance on free enterprise. On June 9, 
he wrote: "Depressions cannot be cured by governments.
. . . capital and labor will pull us out . . . if we can be 
pulled o u t . "57 Later in the year, Pinchot offered a similar 
argument to labor leader John L. Lewis, in an open letter 
intended for publication on Labor Day, 1938, the New Yorker 
assured Lewis that capitalism was "the most productive form
55For House action on the bill, see New York Times, 
May 10, 1938, 1? and New York Times, May 13, 1938, 1, 6.
56Anios Pinchot to Franklin D. Roosevelt, May 17,
1938, Box 65, Pinchot MSS. See also ibid., May 18, 1938,
L0. The money bill subsequently passed in the Senate with 
the President's authority intact. For the text of the Act, 
see U. S., Statutes at Large. LII, 809-20. For an assess­
ment of the legislation, see James T. Patterson, Congres­
sional Conservatism and the New Deal: The Growth of the
conservative Coalition in Congress. 1933-1939 (Lexington: 
university of Kentucky Press, 1967), 233-42.
57Amos Pinchot to Charles r . Eckert, June 9, 1938, 
Box 64, Pinchot MSS.
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of economic organization" yet devised.66
Early in 1939, war clouds in Europe and Asia intensi­
fied Pinchot's hostility toward the New Dealers. On February 
27, the old reformer wrote:
The present administration is being guided by 
radicals who . . . don't believe in either capital­
ism or democracy, and who will never change their 
political point of view. Nor, I think, will Roose­
velt himself. . . . And he will try to keep in power 
by every means . . .  even if he has to throw the 
country into war. . . .59
A few weeks later, Pinchot made the same accusation in
public. In an open letter on April 18, he charged Roosevelt
with systematically plotting to involve the united States in
another world war.60
After fighting broke out in Europe in September,
1939, Pinchot anxiously looked forward to the Presidential 
sweepstakes for 1940. He hoped for the nomination of a 
Republican candidate who could drive Roosevelt out of the 
White House. His first choice was Frank Gannett, but the 
publisher lacked the necessary popular appeal.6'*’ Among the 
other G.O.P. hopefuls, Pinchot preferred business executive
66Amos Pinchot to John L . Lewis, Sept. 3, 1938, Box 
63, ibid. See also New York Times, Sept. 5, 1938, 2.
59Amos Pinchot to John O'Connor, Feb. 27, 1939, Box 
66, Pinchot MSS.
60Amos Pinchot to Franklin D. Roosevelt, April 18,
1939, Box 67, ibid.
61See Amos pinchot to Frank Gannett, Dec. 28, 1939,
Box 66, ibid.; and Amos pinchot to Randolph Walker, Jan. 26,
1940, ibid.
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Wendell L. Willkie to New York Governor Thomas E. Dewey.62 
Still, his immediate concern remained the selection of a 
Republican who could defeat Roosevelt. In June, 1940, he 
declared: ". . . 1  would back Judas Iscariot against our
peerless leader in the White H o u s e . "63
When the Presidential race narrowed to a battle 
between Roosevelt and Willkie, Pinchot eagerly embraced the 
latter candidate. In August, 1940, he urged Willkie to 
challenge the New Deal * s "deadly record of failure and 
inefficiency. . . ."64 Less than two weeks later, he advised 
the G.O.P. contender to offer "vigorous and uncompromising 
opposition to the President's war drive. . . ."66 tenor
of the Willkie campaign pleased Pinchot immensely. On 
October 15, he remarked to Senator Burton K. Wheeler of
^With reference to the New York Governor, Pinchot 
complained:
Today I tried in vain, as I sat watching Dewey from 
the side view, to call to mind someone who could 
better fit the description of a bright, smug, scrappy, 
smalltown squirt. . . .  And I wondered what had happened 
to American public life that a man of his ki.nd and 
calibre should be thought eligible for the presidency 
of the United States.
See Amos Pinchot to Geoffrey parsons, March 14, 1940, Box 
67, ibid. In sharp contrast to his description of Dewey, 
Pinchot called Willkie a man of "resonant personality . . .  
simplicity and sincerity. . . . "  See Amos Pinchot to John 
F. Sinclair, June 13, 1940, Box 68, ibid.
63Amos Pinchot to Lincoln Colcord, June 24, 1940, Box 
67, ibid.
64Amos pinchot to Wendell L. Willkie, Aug. 14, 1940,
ibid.
65Amos pinchot to Wendell L. Willkie, Sept. 4, 1940,
ibid.
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i4oj>Uiiia: "Willkic's speeches seem to mo the most powerful
and convincing political speeches I've hoard in my time."
He went on to predict a triumph for Willkie that would bo
"the most significant political victory since L i n c o l n ' s . " ^
The re-election of Roosevelt to an unprecedented
third term left Pinchot in a dour mood. He attributed the
Democratic victory to the work of machine politicians and
relief r e c i p i e n t s i n  a post-election letter to his son,
lie insisted that "a great majority of the informed free
minded people" had voted for Willkie.®8
With the election over, Pinchot concentrated his
attention on the problems of American foreign policy. He
adamantly opposed United States involvement in the war going
on in Europe. On December 13, he wrote:
I feel that we can be kept out of war. But it is 
going to be a hard fight. . . . The country is in an 
hysterical condition. . . . The idea has been spread, 
and accepted by many, that it is our business to go 
far afield righting the wrongs of the whole world, 
fighting other nations' battles . . . and doing all 
sorts of things which are as much beyond our strength 
as beyond our duty. . . .69
In a concurrent letter to Frank Gannett, Pinchot asserted:
®®Amos Pinchot to Burton K. Wheeler, Oct. 15, 1940,
ibid.
®^Amos pinchot to John Sloane, Nov. 7, 1940, ibid.; 
and Amos Pinchot to Douglas Johnson, Nov. 7, 1940, Box 60, 
ibid.
68Amos Pinchot to Gifford Pinchot, II, Nov. 11, 1940, 
Box 5, ibid.
6^Amos Pinchot to R. Douglas Stuart, Jr., Dec. 13, 
1940, Box 68, ibid.
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. . w e  must all use our best and most devoted efforts to
keep this country from getting into the European 
conflict."70
Pinchot's anti-war stand soon caused him to clash 
with President Roosevelt. On December 29, the Chief Execu­
tive proposed an ambitious program of Lend-Lease aid to
7 1nations engaged in fighting Nazi Germany.' Pinchot force­
fully opposed the President's plan. In January, 1941, he 
attacked Lend-Lease in a statement read to the Foreign 
Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives.7  ^ In ^  
open letter to Roosevelt on February 9, he termed the aid 
proposal ''hysterical madness."7^
After Congress approved Lend-Lease, Pinchot com­
plained bitterly about Roosevelt's political machinations.74 
On April 2, he wrote Lincoln Colcord: "It is extraordinary,
7®Amos Pinchot to Frank Gannett, Dec. 13, 1940, Box 
67, ibid.
7;LSee New York Times, Dec. 30, 1940, 1, 6.
7^pinchot became ill before he could address the 
Committee. John Burke of the American Defense Society read 
the New Yorker's statement into the record. For the text of 
the statement, see U. S., Lend-Lease Bills Hearings Before 
the committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 
Seventy Seventh Congress, First Session on H. R. 1776 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1941), 556-58.
7^Amos Pinchot to Franklin D. Roosevelt, Feb. 9, 1941, 
Box 69, Pinchot MSS. See also New York Times, Feb. 10,
1941, 10.
74Congress passed the Lend-Lease program in March, 
1941. For the text of the legislation, see U. S., Statutes 
at Large, LV, Part 1, 31-33.
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iL is incredible, that the people shouldn't have . . .  
sensed the duplicity, the broken pledges, and the foxy 
manoeuvring of the President. . . .1,75 In a later report to 
his son, Pinchot charged that Roosevelt and a coterie of 
"Marxian intellectuals" planned to impose a socialist 
dictatorship on ftnerica.7®
When the United States finally went to war in Decem­
ber, 1941, Pinchot prepared to defend his most cherished 
political and economic values. Paradoxically, he expected 
the decisive battles of the war years to take place on the 
homefront. He foresaw a clash of rival ideologies on the 
domestic scene that would determine the future of American 
politics. On December 29, Pinchot declared his intention 
to take an active part in the fight "to preserve private 
enterprise and rehabilitate the capitalist system in the 
eyes of the people."77 A few weeks later, he told Frank 
Gannett: "We should still be able to save the capitalist
system if we can explain what it means clearly enough and 
often enough to the country."7®
75Amos Pinchot to Lincoln Colcord, April 2, 1941,
Box 69, Pinchot MSS.
7®Amos Pinchot to Gifford Pinchot, II, Sept. 30, 1941, 
Box 5, ibid. For the same accusation in magazine article 
form, see Amos pinchot, "The Roosevelt-Laski Scheme," 
Scribner1s Commentator, X, No. 6 (Oct., 1941), 62-68.
77Amos Pinchot to H. Dudley Swim, Dec. 29, 1941, Box 
/0, Pinchot MSS.
7®Amos Pinchot to Frank Gannett, Jan. 29, 1942, Box 
72, ibid.
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Pinchot did not endure to waq< • the battles that he 
anticipated. In June, 1942, he complained of "severe 
insomnia and attendant exhaustion."79 Shortly thereafter, 
he tried to commit suicide. The attempt failed, but Pinchot
o n
never again took part in public life. He died on 
February 18, 1944.81
In the last years of his political career, Amos 
Pinchot fought with new enemies on behalf of old values. 
Initially, the New Yorker supported President Roosevelt and 
the New Deal, but he soon grew disenchanted. By 1935, he 
counted himself among the foes of the administration. As 
the 1930's wore on, Pinchot's anti-Roosevelt pronouncements 
became increasingly indiscriminate, in a long series of 
open letters, he warned the public that the President wanted 
dictatorial power. At the same time, Pinchot held tenac­
iously to the values that had long dominated his commitment 
to reform. He continued to believe in the efficacy of com­
petitive capitalism and the need for equal entrepreneurial 
opportunities. With dogged persistence, he advanced atom­
istic competition as a reform alternative to the New Deal. 
Through the last days of his public life, Pinchot embraced 
capitalism as a reform ideology.
79Amos Pinchot to E. S. Webster, June 24, 1942, ibid.
80On Pinchot's attempted suicide, see New Yor?c Times. 
Aug. 7, 1942, 1, 9.
®^Ibid., Feb. 19, 1944, 13.
Chapter 8
THE IDEOLOGUE AND POWER
Ostensibly, Amos Pinchot met all the prerequisites 
for membership in the American ruling class. His family 
background, education, and political connections afforded 
him easy access to public life. Once involved in politics, 
he became fascinated with the struggle for power. Yet 
Pinchot never occupied a position of significant political 
influence. At an early date, he assumed an ideological 
stance that barred him from effective participation in the 
governmental elite.
Pinchot formulated his political values during the 
years before World War I. As a Yale undergraduate in th> 
1890's, he came to appreciate the arguments of William 
Graham Sumner on behalf of capitalism and Social Darwinism. 
His subsequent experiences with the Ballinger-Pinchot 
controversy and the Progressive party awakened his interest 
in reform politics. in 1913, Pinchot found the capstone for 
his political education. The anti-monopoly credo of George 
Record allowed the New Yorker to reconcile his sympathy for 
Sumnerian principles with his commitment to reform. From 
Record, Pinchot learned to see atomistic competitive
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capitalism as a reform ideology.
Pinchot's acceptance of the anti-monopoly creed 
brought important changes in the tenor of his political 
career. He soon emerged as a doctrinaire proponent of 
Record's reform ideas. At the same time, he found it 
increasingly difficult to work with the men who had formerly 
commanded his political allegiance. In governmental affairs, 
he gradually drifted away from his brother Gifford. During 
the 1916 Presidential campaign, he broke publicly with 
Theodore Roosevelt. In 1916, Pinchot supported President 
Woodrow Wilson, but he did not owe his first loyalty to the 
Chief Executive. Instead, he looked to George Record for 
political leadership and ideological instruction.
With American entry into World War I, Pinchot tempo­
rarily reordered his reform priorities. He put aside the 
anti-monopoly creed and pursued goals directly related to the 
war effort. Still very much a reformer, he wanted the 
United States to champion the cause of democracy throughout 
the world, concommitantly, he insisted that democratic 
institutions had to be protected on the homefront. The 
policies actually implemented by the Wilson administration 
left Pinchot frustrated and embittered. He watched in 
dismay while government authorities suppressed domestic 
criticism of the war. When the postwar negotiations at 
Versailles failed to produce a flowering of democracy, he 
turned against President Wilson. Still, the New Yorker 
remained in the camp of reform. He emerged from the war
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yeara convinced of the need for change in the established 
order.
For Pinchot, the return to peacetime politics meant 
revival of the anti-monopoly creed. Along with Record, he 
labored to impose the narrow reform program on the Committee 
of Forty Eight. The two zealots were largely successful, 
but their efforts helped sabotage plans for a broad third 
party coalition. Unrepentant, Pinchot and Record held 
tenaciously to their politico-economic ideas. As political 
organizers and activists, they continued to advance the 
anti-monopoly credo. Working in tandem, they kept their 
vision of reform alive throughout the postwar decade.
After the onset of the Great Depression, Pinchot used 
his reform ideas as a standard of measure for the New Deal. 
Except for a brief period of infatuation, he consistently 
opposed the Roosevelt administration. He deplored the 
centralization of power and the air of economic experimenta­
tion that characterized the Roosevelt regime. His own remedy 
for the economic crisis centered on the anti-monopoly creed 
and its promise of rejuvenated free enterprise. Pinchot*s 
bitter attacks on the New Dealers clearly revealed the sharp 
contrast between his views on reform and their commitments 
to change.
For more than thirty years, Pinchot stayed on the 
periphery of American politics. His family name, native 
abilities, and wide range of activities assured him a place 
near the center of power. Still, he never exerted
significant influence. Instead, he devoted his best 
energies to the advocacy of an increasingly anachronistic 
ideology. While the American ruling class accepted mass 
production industries and the beginnings of the welfare 
state, Pinchot argued for economic competition and indi­
vidualism. Over the years, his atavistic preachments grew 
more and more remote from the realities of American political 
and economic life. Throughout most of his career as a re­
former, Pinchot remained a quixotic figure, an ardent 
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